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i 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how 
is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues 
concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical 
implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the 
philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a 
fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This 
position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I 
demonstrate in this thesis that the ability hypothesis can be restated using the 
intellectualist view of knowledge-how. With regards to the status of 
intellectualism, I argue that the two main traditional arguments against 
intellectualism do not succeed. I also provide new and, I claim, successful 
arguments against intellectualism. These arguments point to a new view of 
knowledge-how that is distinct from both the standard intellectualist and Rylean 
views of knowledge-how. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
The subject of this dissertation is intellectualism. Intellectualism is a controversial 
view about the nature of the knowledge one has when one knows how to do 
something—what is commonly referred to as knowledge-how. Examples of 
knowledge-how then include knowing how to swim, knowing how to add 2 and 
4, knowing how to cook tuna pie, and so on. The standard description of 
intellectualism is that it is the view that knowledge-how is a kind, or sort, or 
species, of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that, of course, is the knowledge one has 
when one knows that something is the case, for example, when one knows that 2 
+ 4 is 6, or one knows that tuna pie is delicious.  
Knowledge-that is also called ‘propositional knowledge’ because it is thought that 
to know that Athens is the capital of Greece, say, is to stand in a certain relation 
to the proposition that Athens is the capital of Greece. In Chapter 1 I will offer a 
more precise characterization of intellectualism, but for now it will suffice to say 
that intellectualism is the view that knowing how to do something is also a matter 
of standing in this same relation—I will call it simply the knowledge-that relation—to 
some proposition. That is, intellectualism tells us that knowing how to swim, like 
knowing that Athens is the capital of Greece, is a matter of knowing that p, for 
some proposition p.  
Gilbert Ryle (1946, 1949) famously argued that intellectualism was an untenable 
position, and he also advanced his own positive view, according to which 
knowledge-how is a kind of dispositional capacity or ability. Ryle’s two-fold view 
of knowledge-how has always had its dissenters, but nonetheless it has effectively 
been the orthodox view of knowledge-how in analytic philosophy; that is, the 
orthodox position has been that intellectualism is false, and that the correct 
account of knowledge-how is something like Ryle’s account, whereby to know 
how to do something is to possess a certain ability or disposition. Furthermore, 
Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that became a familiar 
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tool in the kit of the contemporary philosopher, with this distinction playing an 
important role in debates in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, 
and other areas. 
Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in intellectualism. In 
particular, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s (2001) paper “Knowing How” 
has played a highly influential role in reviving the intellectualist view of 
knowledge-how. Stanley and Williamson presented an intellectualist account of 
knowledge-how and provided linguistic arguments in support of it. Furthermore, 
they, and others such as Paul Snowdon (2004), have argued that Ryle did not 
present a successful regress argument against intellectualism, and that his own 
account of knowledge-how is subject to clear counterexamples. Intellectualist 
accounts of knowledge-how have also been advanced by John Bengson and Marc 
Moffett (2007) (see also Bengson et al. forthcoming), and Berit Brogaard 
(forthcoming a, forthcoming b). 
Four Questions 
The recent enthusiasm for intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how raises a 
number of interesting philosophical issues. In particular, I take the following to be 
four key research questions concerning intellectualism: 
(1) Is the knowledge-that that intellectualists appeal to sufficient for 
knowledge-how? 
(2) Is the knowledge-that that intellectualists appeal to necessary for 
knowledge-how? 
(3) Is there some successful regress argument against intellectualism? 
(4) What are the philosophical implications of intellectualism? 
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Question 1 is related to what is perhaps the most obvious form of objection one 
might raise to intellectualism, namely, that merely knowing that some proposition 
is true does not appear to be a sufficient condition for knowing how to do 
something. Consider, for example, the action of riding a bicycle. Is there really 
some proposition p such that merely knowing that p is sufficient for knowing 
how to ride a bicycle? Many critics of intellectualism, including Ryle himself, have 
argued that there is not, on the grounds that no matter what this proposition p is 
one could know that p and yet still fail to know how to ride a bicycle.  
Now it is not true that there is no proposition p such that knowing that p is a 
sufficient condition for knowing how to ride a bicycle. For example, if p is the 
proposition that one knows how to ride a bicycle then obviously knowing that p 
entails that one knows how to ride a bicycle. Still, knowing how to ride a bicycle is 
surely not a matter of knowing that one knows how to ride a bicycle. What this 
kind of insufficiency objection really amounts to then is something like the 
following claim: for any prima facie plausible account of knowledge-how whereby 
knowing how to F is a matter of knowing that p (for some proposition p), one 
will be able to describe a possible scenario where someone knows that p but fails 
to know how to F. In other words, the real issue is whether the kind of 
knowledge-that that intellectualists appeal to is sufficient for knowledge-how. 
Question 2 concerns the issue of whether knowing that some proposition is true 
could really be a necessary condition for knowing how to do something. Any 
intellectualist account of knowledge-how will be committed to some claim of the 
form: one knows how to F only if one knows that p, for some proposition p. But 
one might suspect that no matter what this proposition p is, it will be possible for 
one to know how to F even when one fails to know that p. Or, again, one might 
at least suspect that for any prima facie plausible intellectualist account of 
knowledge-how, whereby knowing how to F is a matter of knowing that p (for 
some proposition p), one will be able to describe a possible scenario where 
someone knows how to F but fails to know that p.  
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Question 3 concerns the most prominent, but also elusive, objection that has 
been made against intellectualism, namely, Gilbert Ryle’s famous objection that 
intellectualism must be false because the assumption that it is true leads to an 
infinite and vicious regress. As mentioned earlier, intellectualists have argued that 
Ryle’s regress argument fails, but many critics of intellectualism have replied that 
intellectualists have either misinterpreted Ryle’s argument or that there is some 
other related regress argument which does succeed. The issue then of whether or 
not there is a successful regress argument against intellectualism is still rather 
obscure and in need of further examination.  
Unlike the previous questions, Question 4 concerns not the status but rather the 
consequences of intellectualism. There has been a lot written on the issue of 
whether or not intellectualism is true, but very little on what follows if it is true. 
But the truth of intellectualism has potential implications for any area of 
philosophy where the knowledge-how versus knowledge-that distinction has 
played an important role. Indeed, Stanley and Williamson (2001: 441–4) have 
claimed that the truth of their intellectualist account of knowledge-how 
undermines certain philosophical positions that rely on Ryle’s distinction between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that. However, while Stanley and Williamson’s 
account of knowledge-how has received a great deal of critical attention, these 
claims about the implications of their account have not been subjected to the 
same kind of scrutiny. 
Overview 
The purpose of this dissertation is to address the four questions outlined above. 
In particular, my main concern is to develop three independent but closely related 
essays in Chapters 2–4, which respectively address the question of what the 
philosophical implications of intellectualism are, the question of whether 
knowledge-that is necessary for knowledge-how, and the question of whether 
there is some successful regress argument against intellectualism.  
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In Chapter 2, ‘The Ability Hypothesis and Intellectualism’, I address the question 
of what the philosophical implications of intellectualism are. In particular, I 
examine a supposed implication of intellectualism for what is probably the most 
well-known application of the knowledge-how versus knowledge-that distinction 
in philosophy. The ability hypothesis, endorsed by David Lewis (1998) and 
Laurence Nemirow (1980, 1990) amongst others, is an important form of reply to 
Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) famous knowledge argument against physicalism. 
And this reply crucially relies on a distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that. Not surprisingly then, Stanley and Williamson argue that the 
truth of their intellectualist account of knowledge-how is inconsistent with the 
ability hypothesis reply to Jackson’s argument. However, I shall argue that we can 
restate the core claims made by the ability hypothesis using Stanley and 
Williamson’s account of knowledge-how. 
In Chapter 3, ‘Knowing How Without Knowing That’, I address the question of 
whether the kind of knowledge-that appealed to by intellectualists is necessary for 
knowledge-how. I argue that, given certain very standard assumptions abut the 
nature of knowledge-that, intellectualism is subject to three different kinds of 
counterexample. Each putative counterexample is a scenario where someone 
knows how to F but they fail to stand in the knowledge-that relation to any 
proposition p, such that their knowing how to F might plausibly be a matter of 
their knowing that p. The counterexamples differ with respect to the reason why 
the subject fails to possess the relevant knowledge-that.  
After presenting and defending these arguments, I then go on to suggest that 
these new arguments against intellectualism point to a new view of knowledge-
how. This alternative view of knowledge-how is distinct from both intellectualism 
and Ryleanism, although it shares important features with both of these views.  
In Chapter 4, ‘Regarding a Regress’, I address the elusive question of whether 
there is a successful regress argument against intellectualism. I begin by returning 
to Gilbert Ryle’s regress argument against what he called the intellectualist legend, as 
this argument is the source of the idea that there is a successful regress argument 
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against intellectualism. Ryle’s regress argument is demonstrably not such an 
argument. However, one might think that Ryle’s argument points to some related 
and successful regress argument against intellectualism. I go on to consider two 
regress arguments against intellectualism that are related to Ryle’s argument: what 
I call the contemplation regress argument and the employment regress argument. I argue that 
neither of these arguments succeeds. Furthermore, I show that the regress 
arguments against intellectualism presented by Stephen Hetherington (2006) and 
Alva Noë (2005) are also undermined by the same kind of problems faced by the 
contemplation and employment regress arguments.  
Before proceeding to the discussion in Chapters 2–4, however, it will be useful to 
take a closer look at intellectualism. In Chapter 1, ‘Intellectualism and the 
Insufficiency Objection’, my aim is to set the scene for the discussion to follow by 
considering the intellectualist view of knowledge-how in more detail and to also 
address the first of our four questions; that is, the question of whether the kind of 
knowledge-that that intellectualists appeal to is sufficient for knowledge-how. 
These two tasks are closely intertwined because, as we will see, the major 
differences between the various existing intellectualist accounts of knowledge-
how are related to the different ways that intellectualists have attempted to 
respond to the insufficiency objection to intellectualism. I shall argue that once 
we distinguish between two broad kinds of intellectualism it is clear that the 
insufficiency objection could not form the basis of any successful argument 
against intellectualism in general. 
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Chapter 1 Intellectualism and the Insufficiency 
Objection 
 
In the introduction I set out four questions concerning intellectualism. My aim in 
this chapter is to address the question of whether the insufficiency objection 
shows us that intellectualism is false. To address this question, however, we need 
to first take a closer look at the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. In §1 I 
begin by making a clarification about the proper target of intellectualist accounts 
of knowledge-how. In §2 I identify one important kind of intellectualism, what I 
call simple intellectualism. In §3 I discuss the relationship between simple 
intellectualism and Rylean accounts of knowledge-how. In §4 I describe how 
simple intellectualism clearly faces an insufficiency objection. The standard 
response to this objection is to reject simple intellectualism in favour of some 
version of what I call sophisticated intellectualism. In §5 I characterize this response to 
the insufficiency objection and show how the intellectualist accounts of 
knowledge-how given by Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Bengson and 
Moffett (2007) are both versions of sophisticated intellectualism. In §6 I discuss 
an interesting attempt to defend a version of simple intellectualism by Berit 
Brogaard (forthcoming a, forthcoming b). In §7 I argue that the insufficiency 
objection strongly suggests that there is no plausible version of simple 
intellectualism, but that it does not show us that there is no plausible version of 
sophisticated intellectualism.  
1.1 The Proper Target of Intellectualism 
The standard description of intellectualism is that knowledge-how is a kind, or 
sort, or species, of knowledge-that. It is worth noting a sense in which this 
description, whilst standard, is somewhat misleading. The reason is that the term 
‘knowledge-how’ is quite naturally interpreted in a broad way, whereby it refers to 
the knowledge attributed by any sentence of the form ‘S knows how … ’ and not 
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merely to the knowledge attributed by sentences of the form ‘S knows how to …’. 
On this broad interpretation then, both (1) and (2) attribute knowledge-how to 
Ari: 
(1) Ari knows how to swim. 
(2) Ari knows how Ian Thorpe swims. 
But the debates about whether ‘knowledge-how’ is a kind of knowledge-that have 
focused almost exclusively on the issue of whether the knowledge attributed by 
sentences like (1) is a kind of knowledge-that, and not the issue of whether the 
knowledge attributed by sentences like (2) is a kind of knowledge-that. 
Accordingly, when proponents of intellectualism state their accounts of 
‘knowledge-how’ they provide analyses of the form ‘S knows how to F if and only 
if … ’. And, insofar as they consider the matter, even some ardent opponents of 
intellectualism are happy to grant that the knowledge attributed by sentences like 
(2) is a kind of knowledge-that (for example, see Noë 2005: 284). It would be 
more accurate then to talk of knowledge-how-to, rather than knowledge-how, 
when discussing intellectualism. But given the entrenched use of the term 
‘knowledge-how’ in the literature on intellectualism, I will continue to use this 
term in this dissertation. As I use this term, however, it should be understood in a 
narrow way, whereby it refers only to the kind of knowledge one has when one 
knows how to do something. 
1.2 Simple Intellectualism 
The proper target of intellectualism is knowledge-how, in the sense of knowing 
how to do something. With this clarification in place we can now take a closer 
look at the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. In the introduction, I 
characterized intellectualism as the view that knowing how to do something is a 
matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition. But what 
proposition? Intellectualists hold that knowing how to perform some action F is a 
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matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition, the 
content of which concerns a way to F, where the relevant sense of the word ‘way’ 
is the sense whereby it denotes something like a method, technique or procedure 
for performing an action. The standard idea is that S’s knowing how to F is a 
matter of there being some way w such that S stands in the knowledge-that 
relation to the proposition that w is a way to F, or the proposition that w is a way 
for S to F, or some variant thereof. 
What we can call simple intellectualism is the view that knowing how to perform 
some action is solely a matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some 
such proposition. The simple intellectualist then, is someone who is committed to 
the truth of some instance of the following equivalence claim: 
The Simple Equivalence Thesis       
 Necessarily, S knows how to F if and only if there is some relevant 
proposition p concerning a way to F such that S stands in the knowledge-
that relation to p. 
Now, someone who endorses some instance of this equivalence claim could also 
go further and endorse the corresponding instance of the following claim: 
The Simple Identity Thesis       
 To know how to F is to know that p (for some relevant proposition p 
concerning a way to F).  
But I think the best way of characterizing simple intellectualism is to use an 
equivalence claim. For one thing, when intellectualists give the official statement 
of their view they typically offer some analysis of the form ‘S knows how to F if 
and only if … ’. And, for reasons that I will discuss in Chapter 4, someone might 
conceivably endorse such an equivalence claim whilst arguing that this need not 
entail the corresponding identity claim (for an example of this stance see Bengson 
et al. forthcoming: fn. 3). It is important to make note of the simple identity 
thesis, however, as intellectualists often do take the further step of endorsing 
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some identity claim. And in Chapter 4 we will see that regress arguments against 
intellectualism are normally formulated as arguments against some instance of the 
simple identity thesis. 
1.3 Simple Intellectualism and Ryleanism 
When Gilbert Ryle argued that intellectualism was an untenable view of 
knowledge-how, what he had in mind was what I have called ‘simple 
intellectualism’. Ryle not only rejected simple intellectualism but he also offered 
an alternative account of knowledge-how. But what is the Rylean view of 
knowledge-how and what is its relationship to simple intellectualism?  
Gilbert Ryle is often interpreted as claiming that to know how to F is to possess 
the ability to F, which in turn is to possess a certain complex of abilities. For 
example, Stanley and Williamson (2001: 411) write that: “According to Gilbert 
Ryle … knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions”. 
They go on to show that they interpret Ryle as claiming that to know how to F is 
to possess the corresponding ability to F. In other words, Ryle is interpreted as being 
committed to the following three identity claims: 
(ID.1) To know how to F is to possess the ability to F. 
(ID.2) To possess the ability to F is to possess a certain complex of 
dispositions. 
(ID.3) To know how to F is to possess a certain complex of dispositions. 
To parallel this presentation of simple intellectualism, however, it will be useful to 
focus on the equivalence claims entailed by these identity claims: 
(EQ.1) S knows how to F if and only if S possesses the ability to F. 
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(EQ.2) S possesses the ability to F if and only if S possesses a certain 
complex of dispositions. 
(EQ.3) S knows how to F if and only if S possesses a certain complex of 
dispositions. 
Intellectualists frequently argue against Ryle’s account of knowledge-how by 
providing counterexamples to EQ.1. For example, Stanley and Williamson 
present the following cases as counterexamples to Ryle’s account of knowledge-
how: 
[a] ski instructor may know how to perform a certain complex stunt, without being able 
to perform it herself. Similarly, a master pianist who loses both of her arms in a tragic 
car accident still knows how to play the piano (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 416). 
Such cases1 appear to be counterexamples to EQ.1 because they are cases where, 
intuitively, someone knows how to F even though they do not possess the ability 
to F. In which case, contra EQ.1, possessing the ability to F is not a necessary 
condition for knowing how to F. Snowdon (2004) and Bengson and Moffett 
(2007) also provide examples that are meant to be cases where intuitively 
someone has the ability to F but does not know how to F. Snowdon, for example, 
presents the following scenario as an example of such a case:  
A man is in a room, which, because he has not explored it in the least, he does, as yet, 
not know how to get out of. In fact, there is an obvious exit which he can easily open. 
He is perfectly able to get out, he can get out, but does not know how to (as yet) 
(Snowdon 2004: 11). 
And Bengson and Moffett present the following scenario: 
                                            
1 Stanley and Williamson credit the ski instructor to Jeff King. Others have appealed to similar 
cases to support the claim that one can know how to F without possessing the ability to F, 
including: Noam Chomsky (1998), Carl Ginet (1975: 8) and Paul Snowdon (2004).  
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Suppose that Irina is seriously mistaken about how to perform a salchow. She believes 
incorrectly that the way to perform a salchow is to take off from the front outside of her 
skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the front inside edge of her skate. (The correct 
sequence is to take off from the back inside edge and land on the back outside edge of the 
opposite foot after one or more rotations in the air.) However, Irina has a severe 
neurological abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from how 
she actually thinks she is acting. Whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in 
accordance with her misconceptions) this abnormality causes her to reliably perform the 
correct sequence of moves. So, although she is seriously mistaken about how to perform 
a salchow, whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in accordance with her 
misconceptions) the abnormality causes Irina to perform the correct sequence of moves, 
and so she ends up successfully performing a salchow. Despite the fact that what she is 
doing and what she thinks she is doing come apart, she fails to notice the mismatch. In 
this case, it is clear that Irina is (reliably) able to do a salchow. However, due to her 
mistaken belief about how to perform the move, she cannot be said to know how to do 
a salchow (Bengson and Moffett 2007: 46). 
Both of these examples are meant to demonstrate that, contra EQ.1, having the 
ability to F is not a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. Intellectualists 
have argued then that Ryle’s claim that S knows how to F if, and only if, S 
possesses the ability to F is doubly wrong, for one can know how to F but fail to 
possess the corresponding ability to F, and one can possess the ability to F but fail 
to know how to F. 
However, while Ryle was clearly committed to EQ.3—that is, the claim that S 
knows how to F if and only if S possesses a certain complex of dispositions—it is 
actually not entirely clear that Ryle equated knowing how to F with simply 
possessing the corresponding ability to F. In which case, it is not clear that the 
counterexamples given to EQ.1 are actually counterexamples to Ryle’s account of 
knowledge-how. We will have reason to return to this issue in Chapter 3. For 
now, I will simply borrow a term from Bengson and Moffett (2007) and call any 
view that identifies or equates knowing how to F with possessing the ability to F 
neo-Ryleanism, as a way of acknowledging that while this view is closely associated 
with Ryle it may turn out that Ryle himself was not committed to it. 
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Now, while it is not entirely clear that neo-Ryleanism formed an essential part of 
Ryle’s view of knowledge-how, it is the most prominent alternative to 
intellectualism. This may explain why intellectualists often appear to regard their 
counterexamples to neo-Ryleanism as offering strong support to their own view 
of knowledge-how. For example, as Bengson et al. (forthcoming: 14) write of the 
counterexamples they offer: “Understood as counterexamples to neo-Ryleanism, 
these vignettes serve to lend substantial plausibility to radical intellectualism” (emphasis 
added).2  
However, the conclusion that neo-Ryleanism is false only really provides very 
indirect support for intellectualism. To see why, compare neo-Ryleanism with 
simple intellectualism. Neo-Ryleanism tells us that S knows how to F if and only 
if one possesses the ability to F, whereas simple intellectualism tells us that one 
knows how to F if and only if, for some relevant proposition p concerning a way 
to F, one knows that p.  
Now, these two equivalence claims are at best contraries, for while one might 
reasonably argue that they cannot both be true it clearly could be the case that 
they are both false. And the same point clearly applies to the equivalence claim 
entailed by EQ.3, that is, the claim that one knows how to F if and only if one 
possesses a certain complex of dispositions.3  
The point that intellectualism and Ryleanism are, at best, contraries is obvious but 
important to mention because in the literature intellectualism and Ryleanism are 
often the only alternative accounts of knowledge-how that are discussed. This 
indicates, I suspect, that many participants in the debates about the nature of 
                                            
2 Bengson and Moffett (forthcoming: 1) use the term ‘radical intellectualism’ for the view that “S 
knows how to ψ if, and only if, S possesses a certain sort of propositional knowledge concerning 
ψ”.  
3 Actually, in the case of simple intellectualism and EQ.3 it is not even clear that they are 
contraries. Supposing one accepted some dispositional account of knowledge-that, one would 
then have to allow that simple intellectualism and EQ.3 could even turn out to be equivalent.  
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knowledge-how assume that intellectualism and Ryleanism are the only serious 
alternative views of knowledge-how worth considering. I shall argue in Chapter 3, 
however, that this assumption is mistaken.  
1.4 The Insufficiency Objection to Simple Intellectualism 
One of the most prominent objections to simple intellectualism is that merely 
standing in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition concerning a way to 
F does not appear to be a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. To illustrate 
this objection, consider a version of simple intellectualism whereby S knows how 
to F if and only if there is some way w such that S knows that w is a way to F. 
Imagine now that you are watching the Tour de France on TV with Hannah, who 
has never learnt to ride a bicycle. Pointing to one of the cyclists you gently rib her 
by remarking: “That’s a way for you to ride a bicycle”. Consequently, Hannah 
comes to know that that way is a way to ride a bicycle. So, there is a way w such 
that Hannah knows that w is a way to ride a bicycle. But clearly Hannah still does 
not know how to ride a bicycle.  
The general point is that it appears quite easy for someone to gain the kind of 
knowledge-that that simple intellectualists equate knowledge-how with, whilst 
failing to know how to F. But then simple intellectualism looks to be clearly false, 
as simple intellectualism tells us that standing in the knowledge-that relation to 
some such proposition is a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. 
1.5 Sophisticated Intellectualism 
How might an intellectualist respond to the insufficiency objection? They could 
try to offer some defence of simple intellectualism, and in the next section I will 
consider an attempt to provide such a defence by Berit Brogaard. But the 
standard response to the insufficiency objection is to actually grant that merely 
standing in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition concerning a way to 
F is not a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. What we can call sophisticated 
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intellectualism then is the view that knowing how to do something is only partly a 
matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some relevant proposition 
concerning a way to perform that action. The sophisticated intellectualist agrees 
with the simple intellectualist that standing in the knowledge-that relation to some 
relevant proposition concerning a way to F is a necessary condition for knowing 
how to F. However, unlike the simple intellectualist, they hold that satisfying such 
a condition does not suffice for knowing how to F. Rather, they hold that 
knowing how to F is a matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to the 
right kind of proposition and also satisfying some further condition. The 
sophisticated intellectualist then is someone who is committed to the truth of 
some instance of the following equivalence claim: 
The Sophisticated Equivalence Thesis     
 S knows how to F if and only if, for some relevant proposition p 
concerning a way to F:        
 (i) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to p, and   
 (ii) S satisfies X (for some further condition X). 
And, as with simple intellectualism, the sophisticated intellectualist may not only 
endorse an instance of the sophisticated equivalence claim, but they may also go a 
step further and endorse the corresponding instance of the following claim.  
The Sophisticated Identity Thesis      
 To know how to F is to:       
 (i) To know that p (for some relevant proposition p concerning a way to 
F)          
 (ii) To satisfy X (for some further condition X). 
Although, as with the simple equivalence thesis, a sophisticated intellectualist may 
choose only to endorse an instance of the sophisticated equivalence thesis, and 
not the corresponding instance of the sophisticated identity thesis.  
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Now to see how this kind of response to the insufficiency objection works in 
practice I will consider two different versions of sophisticated intellectualism, 
namely, the accounts of knowledge-how offered by Stanley and Williamson 
(2001) and by Bengson and Moffett (2007) respectively.  
Stanley and Williamson’s version of sophisticated intellectualism 
Stanley and Williamson’s (2001: 441) account of knowledge-how as “simply a 
species of propositional knowledge” is by far the most prominent intellectualist 
account of knowledge-how. Their account of knowledge-how will be a major 
focus of the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3. For these reasons, it will be useful to 
look at their account of knowledge-how in some detail. 
Stanley and Williamson state their account as an analysis of the truth conditions 
of knowledge-how ascriptions. On the basis of linguistic arguments that I will 
consider in Chapter 2, Stanley and Williamson offer an initial account of the truth 
conditions of ‘S knows how to F’ ascriptions, whereby they conform to the 
following schema: 
‘S knows how to F’ is true relative to a context c if and only if there is 
some contextually relevant way w for S to F such that S stands in the 
knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a way for S to F. 
However, as Stanley and Williamson recognise, this account is subject to the 
insufficiency objection. For example, in the Tour De France scenario Hannah will 
not only know that that way (i.e. the way the cyclists are riding) is a way to ride a 
bicycle, but she will also know that that way is a way for her to ride a bicycle. For 
recall that you tell Hannah: “That’s a way for you to ride a bicycle.” In other 
words, it is a context in which intuitively (1) is false even though (2) is true:  
(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
(2) Hannah knows that that way is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
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Stanley and Williamson explicitly acknowledge the possibility of such a scenario. 
Their response to this insufficiency objection utilizes the idea “that one and the 
same way can be entertained under different modes of presentation” (ibid. 428). 
To explicate this idea Stanley and Williamson appeal to sentences like the 
following: 
(3) John knows that he himself has burning pants. 
(4) John knows that that man has burning pants.  
There can be contexts in which it appears that (3) is false and (4) is true (at the 
same time) even though (3) and (4) arguably attribute to John knowledge of the 
very same singular proposition (when ‘that man’ refers to John). For example, we 
can imagine that John does not realize that that man he sees with burning pants is 
actually himself reflected in a mirror.  
One solution to the problem presented by (3) and (4) is to say that these 
sentences attribute knowledge of the same proposition but under different modes 
of presentation: a first-personal and a demonstrative mode of presentation, 
respectively. This is meant to dissolve any tension between (3) being false and (4) 
true, since knowing a proposition under one mode of presentation does not entail 
one’s knowing it under any other mode of presentation.  
According to Stanley and Williamson, analogous points apply to the problem 
presented by (1) and (2). On their preferred development of this strategy “verbs 
such as ‘believes’ and ‘knows’ express three-place relations between persons, 
Russellian propositions, and ways of thinking of Russellian propositions” (ibid. 
427). Stanley and Williamson apply this framework so that (1) attributes 
knowledge to Hannah of at least one proposition that contains a “way of riding a 
bicycle” (ibid. 427). Furthermore, they claim that in order for an assertion of (2) to 
be true or appropriate there has to be some way w such that Hannah stands in the 
knowledge-that relation to the Russellian proposition that w is a way for Hannah 
to ride a bicycle under a particular type of mode of presentation—what they call a 
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practical mode of presentation. The idea here is that Hannah entertains this proposition 
under a practical mode of presentation by entertaining the way w, which is a 
constituent of this proposition,4 under a practical mode of presentation.  
The qualification ‘true or appropriate’ reflects the fact that Stanley and Williamson 
wish to remain neutral on the issue of whether this requirement—that one 
entertain the relevant proposition under a practical mode of presentation—should 
be viewed as relevant to the semantics of knowledge-how ascriptions, or as only 
relevant to the pragmatics of using such ascriptions.  
Stanley and Williamson’s explanation then of why it appears that (1) is false even 
though (2) is true, would be that in the Tour de France scenario there is no way w 
such that Hannah stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w 
is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle under a practical mode of presentation. In which 
case, on their view, it follows that either (1) is false or (1) is true. But an assertion 
of (1) is inappropriate, as it pragmatically conveys a falsehood, namely, that there 
is some way w such that Hannah stands in the knowledge-that relation to the 
proposition that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle under a practical mode of 
presentation.  
As Stanley and Williamson point out then, their final account of knowledge-how 
ascriptions can be described either of two ways depending on whether or not 
practical modes of presentation are semantically relevant: 
So, here is our complete account of knowing-how. Suppose modes of presentation are 
semantically relevant. Then [1] is true relative a context c if and only if there is some 
contextually relevant way w such that Hannah stands in the knowledge-that relation to 
the Rusellian proposition that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle, and Hannah 
entertains this proposition under a practical mode of presentation. If modes of 
presentation are not semantically relevant then the truth of [1] does not require that 
                                            
4 Stanley and Williamson take ways to be properties of token events, for example, the way w of 
riding a bicycle such that Hannah knows that that way is a way to ride a bicycle, is understood to 
be a property of a token event of riding a bicycle. 
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Hannah entertain the proposition in question under a practical mode presentation, 
though a use of [1] pragmatically conveys that she does (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 
430). 
Now, this passage suggests that if practical modes of presentation are semantically 
relevant then it is Stanley and Williamson’s view that the truth conditions of 
knowledge-how ascriptions conform to the following schema: 
‘S knows how to F’ is true relative to a context c if and only if there is 
some contextually relevant way w for S to F such that:   
 (a) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a 
way for S to F, and         
 (b) S entertains the proposition that w is a way for S to F under a practical 
mode of presentation. 
But this analysis cannot be quite the right representation of Stanley and 
Williamson’s view, the previous quote notwithstanding. To see why, consider 
John again, who knows that that man has burning pants but who does not know 
that he himself has burning pants. John could conceivably entertain the thought 
that he himself has burning pants without thereby coming to know that he 
himself has burning pants. For example, John might consider, but not accept, the 
supposition that that man is himself. This would produce a scenario where all of 
the following conditions hold: (i) John stands in the knowledge-that relation to 
the Russellian proposition containing John and the property of burning pants 
under a demonstrative mode of presentation; and (ii) John also entertains this 
proposition under a first-personal mode of presentation; but (iii) John does not 
stand in the knowledge-that relation to this proposition under a first-personal 
mode of presentation.  
Analogously, one would expect that there should be some possible scenario 
where all of the following conditions hold: (iv) there is some contextually relevant 
way w such that Hannah stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition 
that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle under a non-practical mode of 
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presentation; and, (v) Hannah also entertains this proposition under a practical 
mode of presentation; but, (vi) there is no contextually relevant way w such that 
Hannah stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a way 
for Hannah to ride a bicycle under a practical mode of presentation.  
According to the analysis of the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascriptions 
offered above, in such a scenario Hannah knows how to F, for given (iv) and (v) it 
follows that Hannah satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of this analysis. But I assume 
that Stanley and Williamson would not want to say that Hannah knows how to F 
in such a scenario, and they should allow that such a scenario is possible, given 
the analogy they draw between first-personal and practical modes of presentation. 
The moral here is that even though they occasionally appear to endorse it, we 
should not interpret Stanley and Williamson as making the conjunctive claim that 
Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle just in case there is some way w such that 
Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle and she entertains w under 
a practical mode of presentation. Rather, their view is that Hannah knows how to 
ride a bicycle just in case there is some way w such that Hannah knows that w is a 
way for her to ride a bicycle under a practical mode of presentation. It is true that 
if one knows that p under a practical mode of presentation, this entails that one 
knows that p and that one entertains p under a practical mode of presentation, but 
the reverse is not the case.  
For such reasons, I take it that a more accurate representation of Stanley and 
Williamson’s final account of knowledge-how (again assuming that practical 
modes of presentation are semantically relevant) is that the truth conditions of 
knowledge-how ascriptions conform to the following schema: 
 ‘S knows how to F’ is true relative to a context c if, and only if, there is 
some contextually relevant way w for S to F such that:   
 (c) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a 
way for S to F, and        
 (d) In standing in this relation S entertains the proposition that w is a way 
for S to F under a practical mode of presentation. 
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Unlike the previous analysis, this analysis does require that for S to know how to 
F it must be the case that S knows, under a practical mode of presentation, that w 
is a way for S to F,5 as opposed to merely requiring that S know that w is a way for 
S to F and that S entertain the proposition under a practical mode of presentation.  
What is involved in entertaining a way w under a practical mode of presentation? 
Stanley and Williamson admit that giving a non-trivial characterisation of a 
practical mode of presentation is a substantive philosophical task, one they 
themselves do not claim to have offered.6 However, they do suggest that 
entertaining a way under a practical mode of presentation will entail the 
possession of certain dispositions: 
Thinking of a person as oneself entails being disposed to behave in certain ways, or 
form certain beliefs, given relevant input from that person … Analogously, thinking of a 
way under a practical mode of presentation undoubtedly entails the possession of certain 
complex dispositions. It is for this reason that there are intricate connections between 
knowing-how and dispositional states (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 429–30). 
Presumably, the idea here is that if there is some way w such that Hannah knows, 
under a practical mode of presentation, that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle, 
                                            
5 One could state the same view by replacing conditions (c) and (d) with just one condition of 
the form ‘S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a way for S to F 
under a practical mode of presentation’ or ‘S knows, under a practical mode of presentation, that 
w is a way for S to F’. But the advantage of stating the analysis using (c) and (d) is that it 
emphasizes the important point that on this view the fact that S stands in the knowledge-that 
relation to the proposition that w is a way for S to F, is only a necessary and not a sufficient 
condition for S’s knowing how to F.  
6 Stanley and Williamson (2001: 429) do not think that the difficulty of this task is a problem for 
their view because they hold that the same is true of first-personal modes of presentation, and 
yet in “both cases … one can provide an existence proof for such modes of presentation”. They 
argue that if, as is often assumed in the philosophy of language, there is a sound argument from 
(3) and (4) to the existence of first-personal modes of presentation, there should also be a sound 
argument from (1) and (2) to the existence of practical modes of presentation. 
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this entails that she possesses certain complex dispositions related to the action of 
riding a bicycle. However, Stanley and Williamson would not want to say that it 
entails that Hannah possesses the corresponding ability to ride a bicycle, for as we 
have seen, they deny that possessing the ability to F is a necessary condition of 
knowing how to F. But clearly the role of practical modes of presentation is to 
explain the natural thought that Hannah failing to know how to F is connected in 
some way to the fact that she fails to possess certain abilities or dispositions 
related to the action of riding a bicycle. On Stanley and Williamson’s view this 
thought is explained by the fact that possessing some such dispositions is a 
necessary condition of entertaining a way of riding a bicycle under a practical 
mode of presentation. 
Bengson and Moffett’s versions of sophisticated intellectualism 
Bengson and Moffett (2007) (see also Bengson et al., forthcoming) offer the 
following analysis of knowledge-how: 
S knows how to F if and only if for some way w of F-ing such that: 
 (e) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a 
way of F-ing, and         
 (f) S minimally understands w. 
According to Bengson and Moffett then, Shane knows how to bowl a googly just 
in case there is some way w such that he stands in the knowledge-that relation to 
the proposition that w is a way of bowling a googly, and he also minimally 
understands w. 
There are some fairly minor differences between Bengson and Moffett’s 
equivalence thesis and Stanley and Williamson’s equivalence thesis. For example, 
Bengson and Moffett’s condition (e) differs slightly from Stanley and 
Williamson’s corresponding condition (c); whereas (c) refers to propositions of 
the form ‘w is a way for S to F’, (e) refers to propositions of the form ‘w is a way 
of F-ing’. The most significant difference between the two accounts, however, is 
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that where Stanley and Williamson’s condition (d) requires one to entertain the 
relevant proposition concerning a way to F under a practical mode of presentation, 
Bengson and Moffett’s condition (f) requires one to minimally understand the 
relevant way. 
This minimal understanding condition is what Bengson and Moffett appeal to 
when responding to the insufficiency objection to simple intellectualism.7 For 
example, in response to the Tour De France case they would grant that Hannah 
satisfies condition (d) of their analysis—that is, that there is a way w of F-ing such 
that Hannah knows that w is a way of F-ing. However, Bengson and Moffett 
would argue that Hannah fails to minimally understand w and that, therefore, the 
case is not a counterexample to their analysis.  
What does it mean to say that Hannah does not minimally understand that way of 
riding a bicycle? Bengson and Moffett explicate this notion of minimally 
understanding a way by appealing to a complex set of views on the nature of 
concepts and concept possession. I do not wish to examine these views in any 
detail, as to do so would require a lengthy discussion that would be tangential to 
my aims here. But Bengson and Moffett’s basic strategy in replying to the 
                                            
7 This is not Bengson and Moffett’s only motivation for including this condition in their analysis 
of knowledge-how. Their account of knowledge-how is motivated in large part by what they take 
to be a certain puzzle regarding knowledge-how attributions, namely, that some, but not all, 
attributions of the form ‘S knows how to F’ entail the corresponding attribution of the ability ‘S 
has the ability to F’ depending on what value we give to ‘F’. Bengson and Moffett’s solution to 
this puzzle appeals to their minimal understanding condition; very roughly, the idea is that for 
some actions—what they call ‘select activities’—one can only minimally understand a way to 
perform that action if one possesses the ability to perform that action. Their examples of select 
activities include: adding m from n; subtracting m from n; inferring q from (p and q); inferring q 
from p and (if p then q). I am not convinced that this puzzle is genuine, as it seems to me that 
Bengson and Moffett do not establish that there is not still a gap between knowledge-how and 
ability, even in the case of their select activities (but see Bengson and Moffett 2007: 36–7 for 
further discussion).  
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insufficiency objection can be explained without going into the full details of 
these views.  
With regards to the Tour De France case, I take it that Bengson and Moffett’s 
reply to such an example relies, in the first instance, on the intuitive idea that 
while Hannah knows that that way is a way of riding a bicycle, her understanding 
of that way is, in some sense, inadequate or incomplete when compared to the 
understanding of, say, the cyclist who she sees riding that way. In Bengson and 
Moffett’s terminology, the cyclist minimally understands this way and Hannah 
does not. This terminology is somewhat misleading, however, as to say that 
Hannah does not minimally understand that way could be interpreted as saying 
that she does not grasp or understand it at all, whereas their idea is only that her 
understanding of that way is somehow less than optimal when compared to the 
understanding of someone like the cyclist—that is, someone who actually knows 
how to ride a bicycle.  
Bengson and Moffett would then analyse this difference—between Hannah’s 
understanding and the cyclist’s understanding—in terms of a difference between 
either their respective concepts of the way in question, and/or their mastery of 
their respective concepts of that way. For example, Bengson and Moffett (2007: 
52) suggest that in a scenario like the Tour De France case Hannah’s conception 
of that way would be less accurate or complete than the cyclist’s conception of 
that way, as only the cyclist’s conception could be used to guide someone in 
riding a bicycle. For Hannah’s conception is based solely on demonstrative 
concepts of that way gained via her visual perception of someone riding that way, 
and they suggest that such concepts alone could not form a correct and complete 
conception of the kinaesthetic properties involved in that way of riding a bicycle.  
However, as I stated above, the details of how Bengson and Moffett analyse their 
minimal understanding condition are not important for our purposes. What is 
important is the structure of their full account of knowledge-how. Bengson and 
Moffett hold that knowing how to F is not only a matter of there being some way 
w such that one stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is 
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a way of F-ing. Rather, it is a matter of satisfying this condition and also 
possessing an adequate understanding of that way. In which case, their account of 
knowledge-how is clearly a version of sophisticated intellectualism.  
It is also worth noting that Bengson and Moffett can appeal to their minimal 
understanding condition to explain the natural thought that Hannah’s failing to 
know how to ride a bicycle is connected somehow to her failure to possess certain 
abilities or dispositions related to the action of riding a bicycle. For Bengson and 
Moffett clearly think that the best way of coming to minimally understand a way 
of riding a bicycle is to actually practise riding a bicycle oneself.8 
1.6 Brogaard’s Defence of Simple Intellectualism 
Adopting some version of sophisticated intellectualism is the standard response 
to the insufficiency objection. But Berit Brogaard (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) 
has offered an interesting defence of a version of simple intellectualism to this 
objection. Brogaard offers the following analysis of knowledge-how, which is 
clearly a version of simple intellectualism: 
 S knows how to F if and only if there is some way w such that S stands in 
the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is how to F. 
                                            
8 Bengson and Moffett claim that for most actions, including actions like riding a bicycle, it is 
possible to know how to perform that action without possessing the ability to perform it (the 
exceptions being ‘select activities’ see fn. 7). It is important to note that there is no lurking 
inconsistency here. For suppose one claimed that the only way one could come to minimally 
understand a way of riding a bicycle was to practise riding a bicycle until one possessed the 
ability to ride a bicycle. Now, I think Bengson and Moffett would actually reject this claim, but 
they could in principle accept it, as it is perfectly consistent with the idea that subsequently one 
could lose the ability to ride a bicycle whilst retaining one’s minimal understanding of a way to 
ride a bicycle. 
26 
According to Brogaard then, Shane knows how to bowl a googly just in case there 
is some way w such that he stands in the knowledge-that relation to the 
proposition that w is how to bowl a googly. 
Brogaard’s analysis is a version of simple intellectualism for it tells us that 
standing in the knowledge-that relation to the right kind of proposition is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for knowing how to F. Of course, Brogaard is 
well aware of the insufficiency objection to simple intellectualism, as she writes:  
Suppose I have never practiced playing the piano but that I have taken numerous theory 
lessons. There is then an x such that I know x is how to play the piano. Still, it would 
seem that someone could correctly claim that I don’t know how to play the piano. 
Likewise, if Mary—a mono-lingual speaker of English—sees Danny curse out his cousin 
in Italian, she might correctly say [whilst pointing] ‘that is how to curse someone in 
Italian’. Yet someone could correctly say ‘Mary doesn’t know how to curse out someone 
in Italian’. After all, Mary doesn’t even speak Italian (Brogaard forthcoming b: 47). 
However, Brogaard does not respond to such cases by adopting some version of 
sophisticated intellectualism. Rather, Brogaard claims that the lesson of such cases 
is that ‘S knows how to F’ attributions are ambiguous between two readings, and 
that this ambiguity provides us with a response to the insufficiency objection: 
There is, however, a straightforward reply to these sorts of objections … knowledge-
how ascriptions that embed infinitive clauses are ambiguous between a reading that 
requires that the subject possess an ability (first-person) and a reading that does not 
require that the subject possess an ability (third person). For example, ‘John knows how 
to play the piano’ may be read as saying that John knows how JOHN may play the piano, 
or as saying that John knows how ONE may play the piano. So, on the analysis offered 
here, ‘John knows how to play the piano’ can be read as saying that there is a w such that 
John knows that w is how John may play the piano or as saying that there is a w such 
that John knows that w is how one may play the piano. If John has never practiced 
playing the piano, it is false that there is a w such that John knows that w is how John 
may play the piano’ but it may well be true that there is a w such that John knows that w 
is how one may play the piano. So, ‘John knows how to play the piano’ is false when 
given the first reading but it may well be true when given the second reading. Likewise, 
if Mary doesn’t speak Italian, then it will be false that there is a w such that Mary knows 
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that w is how Mary may curse out someone in Italian but it may be true that there is a w 
such that Mary knows that w is how one may curse out someone in Italian (Brogaard 
forthcoming b: 47). 
Let us consider then how Brogaard would analyse the Tour De France case. To 
begin with, Brogaard would claim that (1) can be disambiguated in two different 
ways: 
(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
In particular, Brogaard would claim that (1) can be disambiguated as either (1a) or 
(1b):  
(1a) There is a way w such that Hannah knows that w is how Hannah may 
ride a bicycle. 
(1b) There is a way w such that Hannah knows that w is how one may ride a 
bicycle. 
Brogaard’s response to the Tour de France scenario, in short, would be to claim 
that in such a scenario (1a) is false and so, given that (1a) is a legitimate 
interpretation of (1), there is a good sense in which (1) is false, which explains our 
intuition that Hannah does not know how to ride a bicycle.  
Note that the claim that (1) is ambiguous between (1a) and (1b), does not actually 
play any role in Brogaard’s response to the insufficiency objection. The important 
claim with respect to the Tour De France scenario is simply that (1a) is a 
legitimate interpretation of (1), and that (1a) is false in this scenario. The further 
claim that (1b) is also a legitimate interpretation of (1) is superfluous to 
Brogaard’s response to this kind of case. And this is probably a good thing 
because (1b) does not look to be a good interpretation of (1). It is true that the 
syntactic structure of (1) allows for it to be disambiguated as either (1a) or (1b), 
for there is a covert pronoun in the structure of (1) which can either receive its 
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interpretation from the subject of the main clause (i.e. Hannah) or can be 
interpreted as ‘one’.9 But (1b) looks to be implausible as a semantic interpretation 
of (1), for if (1b) is a legitimate interpretation of (1) then it would follow that 
there is a legitimate sense in which anyone who merely knows that there is some 
way that people ride bicycles thereby knows how to ride a bicycle.  
Brogaard’s response to the insufficiency problem requires that (1a) be a legitimate 
interpretation of (1), and that (1a) be false in a scenario like the Tour De France 
case. But why think that (1a) is false in the Tour De France scenario? For note 
that the interpretation of (1) as (1a) is very close, if not equivalent, to Stanley and 
Williamson’s initial account of the truth conditions of (1), which tells us that 
Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle just in case there is some way such that 
Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. To see this compare (1a) 
with (1c): 
 (1a) There is a way w such that Hannah knows that w is how Hannah may 
ride a bicycle. 
 (1c) There is a way w such that Hannah knows that w is a way for Hannah 
to ride a bicycle. 
Stanley and Williamson’s initial account of knowledge-how tells us that an 
assertion of (1) is equivalent to an assertion of (1c), and in turn (1a) and (1c) look 
to be equivalent in meaning. That is, replacing ‘w is how Hannah may ride a 
bicycle’ in (1a) with ‘w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle’ does not appear to 
change the meaning of (1a) at all. For Stanley and Williamson (2001: 424–5) 
interpret ‘to ride a bicycle’ in (1c) as expressing something like ‘can ride a bicycle’, 
and Brogaard also clearly uses ‘may’ in (1a) to expresses something like the ability 
sense of ‘can’ (rather than the deontic sense of ‘may’ where it expresses 
something like permissibility).  
                                            
9 See Chapter §2.1 for further discussion. 
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But while (1a) and (1c) look to be equivalent Stanley and Williamson disagree with 
Brogaard about what the truth value of (1a/1c) would be in a scenario like the 
Tour de France case. Stanley and Williamson (ibid. 428) explicitly state that such a 
scenario would be a case where (1c) would be true. As we have seen, this is why 
Stanley and Williamson think that their initial account of knowledge-how 
ascriptions is inadequate, and why they suggest that a more adequate account of 
knowledge-how ascriptions must appeal to practical modes of presentation—in 
either the semantics or the pragmatics of such ascriptions. Brogaard, however, 
thinks that the Tour De France case would be a scenario where (1a) would be 
false. 
Bearing in mind that Brogaard uses ‘may’ to express something like the ability 
sense of ‘can’, I take it that her rationale for thinking that (1a) is false in a scenario 
like the Tour De France case goes like this: if there were some way w such that 
Hannah knows that w is a way how Hannah may ride a bicycle, this would entail 
that w is a way how Hannah herself may ride a bicycle. But, Hannah clearly lacks 
the ability to ride a bicycle, so there is no way w such that w is a way how Hannah 
may ride a bicycle and, therefore, there is no way w such that Hannah knows that 
w is a way how she may ride a bicycle. 
1.7 Assessing the Insufficiency Objection 
We are now in a proper position to assess the question of whether the 
insufficiency objection shows us that intellectualism is false, for we have seen that 
to answer this question we actually have to address two distinct questions. The 
first insufficiency question is: does the insufficiency objection show us that simple 
intellectualism is false? And the second insufficiency question is: does the 
insufficiency objection show us that sophisticated intellectualism is false? 
In answer to the first question, I think the insufficiency objection strongly 
suggests that simple intellectualism is false. As we have seen, Brogaard gives an 
interesting defence of simple intellectualism that relies on the fact that the 
standard cases used to motivate this objection are cases where a subject not only 
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fails to know how to F but they also fail to possess the ability to F. For example, 
Hannah not only does not know how to ride a bicycle, but there is also a clear 
sense in which she does not possess the ability to ride a bicycle. Brogaard’s basic 
strategy for handling such cases then is to equate knowing how to F with knowing 
that p, for a proposition p such that knowing that p entails that one may/can F. 
In particular, Brogaard claims that S knows how to F if and only if there is some 
way w such that Hannah knows that w is a way how S may/can F.  
This strategy may appeal when responding to examples like the Tour de France 
case, because this is a scenario where intuitively Hannah not only fails to know 
how to ride a bicycle, but she also fails to possess the ability to ride a bicycle. In 
which case, it is relatively easy to motivate the idea that there is no way w such 
that Hannah knows that w is how she can ride a bicycle. But the problem is that 
the insufficiency objection can also be motivated using cases where it seems clear 
that a subject S both fails to know how to F and that there is a way w such that S 
knows that w is a way how S can F.10  
For example, suppose that a chess grandmaster is coaching two of her students, 
Sacha and Boris, as they near the end of a game of chess. The grandmaster says to 
Sacha: “Sacha there is no way for Boris to win from here but there is a way that 
you can win from here”. Sacha thereby comes to know that there is a way that 
Sacha can win the game, but Sacha still does not know how to win the game.11  
                                            
10 In fact, even in the Tour De France case I am inclined to agree with Stanley and Williamson 
that Hannah would know that that way (i.e. the way the cyclist on the television is riding his 
bicycle) is a way how Hannah may/can ride a bicycle. At least, I think it is natural to imagine the 
case in such a way that Hannah would possess this knowledge-that. If we suppose that Hannah 
is such that she could learn how to ride a bicycle in that way—she has the relevant limbs, motor 
control, coordination etc.—and that Hannah knows that she is such a person, then it seems to 
me that she would not only know that that way is how one may ride a bicycle, but she would also 
know that that way is how she may ride a bicycle. In which case, the Tour De France case is still 
a counterexample to Brogaard’s analysis of knowledge-how.  
11 Thanks to Daniel Stoljar for suggesting this example. 
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Such a scenario is surely possible, for Sacha may know that the way the 
grandmaster is referring to is a way she can win the game and yet, unlike the 
grand master, she may still fail to entertain or grasp this way in the manner 
required for her to also know how to win the game. Indeed, it is tempting to say 
that Sacha would still fail to know how to win the game because she only 
entertains this way under some non-practical mode of presentation.  
Similarly, recall Snowdon’s (2003) case of the man who has the ability to get out 
of a room, but who does not yet know how to get out of the room because he has 
not yet explored it. Suppose that a friend calls this man on his mobile phone and 
says: “Don’t worry there is a way you can get out of the room”. The man now 
knows that there is a way that he can get out of the room but, I submit, intuitively 
he still does not know how to get out of the room given that he has not yet 
explored the room.  
Such cases appear to show that the insufficiency objection can be made even 
against Brogaard’s version of simple intellectualism. Perhaps Brogaard could offer 
some response to these cases. But, in answer to our first insufficiency question, I 
think it is safe to say that the insufficiency objection at least strongly suggests that 
any plausible version of simple intellectualism will turn out to be false.12  
                                            
12 Perhaps Brogaard could respond to such cases by appealing to the context sensitivity of the 
modals ‘may’ or ‘can’. For example, in a context where we are discussing what Hannah can do 
given the proper instruction it would be correct to say, “Hannah can ride a bicycle”. But in other 
contexts such an assertion would be incorrect, for example, in a context where we are discussing 
what Hannah can do prior to receiving any instructions or lessons. Similarly, we will happily 
judge that someone can F in view of such-and-such, whilst denying that they can F in view of so-and-so 
(for discussion see Kratzer 1977). One might argue then that the fact that we can elicit the 
intuition that Hannah knows that that way is a way how she may/can ride a bicycle, or that Sacha 
knows that there is a way she can win the game, merely reflects the context sensitivity of ‘may’ 
and ‘can’. But appealing to the context sensitivity of modals like ‘may’ and ‘can’ will only help to 
defend Brogaard’s account of knowledge-how if our intuitions as to whether S knows how to F 
‘line up’ with our intuitions as to whether there is some way w such that S knows that w is a way 
for S to F. And examples like the chess case suggest that this is not the case. (Thanks to Berit 
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However, in answer to our second insufficiency question, it is clear that the 
insufficiency objection does not show us that sophisticated intellectualism is false. 
As we have seen, many intellectualists simply grant that merely standing in the 
knowledge-that relation to some relevant proposition concerning a way to F does 
not constitute a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. Sophisticated 
intellectualists claim that knowing how to F is not only a matter of standing in the 
knowledge-that relation to the right proposition but it is also a matter of satisfying 
some further condition. 
Of course, one might argue that particular versions of sophisticated 
intellectualism do not offer an adequate response to the insufficiency objection. 
Some philosophers have argued that this is the case with respect to Stanley and 
Williamson’s account of knowledge-how, on the grounds that they tell us little 
about what practical modes of presentation are (for example, see Noë 2005, 
Rosefeldt 2004). But even if these objections to Stanley and Williamson’s specific 
version of sophisticated intellectualism are reasonable, they do not show us that 
there is some principled problem with sophisticated intellectualism in general.  
I suspect that many critics of intellectualism consider the insufficiency objection 
to be an objection to intellectualism in general, because they think that the only 
way for the intellectualist to respond to examples like the Tour de France case is 
to appeal to some Rylean condition on knowing how to F. For example, Tobias 
Rosefeldt (2004: 375) seems to raise this kind of concern when, after considering 
Stanley and Williamson’s appeal to the notion of a practical mode of presentation 
as a way of responding to the insufficiency objection, he concludes that their “talk 
about practical modes of presentation is simply disguised talk about abilities.”.  
There are two things to say about this kind of concern with intellectualist 
responses to the insufficiency objection. First, it is not at all obvious that the right 
                                                                                                                            
Brogaard for suggesting that one might appeal to the context sensitivity of the modals ‘may’ and 
‘can’ as a way of responding to the concerns raised above for her defence of simple 
intellectualism, any errors in presenting this response in the best light are my own.) 
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diagnosis of why Hannah fails to know how to ride a bicycle is simply that she 
lacks certain abilities or capacities. As Stanley and Williamson’s ski instructor and 
pianist cases suggest, having the ability to F is not a necessary condition of 
knowing how to F; and examples like Bengson and Moffett’s salchow case 
suggest that it is not even a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. It may 
well turn out then that the best explanation of why Hannah fails to know how to 
ride a bicycle is not simply that she fails to possess certain abilities, but that she 
does not entertain certain propositions under the right mode of presentation, or 
that she does not possess an adequate conception of the way to ride a bicycle.  
Second, even if the intellectualist does have to directly appeal to certain abilities or 
dispositional states in order to respond to the insufficiency objection this is not 
inconsistent with some version of sophisticated intellectualism being true. For 
example, suppose that in response to the insufficiency objection an intellectualist 
offered the following analysis of knowledge-how:  
 S knows how to F if, and only if:       
 (g) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to p (for some relevant 
proposition p concerning a way to F), and     
 (h) S possesses the ability to F. 
This analysis of knowledge-how includes the Rylean condition that one possess 
the ability to F, but it is still a version of sophisticated intellectualism because it 
also includes the intellectualist condition (g). A neo-Rylean might argue that all 
that this shows is that (g) is redundant on the grounds that (h) states not only a 
necessary but also a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. However, as we 
have seen, there are examples that strongly suggest that (h) does not state a 
sufficient condition for knowing how to F. Of course, we have also seen that 
there are examples that strongly suggest that (h) is not a necessary condition for 
knowing how to F, so I am not recommending the above analysis to 
intellectualists. The point is simply that there is no obvious route from the 
insufficiency objection to simple intellectualism to the truth of some form of 
Ryleanism, as opposed to some form of sophisticated intellectualism. The 
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insufficiency objection strongly suggests that there is no plausible version of 
simple intellectualism, but it does not show us that there can be no plausible 
version of sophisticated intellectualism. Hence, we must look elsewhere if we are 
to find a conclusive argument against intellectualism in general. In Chapter 3 I will 
present what I take to be the most powerful arguments for rejecting 
intellectualism, arguments that, if sound, undermine not only simple but also 
sophisticated intellectualism. Now, however, I want to consider the philosophical 
implications of sophisticated intellectualism. In particular, I will consider the 
implications of Stanley and Williamson’s version of sophisticated intellectualism 
for an important position in the philosophy of mind. 
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Chapter 2 The Ability Hypothesis and 
Intellectualism 
 
What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument (Jackson 
1982, 1986) if intellectualists are right that knowledge-how is just a kind of 
knowledge-that? The obvious answer is that the ability hypothesis is false. For the 
ability hypothesis says that when Mary—Frank Jackson’s super-scientist—sees red 
for the first time she gains only knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In this 
chapter I argue that this obvious answer is wrong: a version of the ability 
hypothesis might be true even if knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. In 
§2.1 I briefly return to Stanley and Williamson’s (2001: 1) account of knowledge-
how as “simply a species of propositional knowledge”. In §2.2 I set out the ability 
hypothesis and explain Stanley and Williamson’s claim that it is a consequence of 
their account that the ability hypothesis fails. In §2.3 I demonstrate that this claim 
is not quite right. Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how is 
inconsistent with the combination of everything said by standard statements of 
the ability hypothesis. However, we can restate the core claims of the ability 
hypothesis—that Mary only gains new knowledge-how and not knowledge-that—
within their account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that. In the 
remainder of the chapter (§§2.4–2.6) I examine the implications of this result for 
both critics and proponents of the ability hypothesis.  
2.1 The New Knowledge-how 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Gilbert Ryle famously argued that there was a 
fundamental distinction in kind between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. 
Proponents of the ability hypothesis standardly appeal to this Rylean view of 
knowledge-how when stating their reply to the knowledge argument. As we have 
seen, however, Stanley and Williamson reject the orthodox notion that there is a 
fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. To 
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understand why, consider once again a knowledge-how ascribing sentence, such 
as: 
(1) Mary knows how to ride a bicycle. 
Stanley and Williamson’s main argument for intellectualism rests on the claim that 
ascriptions like (1) are constructions where the compliment of the verb ‘knows’ is 
an embedded question formed by the question word ‘how’ and the infinitive ‘to ride a 
bicycle’. Stanley and Williamson claim then that the syntactic structure (1) is of a 
kind with (2)–(5): 
(2) Mary knows where to find a dollar. 
(3) Mary knows whom to call for help in a bush fire. 
(4) Mary knows which prize to look for. 
(5) Mary knows why to vote for Garrett. 
In particular, Stanley and Williamson claim that, abstracting away from certain 
details, the standardly accepted syntactic structure of (1)–(5) is as follows: 
 (1’) Mary knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle t]. 
(2’) Mary knows [where PRO to find a dollar t]. 
(3’) Mary knows [whom PRO to call t for help in a fire]. 
(4’) Mary knows [which prize PRO to look for t]. 
(5’) Mary knows [why PRO to vote for Garrett t]. 
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‘PRO’ here is a covert or phonologically null pronoun that is the subject of the 
infinitive clause, and the occurrences of ‘t’ indicate the traces of the movement of 
the phrases ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘whom’, ‘which prize’, and ‘why’ in the structure of 
(1’)–(5’) respectively.  
The standard semantics for ascriptions like (2’)–(5’) tells us, roughly, that each 
ascription is true just in case Mary knows an answer to the respective embedded 
question, where to know an answer to the embedded question is to stand in the 
knowledge-that relation to some proposition p that answers that question. If we 
apply the same semantics for embedded questions to (1’) then we get the result 
that (1’) will be true if and only if Mary knows that p, for some proposition p that 
is an answer to the embedded question in (1’).  
Stanley and Williamson suggest that for ascriptions of the form ‘S knows how to 
F’ any legitimate answer to the respective embedded question will be a 
proposition of the form ‘w is a way for S to F’.13 Hence, they hold that if we 
follow the standard semantics for embedded questions then (1’) will be true if and 
only if there is some way w such that Mary stands in the knowledge-that relation 
to the proposition that w is a way to F. More generally, Stanley and Williamson’s 
initial suggestion is that the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascribing 
sentences conform to the following schema: 
‘Mary knows how to ride a bicycle’ is true if and only if there is some way 
w for Mary to ride a bicycle such that Mary stands in the knowledge-that 
relation to the proposition that w is a way for Mary to ride a bicycle. 
                                            
13 Why ways for S to ride a bicycle rather than for someone else? The reason is that Stanley and 
Williamson interpret ‘PRO’ in, for example, (8) as receiving its subject from the main clause so 
that ‘PRO’ is interpreted as ‘Mary’. However, like Brogaard, Stanley and Williamson (2001: 424–
5) note that ascriptions like (8) also allow for an interpretation whereby ‘PRO’ is interpreted as 
‘one’. Furthermore, they note that the infinitive in (8), ‘to ride a bicycle’, not only can be 
interpreted as having ‘can’-like force (which is the interpretation they focus on), but it can also be 
interpreted as having ‘ought’-like force. 
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According to this view then, (1’) expresses an existential generalization over 
propositions; it says that there exists at least one proposition of the form ‘w is a 
way for Mary to F’ such that Mary knows that proposition. Given the accepted 
picture of both the syntactic structure of ascriptions like (2)–(5) and the semantic 
interpretation of (2’)–(5’), Stanley and Williamson (2001: 431) take their “view of 
ascriptions of knowledge-how to be the default view.” And the import of this 
view is that “to say that someone knows how to F is always to ascribe to them 
knowledge-that” (ibid. 426).14 
Of course, in response to the insufficiency objection, Stanley and Williamson also 
include in their final account of knowledge-how the further condition that in 
standing in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition of the ‘w is a way for 
Mary to F’, Mary must also entertain this proposition under a practical mode of 
presentation. More generally, they hold that, if modes of presentation are 
semantically relevant,15 the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascribing 
sentences conform to the following schema: 
‘S knows how to F’ is true if, and only if, there is some way w for S to F 
such that:         
 (a) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a 
way for S to F, and        
                                            
14 See Brown (1970) for a related precursor of this argument. 
15 For ease of exposition, I will treat practical modes of presentation as if they are part of the 
semantics of ‘S knows how to F’ ascriptions in this discussion. Nothing that I go on to argue, 
however, would be essentially affected were we to treat practical modes of presentation as part 
of the pragmatics of using such ascriptions. Also, as we saw in §1.1, on Stanley and Williamson’s 
view the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascriptions like (1’) are relativized to conversational 
contexts. This is because changes in conversational context can change what counts as a legitimate 
answer to an embedded question. But as this feature of their view is also inessential for our 
discussion I have ignored it here.  
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 (b) In standing in this relation S entertains the proposition that w is a way 
for S to F under a practical mode of presentation. 
And recall that on Stanley and Williamson’s preferred development of this view, a 
practical mode of presentation is a way of thinking of a Russellian proposition, 
rather than a constituent of a fine-grained or Fregean proposition (throughout 
this chapter the word ‘proposition’ should be understood as referring to the 
Russellian notion of a proposition). 
The analysis above constitutes the core of Stanley and Williamson’s account of 
knowledge-how. As we have seen, one might object to this account in various 
ways, but the truth or falsity of their account is not my concern in this chapter. 
My concern here is with the consequences of their account for the ability 
hypothesis. Thus, in the following discussion I assume that Stanley and 
Williamson’s account of knowledge-how is true and then consider what follows 
(if anything) for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument. 
2.2 The Ability Hypothesis 
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (KA) invites us to consider the following 
thought experiment. Mary is a brilliant scientist who has spent all her life in a 
black and white room studying all of the (completed) natural sciences; her only 
access to the outside world is via images on a black and white TV screen. One 
fateful day, Mary steps outside her room and sees red for the first time. It seems 
that, upon her release, Mary learns something about the nature of the world, 
namely, what it is like to see red. However, by hypothesis, Mary knows every 
physical truth there is to know prior to her release. Therefore, Jackson argues, 
there is at least one non-physical truth, that is, the truth Mary comes to know 
upon her release. From this initial conclusion, and taking physicalism to be 
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committed to the thesis that all truths are physical truths or are a priori entailed by 
physical truths,16 Jackson concludes that physicalism is false.  
The ability hypothesis offers an elegant reply to KA. Mary does not gain any new 
knowledge-that upon her release but merely knowledge-how. Proponents of the 
reply often take the further step of identifying Mary’s new knowledge-how with 
new abilities that she gains when released—hence the name of the hypothesis. We 
shall come to this further step in due course (see §2.4). Potential candidates for 
Mary’s new knowledge-how include: knowledge how to imagine experiences of 
red; knowledge how to recognize experiences of red; and knowledge how to 
remember experiences of red. For our purposes, the exact knowledge-how Mary 
gains upon release is not crucial.17 What is crucial is that the core of the ability 
hypothesis centres largely on just two claims, a negative claim about what Mary 
does not gain after her release, and a positive claim about what she does gain:  
(NEG) Upon release Mary does not gain any new knowledge-that. 
(POS) Upon release Mary gains new knowledge-how. 
NEG establishes that Jackson’s thought experiment does not describe a 
possibility that undermines physicalism. Mary does not learn any new truth about 
the world upon release because she does not gain any new propositional 
knowledge. POS serves to explain our deep-seated intuition that Mary does 
nevertheless learn something, and thereby comes to know something, upon her 
release. The truth of POS is consistent with the truth of NEG because Mary’s 
new knowledge-how is not propositional knowledge. As Laurence Nemirow says, 
“Mary’s knowledge gap is practical not propositional” (Nemirow 1995: 36). For 
                                            
16 This particular assumption is highly controversial. For his position on this issue see Jackson 
(2004: 423–6). 
17 From this point forward I will use ‘knowledge-how to imagine experiences of red’ as a 
placeholder for one’s favoured version of some list like this. 
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those who take the further step just mentioned, the gap in Mary’s knowledge is 
not propositional because her new knowledge-how is to be identified with new 
abilities, as opposed to new knowledge-that (a point I will return to in §2.4). 
What is the relationship between this response to KA and Stanley and 
Williamson’s account of knowledge-how? As suggested earlier, the obvious 
answer is that Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how is inconsistent 
with the ability hypothesis. Stanley and Williamson endorse this obvious answer 
in their critique of David Lewis’s (1998) version of the ability hypothesis: 
According to Lewis, the correct account of Jackson’s knowledge argument is that Mary 
does not gain new knowledge-that when she leaves her black and white room, but only 
knowledge-how. In particular, she gains knowledge how to recognize, remember, and 
imagine experiences of red. Our discussion shows, however, that Lewis’s account is 
incorrect. Knowing how to imagine red and knowing how to recognize red are both 
examples of knowledge-that. For example, x’s knowing how to imagine red amounts to 
knowing a proposition of the form ‘w is a way for x to imagine red’, entertained under a 
guise involving a practical mode of presentation of a way (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 
442). 
Are Stanley and Williamson right? Undeniably, there is a conflict between their 
account of knowledge-how and the letter of classic statements of the ability 
hypothesis, at least of the kind presented by Lewis (1988) and Nemirow (1980, 
1990). After all, the classic statements of the ability hypothesis say that Mary does 
not gain any new knowledge-that because she merely gains new knowledge-how, 
while Stanley and Williamson’s main claim is that knowledge-how is a form of 
knowledge-that. The interesting question, however, is whether we can give a 
modified statement of the ability hypothesis that, on the one hand, is consistent 
with Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how and, on the other hand, 
retains the spirit of these classic statements.  
One obvious modification of the ability hypothesis would be to concede that 
Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how as a kind of knowledge-that, 
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makes POS incompatible with NEG, and so to deny POS, as it stands, and 
replace it with: 
(POS') Upon release Mary gains new abilities. 
Stanley and Williamson (2001: 442–3) identify this “fallback position” for 
proponents of the ability hypothesis themselves, and they argue that it fails. I 
discuss these arguments in §2.4. For now it will suffice to note that such a 
response to Stanley and Williamson is very unattractive for reasons they do not 
discuss. If our modified ability hypothesis no longer affirms POS, then it no 
longer speaks to our intuition that Mary learns something upon release and 
thereby gains knowledge. Being able to say that Mary learns how to do something, 
and thereby gains knowledge-how, seems to me to be a clearly essential feature of 
the ability hypothesis. Consequently, I will now develop a very different response 
to Stanley and Williamson. This response claims that, despite all appearances to 
the contrary, we can accept Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how 
and still consistently assert versions of both NEG and POS. 
2.3 Mary’s ‘New’ New Knowledge-how 
Here is a reply to KA that is not only consistent with, but relies upon, Stanley and 
Williamson’s account of knowledge-how—specifically the issues surrounding 
sentences (1) and (2). Prior to her release, Mary knows that w is a way for her to 
imagine an experience of red, but she does not know how to imagine an 
experience of red. This is because Mary does not know the proposition that w is a 
way for her to imagine an experience of red under a practical mode of 
presentation. After her release, Mary comes to know that w is a way for her to 
imagine an experience of red under a practical mode of presentation, and hence 
gains new knowledge how to imagine an experience of red. In gaining this 
knowledge-how Mary does not gain knowledge of any new proposition. Mary 
only comes to know, under a practical mode of presentation, a proposition that 
she already knew under some other mode of presentation (recall sentences (3) and 
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(4)). Just as Nemirow (1995) says, the gap in Mary’s knowledge was practical not 
propositional. Physicalism is not refuted by KA, because if Mary does not come 
to know any new propositions then she does not come to know any new non-
physical truths about the world.  
Under what non-practical mode of presentation could pre-release Mary have 
known that w is a way for her to imagine an experience of red? Stanley and 
Williamson themselves suggest one possibility: 
If someone entertained a way of riding a bicycle by possessing a complete physiological 
description of it, that might also give them de re knowledge of that way, though not 
under a practical mode of presentation (2001: fn. 429). 
If someone in this scenario could know (de re) of some way that it is a way for 
them to ride a bicycle, even though they do not know how to ride a bicycle, then 
presumably Mary in her lab (with her knowledge of all of the completed natural 
sciences) could likewise know that w is a way for her to imagine an experience of 
red, even if she did not know how to imagine an experience of red. In both cases, 
Mary knows the relevant proposition under something like a theoretical mode of 
presentation. Alternatively, pre-release Mary might have known that w is a way for 
her to imagine an experience of red under a demonstrative mode of presentation. 
What matters is that Stanley and Williamson’s account explicitly allows for the 
possibility that pre-release Mary could know that w is a way for her to imagine red 
under some mode of presentation other than a practical mode of presentation. The 
above response to KA simply employs this feature of Stanley and Williamson’s 
account to explain how Mary could gain knowledge-how without gaining 
knowledge of a new proposition. Let us call this response to KA the ability 
hypothesis*, or AH*.  
Is AH* really a version of the ability hypothesis? Perhaps the answer is not 
immediately clear. For AH* reveals an ambiguity in standard statements of the 
ability hypothesis with respect to NEG: 
(NEG) Upon release Mary does not gain any new knowledge-that. 
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We can interpret NEG as either of the two following claims:  
(NEG1) Upon release Mary does not gain knowledge of any new 
proposition. 
(NEG2) Upon release Mary does not come to be in any new state of 
propositional knowledge. 
With this disambiguation now clearly in view we can legitimately identify different 
versions of the ability hypothesis. Any version of the ability hypothesis will, of 
course, have to affirm NEG1, since the claim that Mary does not come to know 
any new proposition is the claim the ability hypothesis uses to block Jackson’s 
conclusion that Mary comes to know a new truth about the world. So, we have 
just two versions of the ability hypothesis to choose between: a version that 
endorses POS and only NEG1, and a version that endorses POS and both NEG1 
and NEG2. 
Ability Hypothesis (Version 1) 
(NEG1) Upon release Mary does not gain knowledge of any new 
proposition. 
(POS) Upon release Mary gains knowledge-how. 
Ability Hypothesis (Version 2) 
(NEG1) Upon release Mary does not gain knowledge of any new 
proposition. 
(NEG2) Upon release Mary does not come to be in any new state of 
propositional knowledge. 
(POS) Upon release Mary gains knowledge-how. 
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It should now be clear that AH* is just an instance of version 1 of the ability 
hypothesis, as it asserts POS and NEG1 and it denies NEG2—for if Mary knows 
an old proposition under a new mode of presentation then she is in a new state of 
propositional knowledge. Thus, once we disambiguate NEG we see that AH* is a 
legitimate version of the ability hypothesis. This is enough to show that Stanley 
and Williamson are not quite right to suppose that their account of knowledge-
how is inconsistent with the ability hypothesis. We can consistently accept their 
account of knowledge-how whilst replying to KA with a version of the ability 
hypothesis like AH*.  
To clarify this position, and to reveal some of its implications, I will now look at 
two features of AH* that distinguish it from classical statements of the ability 
hypothesis. Understanding these features improves our understanding of the 
ability hypothesis as a general form of reply to KA. We will also see that AH* has 
virtues other than it simply being consistent with Stanley and Williamson’s 
account of knowledge-how.  
2.4 Where are the Abilities? 
Classic statements of the ability hypothesis identify Mary’s new knowledge-how 
with new abilities. In so doing, they go beyond the core claims NEG and POS. 
Why do they make this further step? The reason is that there is a prima facie 
challenge of explaining how NEG and POS are compatible. Imagine a person 
who claimed (for whatever reason) that in a particular situation Fred gains 
knowledge-why but no knowledge-that. Obviously, it would be incumbent on this 
person to explain how Fred could come to know why something is the case (or 
why to do something, etc.), without thereby also coming to know that something 
is the case, i.e. without gaining new knowledge-that. Likewise, the proponent of 
the ability hypothesis has to explain how Mary can gain new knowledge-how 
without gaining new knowledge-that.  
The version of the ability hypothesis I developed in the previous section, AH*, 
answers this challenge in a particular way. AH* explains how NEG is compatible 
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with POS by disambiguating NEG to get NEG1 and NEG2, and then pointing 
out that POS is clearly compatible with NEG1. On the other hand, classic 
statements of the ability hypothesis answer this challenge in a different way. Their 
answer comes in two parts. First, they identify knowledge-how with abilities. 
More specifically, they claim that Mary’s knowing how to imagine an experience 
of red is identical to her ability to imagine an experience of red. Second, they 
claim that these abilities are what I will call ‘mere abilities’, that is, abilities that are 
utterly distinct from any propositional knowledge.18 Together, these two claims 
provide an explanation of how NEG and POS are compatible. NEG, the claim 
that Mary does not gain any new knowledge-that, is compatible with POS, the 
claim that Mary gains new knowledge-how, because Mary’s knowledge-how is 
identified with mere abilities as opposed to propositional knowledge.  
So, the version of the ability hypothesis I have given is different in an important 
respect from classic statements of the ability hypothesis, namely, it offers a 
different explanation of how NEG is compatible with POS. What is the reason 
for this difference? The reason is that no version of the ability hypothesis that is 
consistent with Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how can say that 
NEG is compatible with POS because Mary’s new knowledge-how is identical to 
mere abilities. If knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, then Mary’s new 
knowledge-how cannot be identical to abilities that are utterly distinct from any 
knowledge-that. That is why AH* answers the challenge of explaining how NEG 
is compatible with POS in a different way. In short, Stanley and Williamson’s 
account of knowledge-how is inconsistent with the explanation of how POS is 
compatible with NEG given by classic statements of the ability hypothesis.  
                                            
18 Lewis does allow that sometimes one’s ability to F is simply identical to one’s knowledge that 
p, for some proposition p (see Lewis 1998: 459 on having the ability to open the combination 
lock on a bank vault). In the case of knowing what it is like to have an experience, however, 
Lewis thinks of the relevant abilities as not involving propositional knowledge at all. 
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We could summarize these points by noting that the following three claims form 
an inconsistent triad: 
 (Stanley and Williamson’s Main Claim) Knowledge-how is a species of 
knowledge-that. 
(The Identity Claim) Mary’s knowledge how to imagine experiences of red 
is identical to her ability to imagine experiences of red. 
(The Distinctness Claim) Mary’s ability to imagine experiences of red is 
utterly distinct from any knowledge-that. 
Classic statements of the ability hypothesis explain how NEG is compatible with 
POS by appealing to both the identity and distinctness claims. This is the grain of 
truth in Stanley and Williamson’s claim that their account of knowledge-how is 
inconsistent with the ability hypothesis. Their main claim is inconsistent with the 
standard explanation of how NEG is compatible with POS because it is 
inconsistent with the conjunction of the identity and distinctness claims. 
However, AH* is a version of the ability hypothesis that relies on an alternative 
explanation of how NEG is compatible with POS. This explanation is consistent 
with Stanley and Williamson’s main claim.  
There is still a question remaining, however, concerning Mary’s new knowledge-
how. In this context, where we are assuming that Stanley and Williamson’s main 
claim is correct, what is the relationship between Mary’s new knowledge-how and 
her new abilities? The relationship will differ depending on whether we choose to 
retain just the identity claim, or just the distinctness claim, or neither of these 
claims. I will consider just the first two options.  
If we deny the distinctness claim then we can still identify Mary’s new knowledge-
how with her new abilities. Mary’s new ability to imagine experiences of red is 
identical to Mary’s new knowledge that w is a way for her to imagine experiences 
of red, under a practical mode of presentation. On the other hand, if we deny the 
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identity claim we can maintain the idea that Mary’s new abilities are mere abilities. 
This option may appeal if one is inclined to regard abilities and propositional 
knowledge as utterly distinct categories. Stanley and Williamson themselves argue, 
as noted in Chapter 1, that knowledge-how at least does not entail ability, because 
it is possible to know how to F whilst not possessing the ability to F. Recall that 
they cite the case of “a master pianist who loses both of her arms in a tragic car 
accident” (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 416). Stanley and Williamson claim that 
this person would still know how to play the piano despite having lost the ability 
to play the piano. If a similar scenario could be conceived for Mary—whereby she 
knows how to imagine an experience of red but does not have the ability to 
imagine an experience of red—we would have to reject the identity claim (see 
Alter 2001 for a development of this idea).  
What would the relationship be between Mary’s new knowledge-how and her new 
abilities if not identity? One possibility is that there is a conceptual or constitutive 
connection, other than identity, between Mary’s new knowledge-how and her new 
abilities. For example, Stanley and Williamson explicitly claim that knowing how 
to F is not identical to the ability to F (at least in many cases), however, they still 
acknowledge intimate connections between knowing how to F and having an 
ability to F. Stanley and Williamson think that if someone has an ability to F, and 
F is an intentional action, then this entails that they know how to F (see 2001: 
415–16, 442–3).19 This is because for Stanley and Williamson intentional actions 
                                            
19 Moreover, recall that Stanley and Williamson (2001: 429) do acknowledge that there are some 
entailments in the other direction, i.e. from knowing how to F to possessing dispositional 
capacities or abilities: “[t]hinking of a way under a practical mode of presentation undoubtedly 
entails the possession of certain complex dispositions. It is for this reason that there are intricate 
connections between knowing-how and dispositional states”. Stanley and Williamson must deny 
that these dispositions that are entailed by S’s knowing how to F are identical to S’s ability to F, 
given that they deny that knowing how to F entails having the ability to F (ibid. 416). Still, as 
discussed in §1.1, such dispositional capacities are presumably closely connected to the ability to 
F. 
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are “employments of knowledge-how” (ibid. 442–3), that is, whenever one 
successfully F’s one employs one’s knowledge how to F. AH* could appeal to this 
same entailment to explain how Mary’s coming to know how to imagine an 
experience of red is intimately connected to her also coming to possess an ability 
to imagine an experience of red. The knowledge-how and the ability may not be 
identical, but the former is a precondition of the latter. Intuitively, knowing how 
to F and the ability to F (at least intentionally) are intimately related, and any 
viable account of knowledge-how will accommodate this intuition. One way to 
accommodate this intuition is to identify knowing how to F with the ability to F, 
but it is not the only way.  
We have just seen that Stanley and Williamson make two important claims about 
the relationship between knowledge-how and ability that are not entailed by their 
core account of knowledge-how (as stated in §2.1). These claims are: that 
knowing how to F does not entail having the ability to F; and that having the 
ability to F (where F is an intentional action) entails knowing how to F. Consider 
now the claim that Mary gains new abilities: 
(POS') Upon release Mary gains new abilities. 
If we reject the distinctness claim we can understand POS' so that it is equivalent 
to POS, by identifying Mary’s new ability to imagine experiences of red with her 
new knowledge how to imagine experiences of red. While this suggestion is 
compatible with Stanley and Williamson’s main claim, it does not fit well with the 
motivations behind their further claim: that knowing how to F does not entail 
that one has the ability to F.  
On the other hand, if we reject the identity claim then POS and POS' are distinct 
claims. Nevertheless, we can say that Mary’s new knowledge-how is a 
precondition of her new abilities—appealing to Stanley and Williamson’s idea that 
ability entails knowledge-how. Alternatively, we could just assert POS' and deny 
POS. This is the “fallback position” briefly discussed at the end of §2.2. We are in 
a good position now—having noted Stanley and Williamson’s claims about 
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entailment relations between knowledge-how ability—to review their arguments 
against this response to their account of knowledge-how.  
As Stanley and Williamson note, the fallback position could be developed in two 
ways. The first development says that Mary only gains new abilities because “there 
is no knowing how to imagine an experience of red. There is just being able to 
imagine an experience of red” (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 442). Stanley and 
Williamson reject this development as they think that the ability to imagine an 
experience of red is clearly an ability to perform an intentional action. But then 
Mary must know how to imagine an experience of red if she gains the ability to 
imagine an experience of red—given Stanley and Williamson’s claim that having 
the ability to F entails knowing how to F.  
The second way to develop the fallback position is to say that Mary only gains 
new abilities because she already had “in her black and white room, knowledge 
how to imagine an experience of red” (ibid. 443). Stanley and Williamson reject 
this development by appealing to our intuition that Mary does not know how to 
imagine an experience of red before she leaves her room. Stanley and Williamson 
ask, “If she knows how to imagine an experience of red, why is she unable to 
imagine such an experience?” (ibid. 443). This is perhaps a somewhat weak 
objection given that they themselves argue that it is possible that one know how 
to F without having the ability to F. However, as we saw in §2.2, there is a more 
fundamental reason to reject either development of the fallback position. If we 
are to preserve the intuition that Mary learns something, we do need to say that 
Mary gains new knowledge-how, and so, by Stanley and Williamson’s main claim, 
that she gains new knowledge-that.  
We have seen that the sense in which Mary gains new knowledge-that conflicts 
with NEG2 but need not conflict with NEG1. Classic statements of the ability 
hypothesis rely on the conjunction of the identity and the distinctness claims to 
show that NEG is compatible with POS. In the current context, we must either 
deny the identity claim, or the distinctness claim, or both. AH* is compatible with 
any of these responses to the inconsistent triad. For AH* does not rely on either 
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the identity or the distinctness claim to show that NEG1 is compatible with POS. 
Rather AH* relies on the distinction between knowing a new proposition versus 
merely coming to be in a new state of propositional knowledge. Let us now 
examine this idea. 
2.5 Old Facts New Modes 
The ‘old-fact/new-mode’ reply to KA20 relies on the idea that we can individuate 
states of propositional knowledge not only by what their propositional objects 
are, but also by what mode of presentation a proposition is known under.21 Given 
that idea, the reply to KA is that Mary comes to be in a new state of propositional 
knowledge but does not gain knowledge of any new proposition. Mary only gains 
knowledge of an old proposition—i.e. a proposition she already knew under some 
mode of presentation—under a new mode of presentation. Proponents of the 
old-fact/new-mode reply often appeal to examples involving co-referring names 
to support this reply to KA. For example, (11) can be false even though (12) is 
true: 
(11) Lois knows that Clark Kent is afraid of Kryptonite. 
(12) Lois knows that Superman is afraid of Kryptonite. 
Old-fact/new-mode theorists claim that if Lois comes to know that Clark Kent is 
afraid of Kryptonite she will come to be in a new state of propositional 
                                            
20 Also known as the ‘the old-fact/new-guise reply’ and the ‘two-ways reply’. Proponents include: 
Horgan (1984), Loar (1990), Lycan (1996), Perry (2001), and Tye (2000). 
21 For reasons of continuity I will state the old-fact/new-mode reply in terms of ‘old-
propositions’ rather than ‘old-facts’, but nothing hinges on this choice. The old-fact/new-mode 
reply can be stated either way; I merely retain the name ‘old-fact/new-mode reply’ out of 
deference to convention. Also, for my purposes, questions about the difference between facts 
and propositions can be set to one side.  
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knowledge, but she will not come to know a new proposition. Like Mary, Lois 
will only come to know an old proposition under a new mode of presentation.22  
Note that we could also have supported the old-fact/new-mode reply by 
appealing to an example we saw in Chapter 1: that (13) can be false even though 
(14) is true. 
(13) John knows that he himself has burning pants. 
(14) John knows that that man has burning pants. 
Suppose that John comes to know that he himself has burning pants. John comes 
to be in a new state of propositional knowledge but he does not come to know a 
new proposition. He already knew the relevant proposition under a demonstrative 
mode of presentation. Like Mary, John only comes to know an old proposition 
under a new mode of presentation. 
Clearly, AH* is a version of this old-fact/new-mode form of reply to KA. Is this a 
problem for AH* conceived as a version of the ability hypothesis reply to KA? 
One erroneous but revealing objection that could be made to AH* is the 
following: 
Objection A 
                                            
22 At the very least Lois will not come to know a new ‘coarse-grained’ proposition, like the 
Russellian notion of a proposition used by Stanley and Williamson. If we were to individuate 
propositions in a Fregean or ‘fine-grained’ manner (5) and (6) would express different 
propositions. But it is clearly a coarse-grained notion of a proposition that proponents of the 
old-fact/new-mode reply have in mind when they say that Mary does not gain knowledge of any 
new proposition. The old-fact/new-mode reply does not stand or fall, however, on issues about 
how to individuate propositions. Old-fact/new-mode theorists can grant that Mary will learn 
new fine-grained propositions or facts (see Lycan 1996: 61), they just deny that Mary would 
thereby gain new information of a kind that would trouble physicalism. 
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(A1) AH* is a version of old-fact/new-mode reply to KA. 
(A2) If a reply to KA is a version of the old-fact/new-mode reply to KA 
then it is not a version of the ability hypothesis reply to KA. 
(A3) Therefore, AH* is not a version of the ability hypothesis reply to KA. 
The problem with this objection is that A2 is false. It is true that the old-
fact/new-mode reply and the ability hypothesis are typically portrayed as rival 
responses to KA, for example by Jackson (2005: 318–20). Proponents of one of 
these forms of reply to KA are often critics of the other.23 Consequently, one 
might think that there is a formal tension involved in claiming that AH* is a 
version of both of these general forms of reply to KA. But in fact, there is no 
such tension. AH* just demonstrates that the line between these two forms of 
reply to KA can be blurred depending on the details of specific versions of either 
reply. However, with few exceptions, this point is seldom acknowledged in the 
literature on KA (Van Gulick 2004: 391–2 is one notable exception; and Pettit 
2004: 106–7 also seems sympathetic to this point). Objection A reveals that the 
gap between the old-fact/new-mode reply and the ability hypothesis reply is not 
as large as it is typically portrayed as being.  
A more substantial objection could be made to AH* based on the fact that it is a 
version of the old-fact/new-mode reply. Critics of the old-fact/new-mode reply 
often claim that it fails for a simple and principled reason. This perception leads 
David Chalmers (1996: 142) to say of the old-fact/new-mode reply that despite 
“the fact that it is easily the most popular response to the knowledge argument, it 
is also easily the weakest of the major replies. It simply does not hold up to 
scrutiny”. Typically, such critics appeal to what we can call, following Chalmers, 
                                            
23 For example, Lewis (1998: 454–5) argues against a rather narrowly conceived version of the 
old-fact/new-mode form of reply. On the other side, many proponents of the old-fact/new-
mode form of reply are critics of the ability hypothesis, including Loar (1990) and Lycan (1996). 
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‘the new fact thesis’ (Chalmers 2004: 289–90).24 Stated in its strongest form the 
new fact thesis says that:  
(The New Fact Thesis) Necessarily, whenever someone gains new 
knowledge of an old proposition they must also gain knowledge of some 
new proposition.25  
If true, the new fact thesis does appear to cause trouble for the old-fact/new-
mode reply. For it is a consequence of the new fact thesis that Mary must come to 
know some new proposition if she comes to know an old proposition under a 
new mode of presentation—contra the old-fact/new-mode reply. In effect, the 
new fact thesis tells us that if NEG2 is false then NEG1 must be false as well—
contra AH*. This suggests the following objection to AH*: 
Objection B 
(B1) AH* is a version of the old-fact/new-mode reply to KA. 
(B2) If the new fact thesis is true then all versions of the old-fact/new-
mode reply to KA are unsuccessful. 
(B3) The new fact thesis is true. 
(B4) Therefore, AH* is unsuccessful. 
We cannot settle here the highly contested set of issues that would have to be 
                                            
24 Critics who appeal (more or less explicitly) to this thesis include: Chalmers (1996: 141–2, 2004: 
289), Lockwood (1989: 136–7), Thau (2002: 127), and proponents of the ability hypothesis like 
Jackson (2005: 318) and Lewis (1998: 454–5). 
25 Again, for the sake of continuity I am stating the new fact thesis in terms of propositions rather 
than facts.  
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addressed to establish the truth or falsity of B3. Notably, it would help to have the 
correct account of informative identity statements. That the new fact thesis is 
controversial should not be surprising as it is really just a denial of the idea behind 
the old-fact/new-mode reply: that one can come to be in a new state of 
knowledge without coming to know any new proposition. But then why should a 
proponent of the old-fact/new-mode reply be moved to abandon their position 
by a thesis that is simply the denial of that position? 
Critics of the old-fact/new-mode reply do argue that the new fact thesis should 
not be seen as controversial. Chalmers (2004: 289) says that the new fact thesis 
“can be endorsed even by those with very different views about reference and 
mental content”. Chalmers’ thought is that we need not appeal to any 
controversial views to establish the new fact thesis. Rather, we need only reflect 
on the stock examples appealed to by proponents of the old-fact/new-mode 
reply: that (5) can be false while (6) is true, even though both sentences attribute 
knowledge of the same proposition to Lois; or that one can know that there is 
water in one’s glass without knowing that there is H2O in it. In all variations of 
such examples (so the thought goes), one would necessarily learn new and 
substantive truths about the world if one came to know that Clark Kent is afraid 
of kryptonite or that there is H2O in my glass.26 
Even if we grant that the new fact thesis is obviously true in all variations of these 
                                            
26 To illustrate this point consider Bill. Bill knows a lot of everyday propositions about water, but 
does not know that water is H2O. One day, Bill’s chemistry teacher informs him that water is 
H2O, and thereby Bill comes to know an old proposition under a new mode of presentation. But 
now Bill should also come to know entirely new and substantive truths about his world: that one 
substance is both water and H2O; that the liquid in one’s glass has a particular molecular 
structure; and so on. Advocates of the new fact thesis think that such examples provide good 
evidence for this thesis. For my part, I am not convinced that we can reasonably infer that 
anyone who gains new knowledge of an old proposition must also gain knowledge of some new 
proposition in all such cases—including very a-typical cases like Mary’s—from the obvious fact 
that normally when we come to know a new proposition we also thereby come to know a lot of 
other propositions. 
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stock examples it is not obvious that it is generally true. Think of David Lewis’ 
(1979) example of the two gods who occupy the same possible world. Both gods 
are omniscient with respect to every proposition true at their world, but they still 
lack knowledge as: 
[n]either one knows which of the two he is. They are not exactly alike. One lives atop 
the tallest mountain and throws down manna; the other lives atop the coldest mountain 
and throws down thunderbolts. Neither knows whether he lives on the coldest 
mountain or on the tallest; nor whether he throws manna or thunderbolts (Lewis 1979: 
520–1). 
According to Lewis (1979: 521): “If the gods came to know which was which, 
they would know more than they do. But they wouldn’t know more 
propositions”. Now imagine someone who (unlike Lewis) wished to explain the 
gods’ new knowledge in terms of their coming to know old propositions under 
new modes of presentation. It would clearly be no objection to such an account 
to point out that it contradicts the new fact thesis.  
Chalmers (2004: 289) himself acknowledges that the new fact thesis does not 
apply to what he calls ‘indexical cases’.27 In doing so, he seems to acknowledge 
that John need not necessarily learn any new proposition when he learns that he is 
that man whose pants are on fire. But John’s epistemic gain in such a situation is 
not trivial and, as we have seen, one explanation of his epistemic gain is that John 
comes to know an old proposition under a new first-personal mode of 
presentation. There is then at least one notion of coming to know an old 
proposition in a new way to which the new fact thesis does not apply.  
This will not concern Chalmers, as he has independent reasons for thinking that 
appeals to indexical knowledge cannot support physicalist responses to KA. 
However, the inapplicability of the new fact thesis to indexical knowledge is 
significant as it shows that the new fact thesis cannot ground a principled 
                                            
27 See Chalmers’ statement of the new fact thesis (Chalmers 2004: 289).  
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objection to all variations of the old-fact/new-mode reply. The new fact thesis 
may only show us that proponents of the old-fact/new-mode reply have often 
chosen poor examples to support their reply to KA.28 This is an important 
concession but it falls well short of conceding that one cannot reply to KA by 
claiming that Mary only comes to know an old-fact in a new way.  
Our reply to Objection B then is this: if the new fact thesis is taken to apply to all 
cases of coming to know an old proposition in a new way then it looks false; in 
which case, we can defend AH* by denying B3. If, on the other hand, the new 
fact thesis is restricted so as not to apply to indexical cases, then we can defend 
AH* by denying B2, for many versions of the old-fact/new-mode reply to KA do 
rely on appeals to first-personal or indexical modes of presentation. Now, it could 
still be the case that the new fact thesis applies to cases of coming to know an old 
proposition under a new practical mode of presentation. But if there is one 
exception to the new fact thesis couldn’t there be more? At the very least, we can 
say that if cases of coming to know an old proposition under a new first-personal 
mode of presentation are exceptions to the new fact thesis then (for all we know) 
the same could be true for practical modes of presentation.  
Furthermore, Stanley and Williamson’s practical modes of presentation are 
modeled on—and are meant to share—important features with first-personal 
modes of presentation29 (and also demonstrative modes of presentation). Given 
the close relationship between first-personal modes of presentation and practical 
modes of presentation, it seems reasonable to argue that if cases of coming to 
                                            
28 To be fair, many proponents of the old-fact/new-mode reply, such as Lycan (1996) and Perry 
(2001), do rely heavily on analogies between Mary’s new knowledge and the gaining of new 
indexical knowledge.  
29 For example, Stanley and Williamson (2001: 433–4) concede that it might be impossible to 
give any reductive description of knowledge-how in non-indexical involving terms. They argue 
that this is not a problem for their account on the grounds that it is likely that the same is true 
for first-personal knowledge, yet first-personal knowledge is still a sub-class of knowledge-that. 
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know an old proposition under a new first-personal mode of presentation are 
exceptions to the new fact thesis, the same is likely to be true of practical modes 
of presentation.30 
Undeniably, AH* is vulnerable to objections that do not obviously arise for classic 
statements of the ability hypothesis. But AH* is also better off in regards to a host 
of well-known criticisms of the ability hypothesis. For example, William G. Lycan 
(1996: 92–5) presents ten prominent arguments against the ability hypothesis. All 
of these arguments are meant to show “that what Mary gains is indeed 
propositional knowledge” (ibid. 92). That is, they are all arguments for the 
conclusion that Mary’s new knowledge must be some form of propositional 
knowledge. Without considering the details of Lycan’s ten arguments we can see 
that none of them affects AH*, for AH* endorses their conclusion. AH* says that 
Mary’s new knowledge is knowledge-how, which in turn is a form of 
propositional knowledge. Thus, AH* shows us that the ability hypothesis cannot 
be undermined by the claim that Mary’s new knowledge must be some form of 
propositional knowledge.  
2.6 Conclusions 
Stanley and Williamson (2001: 441) regard the ability hypothesis as an example of 
a philosophical thesis whose “reliance on the alleged distinction between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that is fatal to the thesis advanced”. They reach 
this conclusion because they assume that their account of knowledge-how is 
inconsistent with the ability hypothesis. This assumption is not quite right. The 
heart of the ability hypothesis response to KA is the idea that NEG is compatible 
with POS. Classic statements of the ability hypothesis maintain that NEG is 
compatible with POS by defending the identity and distinctness claims—that 
Mary’s new knowledge-how is ability, and that these abilities are utterly distinct 
                                            
30 Intuitively, coming to know an old proposition under a practical mode of presentation does not 
sound like a process that necessarily involves coming to know some new proposition.  
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from propositional knowledge. The conjunction of these two claims is 
inconsistent with Stanley and Williamson’s main claim: that knowledge-how is a 
species of knowledge-that. An alternative way to maintain the compatibility of 
NEG with POS is to discern an ambiguity in NEG. This allows one to recognize 
a version of the ability hypothesis, AH*, that is consistent with both Stanley and 
Williamson’s main claim as well as their further claims, that ability entails 
knowledge-how, and that knowledge-how does not entail ability. This is why the 
obvious answer that we began with is false, for we cannot assume that if 
knowledge-how is some form of propositional knowledge then it follows that no 
version of the ability hypothesis is true. AH* shows us that we should not 
confuse the ability hypothesis reply to KA with any specific thesis about the 
nature of knowledge-how. 31 
In closing, I want to highlight two further implications of AH*. The first of these 
is an implication for certain proponents of the ability hypothesis. Consider Frank 
Jackson: the inventor of the knowledge argument, but now a latter-day convert to 
the ability hypothesis. As Jackson (2004: 439) says, he now agrees “with Laurence 
Nemirow and David Lewis on what happens to Mary on her release.” Jackson 
also dismisses the idea that the physicalist can respond to KA by saying that Mary 
only comes to know an old proposition under a new mode of presentation. His 
argument against the old-fact/new-mode reply rests on a variation of the new fact 
thesis (see Jackson 2005: 318).32 But if Stanley and Williamson’s account of 
                                            
31 Of course, there are possible accounts of knowledge-how that are inconsistent with the ability 
hypothesis. The point is that broadly Rylean accounts of knowledge-how (of the kind that Lewis 
and Nemirow appeal to) are not the only accounts of knowledge-how that can be used to state 
the ability hypothesis.  
32 Jackson thinks that every mode of presentation of some x—where he lets x stand for any 
unique thing, event or fact—must be associated with a unique feature or property of x. As he 
states: “Although there is one Robinson, for each guise that applies to him, there is a separate 
feature: it is a feature of Robinson that he is a suspect, that he is a tennis partner, and that he is 
the buyer of a house, and each of these features are distinct” (Jackson 2005: 318). The upshot of 
this view is that corresponding to every individual mode of presentation of some x there will be 
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knowledge-how is correct then Jackson can no longer affirm both NEG and POS 
by saying that Mary only gains new “abilities or know-how (as opposed to 
knowledge-that)” (ibid. 320). Stanley and Williamson’s main claim is inconsistent 
with this conjunction of the identity and distinctness claims. In this context, the 
only way to maintain that NEG and POS are compatible is to distinguish NEG1 
from NEG2, by appealing to something like the distinction between coming to 
know a new proposition versus merely coming to know an old proposition under 
a new mode of presentation. Jackson could choose to deny POS and only affirm 
POS'—the claim that Mary gains new abilities. But as we have seen, this response 
to Stanley and Williamson comes at a very high price, namely, that one can no 
longer say that Mary learns how to do something.  
So, unless he can supply an argument against Stanley and Williamson’s account of 
knowledge-how, Jackson must choose between his commitment to the new fact 
thesis and his commitment to the ability hypothesis. The right choice for Jackson, 
qua proponent of the ability hypothesis, is clear. If we should not confuse the 
ability hypothesis with particular accounts of knowledge-how, then a fortiori we 
should not confuse the ability hypothesis with the views of some of its 
proponents about the new fact thesis, or any other issues not directly related to 
the core claims of the ability hypothesis, i.e. NEG and POS. Proponents of the 
ability hypothesis committed to the new fact thesis, like Jackson (2005) and Lewis 
(1998), must reconsider this commitment or provide an argument against Stanley 
and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how. 
                                                                                                                            
a unique fact about x. In the terminology we have been using we can say that every individual 
mode of presentation of x is paired with a unique proposition. So, Jackson thinks that if 
someone comes to know an old proposition under a new mode of presentation they must come 
to know some new proposition; that is, he endorses the new fact thesis. 
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Finally AH* also has implications for our understanding of the distinction 
between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. In arguing that their account of 
knowledge-how is inconsistent with the ability hypothesis, Stanley and Williamson 
intend to underscore “the dangers of invoking Ryle’s distinction” (2001: 441) 
when doing philosophy. Of course, Stanley and Williamson themselves give an 
account of the distinction between knowledge-how and other forms of 
knowledge-that, but they regard this distinction as being philosophically 
insignificant. This claim also supports their denial that they have “just recreated 
the traditional distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, but in other 
terms” (ibid. 434).  
But we have seen in this chapter that we can deploy Stanley and Williamson’s 
account of knowledge-how to motivate the ability hypothesis reply to KA—one 
of the most important applications of the knowledge-how/knowledge-that 
distinction in philosophy. The moral is that even if some form of intellectualism is 
true there may still be a philosophically significant distinction between 
knowledge-how and other kinds of knowledge-that. Of course, there is still the 
further issue of whether or not intellectualism is in fact true.  In Chapter 1 I 
argued that the insufficiency objection only establishes that simple, and not 
sophisticated, intellectualism is false.  In the next chapter, however, I shall provide 
arguments that—if sound—demonstrate that no form of intellectualism is true. 
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Chapter 3 Knowing How Without Knowing That 
 
In this chapter I present three new arguments against intellectualism. In particular, 
I shall argue that, given certain very standard assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge-that, intellectualism is subject to three different kinds of 
counterexample. Each counterexample is a scenario where someone knows how 
to F but they fail to stand in the knowledge-that relation to any proposition p, 
such that their knowing how to F might plausibly be a matter (either partly or 
wholly) of their knowing that p. In each counterexample the subject fails to stand 
in the knowledge-that relation to some such proposition p because they fail to 
satisfy some familiar, necessary condition for knowing that p. The 
counterexamples differ with respect to what this necessary condition is.  
In denying that knowledge-how is a matter—either partly or wholly—of standing 
in the knowledge-that relation to a proposition, I thereby endorse Gilbert Ryle’s 
conclusion that intellectualism is false, albeit on the basis of different arguments. 
However, I do not thereby endorse some form of Ryleanism. After presenting 
(§3.1) and defending my case against intellectualism (§§3.2–3.3), I suggest that the 
previous discussion points to a new view of knowledge-how that is distinct from 
both intellectualism and Ryleanism (§3.4), although it shares important features 
with each of these views.  
3.1 Three Counterexamples 
To see why the examples I will present are putative counterexamples to 
intellectualism it will help to have some actual intellectualist account of 
knowledge-how in mind. In what follows I will focus again on Stanley and 
Williamson’s (2001) intellectualist analysis of knowledge-how: 
‘S knows how to F’ is true if, and only if, there is some way w for S to F 
such that:         
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 (a) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a 
way for S to F, and        
 (b) In standing in this relation S entertains the proposition that w is a way 
for S to F under a practical mode of presentation. 
According to this view of knowledge-how then, Shane knows how to juggle just 
in case he stands in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition of the form 
‘w is a way for Shane to juggle’, and in standing in this relation he entertains this 
proposition under a practical mode of presentation.  
With Stanley and Williamson’s account in mind I can introduce our three putative 
counterexamples. I take each example to be a case where knowledge-how comes 
apart from knowledge-that; that is, a case where someone knows how to F but 
there is no proposition p such that their knowing how to F might be plausibly a 
matter (either partly or wholly) of their knowing that p. The first example is a case 
where intuitively someone knows how to F, but they do not possess the kind of 
knowledge-that that such knowledge-how might be plausibly equated with, 
because their relevant beliefs are only accidentally true. Similar cases have been 
discussed in the literature, by Stanley and Williamson (2001: 435) and Ted Poston 
(forthcoming). But the possibility that such cases constitute counterexamples to 
intellectualism has normally been overlooked33 (a point I will return to at the end 
of this section).  
The second and third cases are each of a kind that has not been discussed before. 
The second case is a scenario where intuitively someone knows how to F but they 
do not possess the kind of knowledge-that that this knowledge-how might be 
plausibly equated with, because their relevant beliefs are defeated. The third case is 
a scenario where intuitively someone knows how to F but they do not possess the 
                                            
33 Aidan McGlynn, on his blog ‘The Boundaries of Language’, has independently noted the 
possibility of construing the kind of Gettier style cases that are already found in the literature as 
counterexamples to intellectualism (see <http://aidanmcglynn.blogspot.com/2007/08/is-
knowledge-how-gettier-susceptible.html>). 
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kind of knowledge-that that this knowledge-how might be plausibly equated with, 
because they lack the relevant beliefs.34 Here then are our three putative 
counterexamples: 
The Lucky Light Bulb        
 Charlie wants to learn how to change a light bulb, but he knows almost 
nothing about light fixtures or bulbs. So, he consults The Idiot’s Guide to 
Everyday Jobs. Inside, Charlie finds an accurate set of instructions describing 
a light fixture and bulb, and the way to change a bulb. Charlie grasps these 
instructions perfectly. And there is a way, call it ‘w1’, such that Charlie now 
believes that w1 is a way for him to change a light bulb, namely, the way 
described in the book. However, unbeknownst to Charlie, he is extremely 
lucky to have read these instructions. For the disgruntled author of The 
Idiot’s Guide filled her book with misleading instructions. Under every entry 
she intentionally misdescribed the objects involved in that job, and 
described a series of actions that would not constitute a way to do the job 
at all. However, at the printers, a computer error caused the text under the 
entry for ‘Changing a Light Bulb’, in just one copy of the book, to be 
randomly replaced by new text. By incredible coincidence, this new text 
provided the clear and accurate set of instructions that Charlie would later 
consult. 
The Dogmatic Hallucinator       
 Lucy occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of hallucination. On 
occasion, it seems to her that she remembers an event of learning how to 
F, when in fact no such event occurred. Furthermore, the way Lucy 
                                            
34 The three arguments by counterexample given here closely parallel, and are partly inspired by, 
arguments that Dean Pettit (2002: 519–50) has given for the conclusion that linguistic 
understanding is not a kind of knowledge-that. I will not examine Pettit’s arguments here as to 
do so would take us into issues beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, my 
intellectual debt to Pettit’s arguments should be clear to those familiar with his excellent paper.  
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‘remembers’ as being the way to F, is not a way to F at all. On Saturday, a 
clown teaches Lucy how to juggle. Consequently, she knows how to juggle. 
And there is a way, call it ‘w2’, such that Lucy now believes that w2 is a way 
for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her to juggle. On 
Sunday, Lucy is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how 
to juggle. However, as she begins, the alarm goes off on her false memory 
detector (or FMD), a remarkable device that is a super-reliable detector of 
her false memories. This indicates to Lucy that her apparent memory of 
learning how to juggle is a false memory that is misleading with respect to 
the way to juggle. Normally, Lucy would revise her beliefs accordingly, and 
this is what she believes she ought to do now. However, on this occasion 
she is unable to shake the beliefs she believes she ought to revise. For 
example, Lucy continues to believe that she knows how to juggle and that 
w2 is a way for her to juggle. Of course, Lucy did learn how to juggle 
yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that was highly 
unlikely. 
The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator       
 Jodie occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of hallucination. On 
occasion, it seems to her that she remembers an event of learning how to 
F, when in fact no such event occurred. Furthermore, the way Jodie 
‘remembers’ as being the way to F, is not a way to F at all. On Saturday, a 
clown teaches Jodie how to juggle. Consequently, she knows how to 
juggle. And there is a way, call it ‘w3’, such that Jodie now believes that w3 is 
a way for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her to juggle. On 
Sunday, Jodie is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how 
to juggle. However, as she begins, the alarm goes off on her false memory 
detector (or FMD), a remarkable device that is a super-reliable detector of 
her false memories. This indicates to Jodie that her apparent memory of 
learning how to juggle is a false memory that is misleading with respect to 
the way to juggle. Normally, Jodie would revise her beliefs accordingly, and 
this is exactly what Jodie does. She no longer believes that she knows how 
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to juggle or that w3 is a way for her to juggle. Of course, Jodie did learn 
how to juggle yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that 
was highly unlikely. 
The conclusion that these examples are all counterexamples to Stanley and 
Williamson’s account of knowledge-how rests on two premises. The first premise 
is that the subjects in these cases each possess the relevant knowledge-how. More 
precisely, the premise states that the following claims are all correct, where ‘t1’ 
refers to a moment just after Charlie has grasped the instructions in The Idiots 
Guide, ‘t2’ refers to a moment just after Lucy has resisted revising her beliefs, and 
‘t3’ refers to a moment just after Jodie has revised her beliefs: 
The Knowledge-how (KH) Claims     
 (KH.1) At t1 Charlie knows how to change a light bulb.  
 (KH.2) At t2 Lucy knows how to juggle.    
 (KH.3) At t3 Jodie knows how to juggle. 
The second premise is that the subjects do not possess the kind of knowledge-
that which Stanley and Williamson would identify their knowledge-how with. 
More precisely, the premise states that the following claims are all correct: 
The No Knowledge-that (NKT) Claims      
 (NKT.1) At t1 Charlie does not know that w1 is a way for him to change a 
light bulb.         
 (NKT.2) At t2 Lucy does not know that w2 is a way for her to juggle.
 (NKT.3) At t3 Jodie does not know that w3 is a way for her to juggle. 
The KH claims, I submit, are all intuitively correct. The fact that Charlie is 
extremely lucky to have read accurate (as opposed to misleading) instructions just 
seems irrelevant to whether or not he comes to know how to change a light bulb 
on the basis of reading those instructions. The fact that a number of Lucy’s 
beliefs about juggling are defeated does not seem to be a reason to think that she 
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has lost her knowledge how to juggle. Indeed, the intuitive thing to say with 
regard to Lucy’s belief at t2 that she knows how to juggle, is that while this belief 
is unjustified, it is nonetheless true. Finally, the fact that at t3 Jodie no longer 
believes that she knows how to juggle, or that w3 is a way for her to juggle, does 
not seem to be a reason to conclude that Jodie has lost her knowledge how to 
juggle. Indeed, while Jodie’s belief at t3 that she does not know how to juggle is 
justified, it is also intuitively false.  
Moving to the NKT claims, recall that according to Stanley and Williamson if S 
knows how to F then there is some contextually relevant way w such that S knows 
that w is a way for S to F. But this putative necessary condition for knowing how 
to F fails to hold in any of our three scenarios. The contextually relevant ways in 
our three scenarios are clearly just w1, w2 and w3. Now, at t1 Charlie does believe 
that w1 is a way for him to change a light bulb, and this belief is both true and 
justified. But this belief does not constitute knowledge, for it is only accidentally 
true, or true only as a matter of mere luck. And it is a familiar lesson from the 
Gettier literature, that knowledge-that is incompatible with the kind of epistemic 
luck present in this scenario.35  
Similarly, at t2 Lucy does believe that w2 is a way for her to juggle. But again, this 
belief does not constitute knowledge, for Lucy knows that her FMD is a super-
reliable detector of her false memories, and that these false memories are 
misleading with respect to the way to perform the relevant action. Lucy believes 
then that her belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle is not reliable or epistemically 
responsible. Furthermore, she is justified in this higher-order belief. In such a 
situation, Lucy’s first-order belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle, while true, 
                                            
35 There is no need to offer an explicit analysis here of the kind of epistemic luck that 
knowledge-that excludes. Notoriously, no such analysis is widely accepted. But there is 
widespread agreement that knowledge-that excludes that kind of luck—whatever it is exactly—
that is at work in Gettier cases. All we require then, is that the case I describe is of a kind with 
cases found in the Gettier literature; and I think that it clearly is. For an excellent discussion of 
the relationship between knowledge-that and epistemic luck see Duncan Pritchard (2005). 
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does not possess the justification or warrant necessary for knowledge.36 Finally, at 
t3 Jodie clearly does not know that w3 is a way for her to juggle, for she does not 
even believe that w3 is a way for her to juggle.  
I submit that the KH and NKT claims are all correct. It follows that each of our 
three examples is a counterexample to Stanley and Williamson’s account of 
knowledge-how.  
Furthermore, I submit that these examples will be counterexamples to any 
plausible account of knowledge-how, whereby knowing how to F is, at least 
partly, a matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some relevant 
proposition p. On any plausible version of such an account, this proposition p 
will concern something like a way, method or procedure for F-ing. If so, it would 
be an easy exercise to redescribe our three examples to emphasize the fact that 
Charlie’s belief that p is only accidentally true, that Lucy’s belief that p is defeated, 
and that Jodie does not believe that p. In other words, for any plausible version of 
either simple or sophisticated intellectualism—whereby one knows how to F only 
if one stands in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition p concerning a 
way to F—we will be able to provide parallel arguments for the corresponding 
NKT claims of the form: ‘At tn S does not know that p.’ The arguments given 
here clearly apply then not only to Stanley and Williamson’s account of 
knowledge-how, but also to the intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how offered 
by Bengson and Moffett (2007) and Brogaard (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) that 
I discussed in Chapter 1. 
                                            
36 I assume that the defeater for Lucy’s belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle is her higher-order 
belief that her belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle is not reliable. But this assumption is not 
essential to my argument. It could be that the defeater is Lucy’s experience of seeing the readout 
on her FMD or some relevant proposition. For our purposes, all that matters is that Lucy’s belief 
that w2 is a way for her to juggle does not constitute knowledge-that in this scenario. Similarly, 
for ease of exposition, I assume that what gets defeated is Lucy’s belief that w2 is a way for her to 
juggle. But my argument is perfectly consistent with views according to which it is Lucy’s reasons 
for believing that w2 is a way for her to juggle that are defeated, rather than the belief itself.  
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To clarify these three arguments by counterexample, it may help to contrast one 
of them with a related but weaker form of argument against intellectualism 
examined by Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Poston (forthcoming), each of 
whom discusses cases like the lucky light bulb as a means of evaluating this 
objection. Stanley and Williamson imagine that someone might object to their 
account of knowledge-how by appealing to a supposed disanalogy between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that: 
On the analysis we presented in the last section, knowing-how is analyzed in terms of 
knowing-that. In particular, knowing how to F is a matter of knowing that p, for a 
certain proposition p (as well as entertaining it under the right mode of presentation). So, 
knowing-how is straightforwardly analysed in terms of knowing-that. But one might 
worry that significant disanalogies still remain between knowing-how and other kinds of 
knowing-that. One potential source of disanalogy involves Gettier cases. We can 
imagine cases of justified true belief that fail to be knowledge-that, because they fail to 
satisfy some extra condition. It may appear difficult to conceive of Gettier-cases for 
knowledge-how. But if knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that, there should 
be such cases (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 435). 
Stanley and Williamson dismiss this disanalogy objection by disputing the claim 
that there are no Gettier cases for knowledge-how.37 In response, Poston defends 
the disanalogy objection by defending the claim that there are no Gettier cases for 
knowledge-how. 
The disanalogy objection and my argument that appeals to the lucky light bulb 
case are importantly different. Suppose we could demonstrate that Poston is right, 
and there are no Gettier cases for knowledge-how. That is, no cases where one 
fails to know how to F for the same kind of reason one fails to know that p in a 
standard Gettier case. This alone would not establish that intellectualism is false. 
As it could be the case that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that that is 
                                            
37 As we will see in §3.2, Stanley and Williamson also raise another reason for rejecting this 
disanalogy objection, namely, they reject the assumption that all kinds of knowledge-that are 
susceptible to Gettier cases. 
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merely disanalogous, in this respect, to other kinds of knowledge-that. That is, for 
all that we have shown, it could be the case that in any Gettier-like scenario where 
someone knows how to F, they will also possess the kind of knowledge-that that 
intellectualists would equate their knowledge-how with. 
On the other hand, our argument claims that there is at least one Gettier scenario 
where someone knows how to F and they also fail to possess the kind of 
knowledge-that that this knowledge-how might be plausibly equated with. If this 
is correct, it does follow that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that. 
Furthermore, the existence of such a Gettier scenario is consistent with the 
existence of other Gettier scenarios where knowledge-how and knowledge-that 
go together. This argument does not require then that knowledge-how is never 
susceptible to the kind of epistemic luck found in Gettier cases. Nor, for that 
matter, does it require that knowledge-that is always susceptible to such luck. 
The crucial issue then, with respect to Gettier scenarios, is not whether or not 
there is some disanalogy between knowledge-how and knowledge-that with 
respect to such scenarios. Rather, the crucial issue is whether or not knowledge-
how and knowledge-that come apart in any such scenarios.  
The more general moral is that to respond to any of our putative 
counterexamples it will not suffice for the intellectualist to merely argue that there 
are other similar cases where knowledge-how and knowledge-that go together. 
Rather, the intellectualist must dispute the evaluation offered of these particular 
examples. There are obviously two ways they could do this. For each case the 
intellectualist could deny the relevant KH claim, or they could deny the relevant 
NKT claim. In §3.2 and §3.3 I will discuss both forms of response separately. In 
doing so, I hope to show that on close examination neither form of response is 
plausible.  
3.2 The No Knowledge-that Claims 
The first form of response to our putative counterexamples that I will consider is 
one that disputes the relevant NKT claim. If we start with the lucky light bulb 
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case, the question is whether the intellectualist can reasonably deny NKT.1. Recall 
that the reason for thinking that Charlie’s belief that w1 is a way for him to change 
a light bulb does not constitute knowledge-that is that this belief is only 
accidentally true.38 If the intellectualist is to claim that at t1 Charlie does know that 
w1 is a way for him to change a light bulb, they will have to deny the standard 
view that knowledge-that is subject to an anti-luck condition. Namely, that if one 
knows that p then it is not a matter of mere luck or accident that one’s belief that 
p is true. Denying NKT.1 appears to be an unattractive response to the lucky light 
bulb case because it commits the intellectualist to a major revision of our 
conception of knowledge-that. 
The intellectualist might still respond that all that is needed is a ‘localized’ 
rejection of the idea that knowledge-that is subject to an anti-luck condition. 
Stanley and Williamson themselves could be interpreted as suggesting this kind of 
response in their discussion of the disanalogy objection: 
                                            
38 One might point out that at t1 Charlie is better positioned with respect to knowing that w1 is a 
way for him to change a light bulb than he was before t1. For example, if he now attempts to 
change a light bulb he will come to know that w1 is a way for him to change a light bulb more 
easily than he would have if he did not already believe that this was the case. This is true but 
beside the point. For it does not alter the fact that at t1 Charlie does not know that w1 is a way for 
him to change a light bulb. Consider an analogy. At morning tea you ask Mary if she knows 
which bus goes to Kingston. She tells you that the 501 goes to Kingston and you believe her, 
despite the fact that you know Mary is a compulsive liar. And indeed, Mary did intend to give 
you false information but, by accident, she gave you correct information. Given your new true 
belief that the 501 goes to Kingston, you are now in a better position with respect to knowing 
that the 501 goes to Kingston. For now you are more likely to act in ways that will lead to you 
gaining further evidence in support of this belief. For example, if you want to get a bus to 
Kingston you will choose to catch the 501. But your new proximity to knowledge does not 
change the fact that at morning tea—when your only evidence is testimony from a source you 
know to be highly unreliable—your belief does not constitute knowledge. 
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We doubt that every kind of knowledge-that is susceptible to Gettier cases. So it would 
not worry us if it were not possible to come up with a Gettier case for knowledge-how 
(Stanley and Williamson 2001: 435).  
On one interpretation of this passage, Stanley and Williamson are claiming that 
they would be unconcerned if they had to deny that knowledge-how is subject to 
an anti-luck condition, because they think that there are other kinds of 
knowledge-that which are also not subject to such a condition.39 And the claim 
that knowledge-how is not subject to an anti-luck condition is consistent with the 
claim that other kinds of knowledge-that are subject to such a condition. Stanley 
and Williamson might then point out that in claiming that Charlie knows that w1 is 
a way for him to change a light bulb they need only commit themselves to the 
claim that one particular kind of knowledge-that is not subject to an anti-luck 
condition.  
However, Stanley and Williamson cannot simply assert that knowledge-how is a 
distinctive kind of knowledge-that that is not susceptible to Gettier cases. Rather, 
what they would need to establish is that S’s standing in the knowledge-that 
relation to a proposition of the form ‘w is a way for S to F’, is a distinctive kind of 
knowledge-that that is not susceptible to Gettier cases. But why should we think 
                                            
39 The claim that not all kinds of knowledge-that are susceptible to Gettier cases is somewhat 
difficult to interpret, as there are at least two quite distinct ways it could turn out to be true. As 
interpreted above, the idea is that there is at least one kind of knowledge-that such that one can 
possess this kind of knowledge-that even when one’s relevant justified true beliefs are only 
accidentally true. If this were the case, then this kind of knowledge-that would not be susceptible 
to Gettier cases because it is not subject to an anti-luck condition. But perhaps Stanley and 
Williamson’s idea here is that there are some kinds of knowledge-that such that one simply 
cannot describe any scenario where one has the relevant justified true beliefs but they are only 
accidentally true. If this were the case then this kind of knowledge-that would not be susceptible 
to Gettier cases, but it would still be subject to an anti-luck condition, for it would trivially satisfy 
such a condition. I have focused on the former idea above for the simple reason that we 
obviously can describe scenarios where someone has a justified true belief of the form ‘w is a way 
to F’ that is only accidentally true.  
73 
that this is the case? There is nothing obviously special about propositions 
concerning ways to perform actions such that S could know that p, even though 
S’s belief that p is merely accidentally true, whenever p happens to be a 
proposition of the form ‘w is a way for S to F.’ 
Perhaps Stanley and Williamson might argue that the relevant kind of knowledge-
that that is not susceptible to Gettier cases is the knowledge-that which S has 
when S stands in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition of the form ‘w 
is a way for S to F’ and, in standing in this relation, S entertains that proposition 
under a practical mode of presentation. That is, Stanley and Williamson could 
claim that the fact that Charlie’s belief that w1 is a way for him to change a light 
bulb is accidentally true is irrelevant to whether or not he knows that w1 is a way 
for him to change a light bulb under a practical mode of presentation.  
But note how odd this suggestion would be. No one has ever tried to defend the 
tripartite analysis of knowledge by claiming that while the subjects in Gettier cases 
do not come to know that p under such-and-such mode of presentation, they do 
come to know that p under some other mode of presentation. And there is a 
good reason why not. For the fact that someone’s belief that p is merely 
accidentally true is surely a reason to think that they do not know that p simpliciter, 
regardless of what mode of presentation they happen to entertain that proposition 
under.  
At the very least, if Stanley and Williamson were to adopt this response they 
would owe us an explanation of why knowledge of propositions of the form ‘w is 
a way for one to F’ is resistant to Gettier influences in the special case where one 
entertains that proposition under a practical mode of presentation. And this 
explanation cannot simply consist in the claim that knowing that w is a way for 
one to F under a practical mode of presentation is knowledge-how, and 
knowledge-how is resistant to Gettier influences. 
The problem is that modes of presentation look like the wrong kind of thing on 
which to base such an explanation. Consider the sorts of reasons that are typically 
offered to explain why S fails to know that p in a given Gettier scenario: that the 
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truth of S’s belief that p is not appropriately related to S’s reasons for holding that 
belief, or that the source of S’s belief that p is unreliable, and so on. Such reasons 
for thinking that S fails to know that p do not seem even to be addressed—let 
alone outweighed or undermined—by the extra information that S happens to 
entertain p under such-and-such a mode of presentation.  
The general point is that it is difficult to see how the intellectualist could motivate 
the claim that in denying NKT.1 they need only endorse a localized, rather than 
wholesale, rejection of the idea that knowledge-that is subject to an anti-luck 
condition. This is because the kind of knowledge-that that intellectualists’ equate 
knowledge-how with has no distinctive features that would support such a claim. 
Denying NKT.1 is still an unattractive response then to the lucky light bulb case, 
given that it commits the intellectualist to such a major revision of the standard 
conception of knowledge-that. 
And, if anything, the situation with regard to NKT.2 and NKT.3 is worse. Recall 
the reasons given in §3.1 for accepting these two claims. NKT.2 was supported by 
the claim that at t2 Lucy’s belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle is defeated, and 
hence does not possess the justification or warrant necessary for it to constitute 
knowledge. NKT.3 was supported by the claim that at t3 Jodie does not believe 
that w3 is a way for her to juggle. If we accept the defeat and no-belief claims, the 
consequences of denying NKT.2 and NKT.3 are severe. If the defeat claim is 
true, to deny NKT.2 is also to deny that having justification or warrant for one’s 
belief that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. And if the belief claim is 
true, to deny NKT.3 is also to deny that believing that p is a necessary condition 
for knowing that p.  
Faced with a choice between maintaining that knowledge-how is a species of 
knowledge-that, and denying that knowledge-that is subject to a justified or 
warranted belief condition, I take it that the right choice is clear. We should reject 
the intellectualist thesis. Faced with the parallel choice with regard to the belief 
condition, the right choice is just as clear. Again, we should reject the 
intellectualist thesis. To choose otherwise in either case would be to radically 
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revise our conception of knowledge-that, just to maintain the thesis that 
knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that.  
If the intellectualist is to deny NKT.2 and NKT.3 then, they must establish that 
the defeat and belief claims are false. But can one plausibly deny either of these 
claims? Perhaps, against the defeat claim, the intellectualist might argue that when 
one entertains a proposition p under a practical mode of presentation, then one’s 
belief that p can be justified even when one has a justified belief that their belief 
that p is unreliable. But again, I think the intellectualist would be hard pressed to 
justify this ‘localized’ rejection of what clearly looks like a necessary condition for 
knowledge-that in general. Namely, that if one knows that p then one does not 
have a justified belief that one’s belief that p is unreliable, or epistemically 
inappropriate.40 The fact that Lucy has a justified belief that her belief that w2 is a 
way for her to juggle is unreliable, is surely a reason to conclude that she does not 
know that w2 is a way for her to juggle simpliciter. It is not merely a reason to 
conclude that Lucy does not know that w2 is a way for her to juggle, if she 
happens to entertain this proposition under a non-practical mode of presentation. 
What of the no-belief claim? Could not one argue that at t3 Jodie still implicitly or 
tacitly believes that w3 is a way for her to juggle? And, if so, could not one argue 
that Jodie still implicitly or tacitly knows that that w3 is a way for her to juggle? 
Undoubtedly, there is a good sense in which at t3 it will still seem to Jodie that w3 is 
a way for her to juggle. For example, if Jodie imagines w3, this way will still strike 
her as being a way to juggle. But we should not confuse mere seemings with 
beliefs. Even if one knows that the two lines in a Müller-Lyer figure are of the 
same length, it will still seem to one that they differ in length. And as George 
Bealer (1993) has pointed out (amongst others), the same point applies not only 
                                            
40 This kind of condition is widely accepted as a necessary condition for knowledge-that by both 
internalists and externalists, for discussion see Michael Bergman (1997: 399–417). There is a 
debate about whether one’s second-order belief that one’s belief that p is not reliable must itself 
be justified in order for it to defeat one’s first-order belief that p. But this debate is not relevant 
here given that Lucy’s higher-order belief is justified. 
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to perceptual seemings but also to intellectual seemings. To use one of Bealer’s 
examples, it can still seem to one that the naïve axiom of set theory is true, even 
though one does not believe that it is true because one knows that it leads to a 
contradiction. Likewise, while it seems to Jodie that w3 is a way for her to juggle, I 
think it is clear that she fails to believe that w3 is a way for her to juggle. 
Furthermore, Jodie has consciously reflected on the question of whether or not w3 
is a way for her to juggle, and she has concluded on the basis of her relevant 
evidence that w3 is not a way for her to juggle. If someone has consciously 
reflected on the question of whether or not p and concluded on the basis of their 
relevant evidence that not-p, this is normally a strong indicator that they do not 
believe that p. There are difficult cases (including ones involving delusional 
beliefs) where one might think that someone has both the belief that p and the 
belief that not-p at the same time. But I see no reason to regard the non-dogmatic 
hallucinator as being such a case. More importantly, even if there can be cases 
where one still believes that p after coming to believe that not-p on the basis of 
the kind of conscious reflection Jodie engages in, these would clearly be cases 
where one fails to know that p.  
Denying the relevant NKT claim does not look to be a plausible response for the 
intellectualist to any of our putative counterexamples. In each case, denying the 
NKT claim forces the intellectualist to reject a plausible and widely accepted 
assumption about the nature of knowledge-that. However, there is still another 
form of response to these counterexamples that needs to be evaluated.  
3.3 The Knowledge-how Claims 
The second possible form of response to our putative counterexamples is to 
contest the relevant KH claim. There is reason to think that Stanley and 
Williamson would at least reject KH.1. Consider what Stanley and Williamson say 
about the following example they offer as proof that there can be Gettier cases 
for knowledge-how:  
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Bob wants to learn how to fly in a flight simulator. He is instructed by Henry. Unknown 
to Bob, Henry is a malicious imposter who has inserted a randomising device in the 
simulator’s controls and intends to give all kinds of incorrect advice. Fortunately, by 
sheer chance the randomising device causes exactly the same results in the simulator as 
would have occurred without it, and by incompetence Henry gives exactly the same 
advice as a proper instructor would have done. Bob passes the course with flying colors. 
He has still not flown a real plane. Bob has a justified true belief about how to fly. But 
there is a good sense in which he does not know how to fly (Stanley and Williamson 
2001: 435). 
So, Stanley and Williamson think that this example—I will call it the flight simulator 
case—is a case where someone fails to know how to F for the same kind of 
reason one fails to know that p in a Gettier scenario. Now, for the reasons 
discussed at the end of §3.1, if Stanley and Williamson’s evaluation of this case is 
correct it does not follow that KH.1 is false. Nevertheless, given the obvious 
similarities between the flight simulator and lucky light bulb cases one might 
reasonably expect that our verdicts about whether Bob knows how to fly and 
whether Charlie knows how to change a light bulb should be the same. If Stanley 
and Williamson are right in claiming that Bob does not know how to fly, this 
would at least give us some reason to reconsider KH.1. 
But are Stanley and Williamson right? Is there a good sense in which Bob does 
not know how to fly? Clearly, Bob has justified and true beliefs about flying that 
do not constitute knowledge-that, because they are only accidentally true. 
However, I think Stanley and Williamson are simply wrong that the intuitive thing 
to say of this case is that Bob does not know how to fly. As Poston (forthcoming) 
says: “As far as intuition goes this does not seem correct. There is a good sense in 
which Bob does know how to fly.”  
To make the intuition vivid, compare Bob with his near perfect counterpart Joe. 
The only salient difference between Bob and Joe is that in Joe’s world his 
simulator not only operates correctly but it has not been interfered with, and his 
instructor not only gives him the correct advice but he intended to do so. So, 
when Joe exits his simulator, we can safely assume that he knows how to fly. But 
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on what grounds then, could we deny that Bob knows how to fly? The fact that 
Bob, unlike Joe, is extremely lucky to receive the very same feedback from his 
simulator/instructor does not seem to be a reason to conclude that only Joe 
comes to know how to fly on the basis of receiving this feedback.41  
Someone might try to argue for the claim that there is both a good sense in which 
Bob knows how to fly and a good sense in which he does not know how to fly. I 
doubt that this is the case, but two points are worth mentioning about this claim. 
First, it is clear that Stanley and Williamson themselves do not take knowledge-
how ascriptions to be ambiguous in this way. Second, as Stanley and Williamson 
acknowledge, Bob’s relevant belief of the form ‘w is a way for Bob to fly’ does not 
constitute knowledge-that in this scenario. If so, then if there is a good sense in 
which Bob knows how to fly it follows that there is a good sense in which 
knowledge-how comes apart from knowledge-that in the flight simulator case. In 
other words, it would follow that there is a good sense in which knowledge-how 
is not a kind of knowledge-that.42 
                                            
41 Note that we could have used a similar comparison to support the intuition for KH.1. 
Compare Charlie with his near perfect counterpart Jack. Jack’s world is just like Charlie’s in all 
but one salient respect, namely, in Jack’s world The Idiots Guide* was written by a non-malicious 
author who intended to fill her book with helpful descriptions of ways to perform everyday jobs 
(and there were no errors during printing etc.). The text in the light bulb section of Jack’s copy 
of The Idiot’s Guide* is the same as the text in Charlie’s copy of The Idiot’s Guide. So Jack reads the 
exact same description of how to change a light bulb that Charlie reads. And like Charlie, Jack 
comprehends these instructions perfectly. Obviously, it is safe to assume that Jack knows how to 
change a light bulb after reading these instructions. This is an ordinary way of gaining 
knowledge-how. But how could we deny that Charlie comes to know how to change a light bulb 
after reading the very same instructions? The fact that Charlie, unlike Jack, is extremely lucky to 
read these instructions does not seem to be a reason to conclude that only Jack comes to know 
how to change a light bulb. 
42 Stanley (2005: 133) explicitly denies the claim that knowledge-how ascriptions are ambiguous 
between a sense in which they ascribe knowledge-how and a sense in which they do not, as do 
Bengson and Moffett (2007: 38–40). As discussed in Chapter 1, Brogaard does hold that ‘S 
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Stanley and Williamson’s interpretation of this case is also strange given that their 
own account of knowledge-how tells us that Bob knows how to fly. Let me 
explain. The core of Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge-how was 
stated earlier in §3.1. Recall, however, that we saw in Chapter 2 that Stanley and 
Williamson also make two further, and important, claims about the nature of 
knowledge-how. First, Stanley and Williamson (2001: 442–3, see also 2001: 415–
16) hold that all intentional actions “are employments of knowledge-how”. That 
is, they accept the following claim: 
(1) If S Fs intentionally, S knows how to F. 
Second, Stanley and Williamson infer from (1) a further claim concerning abilities, 
as their discussion of the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument 
reveals: 
For the ability to imagine an experience of red is clearly an ability to perform an 
intentional action. And we do find it very plausible that intentional actions are 
employments of knowledge-how … But if intentional actions are employments of 
knowledge-how then Mary’s acquisition of an ability to imagine an experience of red 
brings with it knowledge how to imagine red [.] (ibid. 442–3). 
So, Stanley and Williamson hold that if one has the ability to perform an action 
intentionally then one knows how to perform that action. That is, they accept the 
following claim: 
(2) If S has the ability to F intentionally, S knows how to F. 
                                                                                                                            
knows how to F’ ascriptions are ambiguous, as she claims that ‘John knows how to play the 
piano’ can be interpreted either as “saying that there is a w such that John knows that w is how 
John may play the piano or as saying that there is a w such that John knows that w is how one 
may play the piano” (forthcoming b: 47). But clearly, on either disambiguation, knowing how to 
play the piano is still a kind of knowledge-that.  
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But then it is a necessary consequence of their full account of knowledge-how—
and a plausible assumption—that Bob does know how to fly. The assumption is 
that Bob has the ability to fly a plane intentionally. And this is very plausible. 
After all, Bob passes the course that imparts this ability with “flying colours”. To 
emphasize the point, note that Joe has the ability to fly a plane intentionally as he 
exits his simulator. But then we must conclude that Bob also has this ability, for 
Joe and Bob are clearly equivalent with respect to their abilities to fly a plane. 
The issue here can be illustrated by noting that the following three claims form an 
inconsistent triad: 
(3) If S has the ability to F intentionally, S knows how to F.  
 (4) Bob has the ability to fly intentionally.     
 (5) Bob does not know how to fly. 
Stanley and Williamson claim both that Bob does not know how to fly, and that 
having the ability to F intentionally entails knowing how to F; that is, they endorse 
both (2) and (4). However, (3) is true. It must be the case then that either (2) or 
(4) or both (2) and (4) are false. So, to maintain that Bob does not know how to 
fly Stanley and Williamson would have to deny (2), thereby denying a key 
commitment of their full account of knowledge-how.  
Furthermore, if Stanley and Williamson are right that having the ability to F 
intentionally entails knowing how to F, this is highly important in this context 
given that the following ability ascriptions are very plausible: 
(6) At t1 Charlie has the ability to change a light bulb intentionally 
 (7) At t2 Lucy has the ability to juggle intentionally   
 (8) At t3 Jodie has the ability to juggle intentionally 
For if Stanley and Williamson are right that (2) is true then (6), (7) and (8) each 
entail the corresponding knowledge-how ascription, that is, they entail KH.1, 
KH.2 and KH.3 respectively. 
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Could Stanley and Williamson reply that while Charlie, Lucy and Jodie possess the 
ability to perform these actions they do not possess the ability to perform them 
intentionally? Perhaps with regard to (8), one might argue that to have the ability 
to juggle intentionally, Jodie would have to believe that w3 is a way for her to 
juggle. However, as mentioned earlier, at t3 it would still seem to Jodie that w3 is a 
way for her to juggle. So, one could convince Jodie to try to juggle that way that 
merely seems to her to be a way to juggle. And if she did try, she would likely 
succeed. In which case, I think the natural thing to say would be that Jodie not 
only juggled but that she did so intentionally.  
In any case, even if one could resist (8) on these grounds, (6) and (7) seem 
straightforwardly true. It may be a necessary condition of S’s having the ability to 
F intentionally that there be some way w that is a way for S to F such that S 
believes that w is a way for S to F. But it is surely not a necessary condition of S’s 
having the ability to F intentionally that such a belief must also be non-
accidentally true and/or justified.43  
If the intellectualist is to deny any of these KH claims (or at least KH.1 and 
KH.2) then they must deny that having the ability to F intentionally entails 
knowing how to F. Luckily, other intellectualists have identified cases that are 
fairly plausible counterexamples to this entailment, as a means of arguing against 
neo-Ryleanism; that is, the view that to know how to F is to simply possess the 
ability to F. Recall, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, Bengson and Moffett present the 
following scenario—I will refer to it from now on as the salchow case—as an 
example where intuitively someone has the ability to F but does not know how to 
F: 
                                            
43 Bengson et al. (forthcoming: fn. 23) make a similar point in regard to Stanley and Williamson’s 
claim that having the ability to F intentionally entails knowing how to F. 
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Suppose that Irina is seriously mistaken about how to perform a salchow. She believes 
incorrectly that the way to perform a salchow is to take off from the front outside of her 
skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the front inside edge of her skate. (The correct 
sequence is to take off from the back inside edge and land on the back outside edge of the 
opposite foot after one or more rotations in the air.) However, Irina has a severe 
neurological abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from how 
she actually thinks she is acting. Whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in 
accordance with her misconceptions) this abnormality causes her to reliably perform the 
correct sequence of moves. So, although she is seriously mistaken about how to perform 
a salchow, whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in accordance with her 
misconceptions) the abnormality causes Irina to perform the correct sequence of moves, 
and so she ends up successfully performing a salchow. Despite the fact that what she is 
doing and what she thinks she is doing come apart, she fails to notice the mismatch. In 
this case, it is clear that Irina is (reliably) able to do a salchow. However, due to her 
mistaken belief about how to perform the move, she cannot be said to know how to do 
a salchow (Bengson and Moffett 2007: 46). 
And Paul Snowdon (2004) presents the following scenario—I will refer to it from 
now on as the man in a room case—as a counterexample to the claim that if one has 
the ability to F then one knows how to F: 
A man is in a room, which, because he has not explored it in the least, he does, as yet, 
not know how to get out of. In fact, there is an obvious exit which he can easily open. 
He is perfectly able to get out, he can get out, but does not know how to (as yet) 
(Snowdon 2004: 11). 
Both of these examples appear to be plausible counterexamples not only to the 
claim that if one has the ability to F then one knows how to F, but also to the 
stronger claim that if one has the ability to F intentionally then one knows how to 
F. And if (2) is false then one can consistently deny KH.1, KH.2 and KH.3 whilst 
accepting (6), (7) and (8). However, this is not yet a reason to think that any of the 
KH claims are false.  
It is clear that in practice, many subjects would have the intuition that the KH 
claims are correct. One line of response available to the intellectualist would be to 
claim that while the KH claims are intuitive they are nonetheless false. But if they 
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are to deny these intuitive claims, the intellectualist owes us some explanation of 
why our intuitions about these cases are so systematically misleading.  
Probably the most obvious explanation would be to claim that we somehow 
confuse the fact that the subjects in our putative counterexamples possess the 
relevant ability with their possessing the corresponding knowledge-how. 
Appealing to the idea that ability ascriptions implicate—but do not entail—the 
corresponding knowledge-how ascription, would be one way to develop such an 
argument. The explanation then of our intuitions regarding KH.1, KH.2 and 
KH.3, would be that we confuse a conversational implicature with an entailment. 
For example, our intuition that Charlie knows how to change a light bulb is 
explained by the fact that we know that Charlie has the ability to change a light 
bulb, and we mistakenly think that ‘S has the ability to F’ entails ‘S knows how to 
F’.  
This strategy for explaining away our intuitions regarding the KH claims may 
appear promising.44 The salchow and man in a room cases do seem to show that 
there is no entailment from ‘S has the ability to F’ to ‘S knows how to F’, even 
when S’s ability is an ability to F intentionally. But presumably, in stereotypical or 
paradigmatic cases of someone’s having the ability to F, they will also know how 
to F, in which case it seems reasonable to suppose that there is a sense in which ‘S 
has the ability to F’ implicates ‘S knows how to F’.  
However, note that there is an inherent tension in this kind of response to our 
putative counterexamples. To establish that having the ability to F does not entail 
knowing how to F, the intellectualist needs there to be clear cases where 
intuitively someone has the ability to F but does not know how to F. And there 
are such cases. But then why does our familiarity with the relevant implicature 
lead us to mistakenly have the intuition that KH.1, KH.2 and KH.3 are true, 
                                            
44 Bengson and Moffett think that there is a stereotypical implicature in the other direction, from 
knowing how to F to having the ability to F. For further discussion of the notion of a 
stereotypical implicature see Bengson and Moffett (2007: 35). 
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when it obviously does not lead us to make the parallel mistake with regard to the 
salchow and man in a room cases? In both sets of cases the relevant subject has the 
ability to F intentionally and, according to the intellectualist, does not know how 
to F. The intellectualist then would have to provide a plausible explanation of this 
asymmetry that is also consistent with their interpretation of these cases. Perhaps 
there is some such explanation, but I am not sure what it would be.  
On the other hand, we can offer a natural explanation of this asymmetry in our 
intuitions, namely, that the subjects in the lucky light bulb, dogmatic hallucinator 
and non-dogmatic hallucinator cases know how to perform the relevant actions, 
whereas the subjects in the salchow and man in a room cases do not. 
I also doubt that it is an essential feature of the counterexamples offered here that 
the subjects in these scenarios possess the ability to perform the relevant actions. 
As intellectualists often point out, one can know how to F without possessing the 
ability to F, as Stanley and Williamson’s (2001: 416) case of the master pianist 
who loses her arms in a tragic car accident illustrates. Intuitively, after such an 
accident the master pianist would still know how to play the piano even though 
she has lost her ability to do so. Again, such examples are cited by intellectualists 
as evidence against neo-Ryleanism, for they suggest that having the ability to F is 
not a necessary condition for knowing how to F.  
Bearing this point in mind, let us add an unfortunate twist to the lucky light bulb 
case. Namely, just after Charlie grasps the instructions in The Idiot’s Guide at t1 his 
arms are removed (I will leave the details of how to your imagination). Otherwise, 
the case remains exactly the same. Does Charlie still know how to change a light 
bulb? As with the pianist case, I take it that the intuitive answer is yes. In which 
case, we still have a scenario where intuitively Charlie knows how to F, and the 
same reasons are still present for thinking that Charlie does not possess the kind 
of knowledge-that that such knowledge-how might be plausibly equated with. 
However, in this modified scenario, Charlie also lacks the ability to change a light 
bulb. So, the intellectualist cannot dismiss the knowledge-how intuition here by 
claiming that we are merely confusing the fact that Charlie has the ability to 
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change a light bulb with his knowing how to change a light bulb. And one could 
modify the dogmatic hallucinator and non-dogmatic hallucinator cases to achieve 
the same kind of result. 
However, I think the more important point is simply that there are good reasons 
to be suspicious of such attempts to dismiss our intuitions regarding the KH 
claims. Consider the very examples intellectualists appeal to when arguing against 
neo-Ryleanism—the salchow and man in a room cases or Stanley and Williamson’s 
pianist case. As counterexamples to neo-Ryleanism, these cases are compelling. 
But the intuitive force of such examples suggests that we are quite capable of 
discerning the difference between knowing how to F and possessing the ability to 
F. It seems implausible then to suppose that our intuitions about the KH claims 
are merely the result of our confusing the fact that a subject has the ability to F 
with their knowing how to F.  
There is no simple way to dismiss our intuitions about the KH claims. But 
intellectualism requires that we deny the KH claims, for we saw in §3.2 that 
denying the NKT claims is not a plausible response to our putative 
counterexamples. In the absence of some good way to dismiss our intuitions 
regarding the KH claims, I submit that we should reject intellectualism. 
3.4 Toward a New Theory 
I have argued in this chapter that intellectualism is false. But what is knowledge-
how if it is not a kind of knowledge-that? The most prominent alternative to 
intellectualism is neo-Ryleanism. However, neo-Ryleanism does not appear to be 
a viable alternative to intellectualism. The salchow and man in a room cases suggest 
that having the ability to F does not suffice for knowing how to F, and examples 
like the pianist case suggest that having the ability to F is not necessary for 
knowing how to F.  
However, I think that by reflecting on our three counterexamples we can find a 
promising alternative to both intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism. According to 
this view, knowing how to F is a matter of standing in a relation to a proposition 
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other than the knowledge-that relation. The relevant relation is the one that S 
stands in to a proposition p, when it seems to S that p is the case.  
Importantly, this relation is not the belief relation. As mentioned earlier, it can 
seem to one that p even when one fails to believe that p. That is, believing that p 
is not a necessary condition for it seeming to one that p. In which case, seemings 
cannot be understood as merely some species of belief.45 
Also, the kind of seemings that are relevant to this new account of knowledge-
how are not perceptual (or sensory) seemings. Paradigmatic cases of perceptual 
seemings include visual seemings, as when one looks at the Müller-Lyer figure and 
one’s visual experience presents the two horizontal lines as being unequal in 
length. Paradigmatic examples of non-perceptual seemings include intellectual 
seemings, as when one entertains the proposition that if p then not not p, and 
then one “sees” that it is true. 
Intellectual seemings are often contrasted not only with perceptual seemings, but 
also with seemings that are grounded in introspection, imagination, or memory.46 
In which case, the class of non-perceptual seemings includes, but is not exhausted 
by, the class of intellectual seemings. In claiming that the kind of seemings 
relevant to our new account of knowledge-how are non-perceptual, I intend to 
remain neutral on the question of whether the seemings in question should be 
characterised as purely intellectual seemings, or as non-perceptual seemings 
                                            
45 Of course, this is not to say that there aren’t important connections between seemings and 
belief. As is often noted, seemings typically incline one to believe their propositional content. 
Although, as William Tolhurst (1998: 297) points out, seemings do more than just incline one to 
believe, for when it seems to one that p “one experiences believing [that p] to be demanded or 
required.” Furthermore, “seemings have the feel of truth, the feel of a state whose content 
reveals how things really are” (ibid. 298–9). 
46 As Bealer (1993: 102) says, intellectual seemings are seemings that one can have “in the 
absence of any particular sensory (imaginative) or introspective experiences.” For a similar 
construal of intellectual seemings see also Michael Huemer (2005) and Joel Pust (2000). 
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(because they might be seen as essentially relying on introspection, imagination or 
memory). 
Bearing these points in mind—that seemings are not beliefs and that the kind of 
seemings at issue here are non-perceptual seemings—we can introduce a new 
analysis of knowledge-how: 
The Seeming Analysis       
 S knows how to F if, and only if, there is some way w that is a way to F 
such that:          
 (c) S stands in a (non-perceptual) seeming relation to the proposition that 
w is a way to F, and        
 (d) In standing in this relation S entertains w under a practical mode of 
presentation. 
The motivation for the seeming analysis is that in all of our counterexamples to 
intellectualism there is intuitively still some way w for the subject to perform the 
relevant action F such that it seems to the subject that w is a way to F. It seems to 
Charlie that w1 is a way to change a light bulb even though his belief that w1 is a 
way for him to change a light bulb is only accidentally true. It seems to Lucy that 
w2 is a way to juggle even though her belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle is 
defeated. And, as noted earlier, it still seems to Jodie that w3 is a way to juggle 
even though she does not believe that w3 is a way for her to juggle.  
Of course, the point here is not that if Charlie (for example) were to simply 
observe someone else changing a light bulb at t1 then it would still seem to him 
that that way is a way to change a light bulb. This is true, but this would only be a 
perceptual seeming. Rather, the point is that if at t1 Charlie were to entertain the 
proposition that w1 is a way to F, or if he were to simply think of w1, it would still 
seem to him that w1 is a way to F. This is the sense then in which this seeming is 
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non-perceptual, for it is a seeming that Charlie can have in the absence of his 
having any particular kind of perceptual experience.47 
The seeming analysis accords then with our intuitions that the KH claims are 
correct. Furthermore, the seeming analysis also accords with our intuitions about 
the salchow and man in a room cases. There is a series of actions such that it seems to 
Irina that that series of actions is a way to perform the salchow. But this series of 
actions is not in fact a way to perform the salchow. The seeming analysis rightly 
predicts then that Irina does not know how to perform the salchow. And while 
there is a way for the man in a room to exit the room, it does not seem to the 
man that that way is a way to exit the room, as he is not even aware yet of this 
way to exit the room. Furthermore, the seeming analysis accords with our 
intuitions about the pianist case. For even after her accident, it will still seem to 
the pianist that that way she used to play the piano is a way to play the piano. 
It appears that across a diverse range of cases the seeming analysis accords with 
our intuitions better than both intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism. Unlike 
intellectualism, it accords with our intuitions about the lucky light bulb, dogmatic 
hallucinator and non-dogmatic hallucinator cases. And unlike neo-Ryleanism, the 
seeming analysis accords with our intuitions about the salchow, man in a room and 
unfortunate pianist cases. 
Both conditions (c) and (d) of our seeming analysis require some explanation. 
Starting with (d), why include the parallel of Stanley and Williamson’s condition 
(b) in our new analysis of knowledge-how? As we saw in Chapter 1, Stanley and 
Williamson include (b) because without this condition their analysis would clearly 
not describe a sufficient condition for knowing how to F. Intuitively, there can be 
contexts in which one fails to know how to F, even though there is some way w 
such that one knows that w is a way for oneself to F. Likewise, one could 
                                            
47 As mentioned above, whether this kind of seeming can be had in the absence of Charlie 
having any particular kind of introspective, imaginative, or mnemonic experience is an issue I 
wish to remain neutral on here.  
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presumably fail to know how to F, even though there is some way w such that it 
non-perceptually seems to one that w is a way for oneself to F. Stanley and 
Williamson’s condition (b) is intended to be a solution to this problem. Insofar as 
this fix works for their intellectualist account of knowledge-how, the same fix will 
work for our seeming analysis of knowledge-how. If practical modes of 
presentation cannot be used to solve this problem then we could appeal to other 
intellectualist strategies for addressing the same issue, like Bengson and Moffet’s 
strategy of claiming that one knows how to F only if one minimally understands 
some way to F. 
Obviously, with regard to (c), one can know how to F even when it does not 
occurrently seem to one that some way w is a way to F—for example, when one is 
asleep. The seeming analysis will not be plausible then unless one can satisfy (c), 
even when it does not occurrently seem to one that some way w is a way to F. But 
the idea that an ascription of the form ‘It seems to S that p’ could be true of S 
even when it does not occurrently seem to S that p, might initially appear strange. 
Typically, philosophers are interested in such ascriptions only insofar as they refer 
to occurrent and conscious seemings. For example, philosophers concerned with 
the nature of philosophical intuition are often concerned with the kind of 
occurrent state one is in when, on considering a Gettier scenario (say), it seems to 
one that the subject in this scenario does not know that the relevant proposition 
is true.  
But there is also a natural interpretation of ‘It seems to S that p’ ascriptions, 
whereby they can be satisfied by non-occurrent states. Suppose that during a 
conversation about the intuitions of our friends I assert, “It still seems to Bill that 
the naïve axiom of set theory is true even though he knows it to be false”. In such 
a context, it is no objection to my claim to point out that Bill is currently in a 
deep, dreamless sleep. For my claim is naturally interpreted as being satisfied by 
some standing, or non-occurrent, state of Bill, rather than some occurrent state of 
it seeming to Bill that the naïve axiom of set theory is true. And presumably, this 
non-occurrent state is one that consists (at least partly) in the disposition for it to 
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occurrently seem to Bill that naïve axiom of set theory is true, in certain relevant 
conditions.48 
Likewise, condition (c) should be understood in such a way that in order to satisfy 
(c) it suffices that it seem to one that w is a way to F, in this non-occurrent sense 
of ‘It seems to S that p’. That is, where for it to non-occurrently seem to one that 
some way w is a way to F is to be in a state that consists (at least partly) in the 
disposition for it to occurrently (and non-perceptually) seem to one that w is a 
way to F.  
The seeming analysis is something of an intermediate position between Ryle’s 
own account of knowledge-how and intellectualism. The seeming account is 
related to intellectualism because it claims that knowing how to do something is a 
matter of either standing in, or being disposed to stand in, an intentional relation 
to a true proposition. Of course, unlike intellectualism, the relevant relation is not 
the knowledge-that relation. Rather, it is the relation of it occurrently seeming to 
one that some proposition is true.  
The seeming account is related to Ryle’s account of knowledge-how because both 
accounts appeal to dispositional states. Neo-Ryleanism is often attributed to Ryle, 
                                            
48 Philosophers who identify philosophical intuitions with seemings typically deny that intuitions 
are dispositional states. It is worth emphasizing that this denial is consistent with the idea of 
dispositional seemings appealed to here. I am not claiming that occurrent seemings can be 
analysed as some kind of dispositional state (indeed, I think it is clear that they cannot be so 
analysed). Rather, I am claiming that as well as occurrent seemings we can quite naturally talk of 
dispositional seemings, where these are understood to be dispositions to have an occurrent 
seeming. A similar distinction applies to the related notion of understanding. As David Hunter 
(1998: 559–80) notes, there is a natural and useful distinction to be made between states of 
occurrent understanding and dispositions to be in such occurrent states—what he calls 
“dispositions to understand.” As with seeming ascriptions, I think it is clear that ascriptions of 
understanding can be satisfied not only by states of occurrent understanding, but also by non-
occurrent states that consist (at least partly) in dispositions to be in occurrent states of 
understanding. 
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and indeed some things he says could be seen as supporting such an ascription. 
Still, it is not clear that Ryle did identify knowing how to F with the 
corresponding ability to F. What is clear, however, is that Ryle identified knowing 
how to F with the possession of a complex of dispositions.49 Similarly, the 
seeming account allows that one can know how to F in virtue of being in the 
relevant kind of dispositional state.  
In setting out his account of knowledge-how, Ryle mainly appealed to 
dispositions to perform various kinds of observable actions. In contrast, the 
seeming account appeals to a disposition to be in a certain kind of conscious and 
intentional state. In this respect, the seeming account parts ways with at least the 
letter of Ryle’s account of knowledge-how. Exactly how far it departs from the 
spirit of Ryle’s account is difficult to say. While Ryle mainly appeals to 
behavioural dispositions when setting out his account of knowledge-how, 
sometimes he also appeals to dispositions to be in certain cognitive or 
                                            
49 Or, as Ryle (1949: 44) would say, it is a single disposition “the exercises of which are 
indefinitely heterogenous.” Brian Weatherson, in an entry on his blog “Thoughts, Arguments 
and Rants”, claims that Ryle is only committed to this view, and not neo-Ryleanism and, 
therefore, the standard counterexamples to neo-Ryleanism simply do not apply to Ryle (see, 
<http://tar.weatherson.org/2006/07/22/ryle-on-knowing-how/#comments>). As we saw in 
Chapter 1 (§1.2), Stanley and Williamson (2001: 411) attribute both this view and neo-Ryleanism 
to Ryle, claiming that according to Ryle “knowledge-how is ability, which is in turn a complex of 
dispositions.” That is, they take Ryle to be committed to both of the following identity claims: (i) 
to know how to F is to possess the ability to F; and (ii) to know how to F is to possess a 
complex of dispositions. This explains why Stanley and Williamson take their counterexamples 
to (i) (like the pianist case) to be counterexamples to Ryle’s account of knowledge-how. Like 
Weatherson, I am not convinced that Ryle is committed to (i), but even if he is, it seems to me 
that he would lose little if in response to the standard counterexamples to (i) he were to simply 
reject (i) whilst retaining (ii).  
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phenomenal states. Ryle’s account of knowledge-how then is more complex than 
his reputation as a philosophical behaviourist would suggest.50 
Obviously, much work remains to be done to develop this alternative account of 
knowledge-how. The role of the seeming account here is only to illustrate the 
possibility of promising alternatives to both intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism. In 
the literature, intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism are normally the only accounts of 
knowledge-how that are discussed. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, this situation 
can lead to a tendency to regard arguments against either account as being 
arguments, by default, for the other. The seeming account emphasizes the fact 
that we should not regard the arguments against intellectualism given here as 
being arguments for neo-Ryleanism. Furthermore, it shows us that even if 
knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that, as I have argued, it could still be 
the case that knowledge-how is propositional in nature. In looking beyond the 
standard dichotomy of intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism, we may just find a 
more adequate account of knowledge-how.  
However, as the main purpose of this dissertation is to examine the intellectualist 
view of knowledge-how, I will not consider the possibility of alternative views of 
knowledge-how in any further detail here. Rather, in the final chapter I want to 
consider the most famous objection to the intellectualist view of knowledge-how; 
namely, the objection that intellectualism must be false because assuming it to be 
true leads to an infinite and vicious regress. 
                                            
50 For discussion of these complexities, in particular with regard to Ryle’s dispositional account 
of belief, see Eric Schitwzgebel (2002: 259–60), and also Brian Weatherson (forthcoming). 
Whether these complexities in Ryle’s views are consistent with his claims to have undermined 
“the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine” (Ryle 1949: 15–16) is an interesting question that is 
obviously beyond the scope of our discussion here. 
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Chapter 4 Regarding a Regress 
  
In the previous chapter I presented three new arguments against intellectualism. 
In this final chapter I want to examine the most prominent of existing objections 
against intellectualism, namely, the objection that there is a successful regress 
argument against this view of knowledge-how. Such an argument asks us to 
assume, for the purposes of reductio, that intellectualism, or some thesis entailed by 
intellectualism, is true. It then purports to show that from this assumption, and 
(presumably) certain other premises, one can derive an infinite regress. From this 
initial conclusion it is then inferred that intellectualism is false. I assume that for 
this type of argument to succeed the inference steps that generate the infinite 
regress must be valid; any required premises (other than the reductio premise) must 
be sound; and the regress has to be intuitively vicious rather than merely benign.  
Our search for such an argument begins in §4.1 with an examination of Gilbert 
Ryle’s (1946, 1949) regress argument against what he called the intellectualist legend. 
This argument is the source of the idea that there is some successful regress 
argument against intellectualism. All existing attempts to explicate this kind of 
argument are either inspired by Ryle’s argument or are offered as reconstructions 
of his argument. In §4.2 I examine a well-known regress argument against 
intellectualism that Stanley and Williamson (2001) offer as a reconstruction of 
what they take to be Ryle’s argument against intellectualism—what I will call the 
contemplation regress argument. In §4.3 I construct another regress argument against 
intellectualism that draws its inspiration from Ryle’s argument against the 
intellectualist legend—what I call the employment regress argument. And in §4.4 I 
consider what reasons an intellectualist might offer for rejecting the key premise 
that this argument relies upon. In §4.5 I examine regress arguments against 
intellectualism offered by Stephen Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005). In §4.6 I 
discuss some general features of the regress arguments considered here and, in 
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light of the previous discussion, I answer the question of whether there is some 
successful regress argument against intellectualism.  
4.1 Ryle’s Regress 
Gilbert Ryle discusses the nature of knowledge-how in two works titled 
“Knowledge How”: the famous second chapter of The Concept of Mind (Ryle 1949) 
and a less well-known paper (Ryle 1946). In each of these works Ryle’s primary 
concern is to examine the nature of intelligence and intelligent actions. For Ryle 
this examination is closely tied to an examination of the ‘mental-conduct 
concepts’ or ‘intelligence epithets’ that we apply to both persons and actions, 
which include adjectives like: “‘clever’, ‘sensible’, ‘careful’, ‘methodical’, 
‘inventive’, ‘mental’, ‘quick-witted’” (Ryle 1949: 26). And, on the other hand, there 
are adjectives that are used to indicate that a person is deficient in intelligence or 
that an action is not performed intelligently, like: “‘stupid, ‘dull’, ‘silly’, ‘careless’, 
‘unmethodical’, ‘uninventive’” (ibid.). 
Ryle describes the intellectualist legend as a view concerning these intelligence 
epithets that is widely accepted but also fundamentally in error. As Snowdon 
(2004: 15–16) points out, Ryle’s discussion is made rather confusing by the way 
he moves back forth between questions about what it is for persons to be 
intelligent (or clever, or skilful etc.), and what it is for actions to be intelligent (or 
clever, or skilful etc.). Sometimes Ryle describes the intellectualist legend as a view 
about what it is for a person to be intelligent, or as a view about what the ‘faculty’ 
of intelligence is. But primarily, Ryle construes it as a view about the nature of 
intelligent actions, and it is this view that his regress argument is directed at.  
Ryle gave many different glosses of the intellectualist legend all of which 
unfortunately are somewhat vague, with different terminology often being used to 
express seemingly related but still importantly distinct concepts. One of Ryle’s 
(1949: 29) most well-known statements of the intellectualist legend occurs after 
the following key passage: 
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What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to make and appreciate 
jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish or to argue? Part of what is meant is 
that, when they perform these operations, they tend to perform them well, i.e. correctly 
or efficiently or successfully. Their performances come up to certain standards, or satisfy 
certain criteria. But this is not enough. The well-regulated clock keeps good time and the 
well-drilled circus seal performs its tricks flawlessly, yet we do not call them ‘intelligent’. 
We reserve this title for the persons responsible for their performances. To be intelligent 
is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply them; to regulate one’s actions and not 
merely to be well-regulated. A performance is described as careful or skilful, if in his 
operations he is ready to direct and correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon 
successes, to profit from the examples of others and so forth. He applies criteria in 
performing critically, that is, in trying to get things right (Ryle 1949: 29). 
I take it that Ryle’s main aim in this passage is to motivate a distinction between 
merely successful actions and intelligent or skilful actions. And Ryle uses this 
distinction to characterize both what it is to know how to perform some action 
and what it is for a person to be intelligent. Ryle suggests that part of what we 
mean when we say that someone knows how to F, is not only that they tend to F 
successfully, but that they tend to F intelligently or skilfully. Similarly, it appears 
that Ryle thinks of an intelligent person as someone who not only tends to 
perform successful actions, but someone who tends to perform actions that are 
intelligent, or careful, or skilful etc.  
The examples Ryle appeals to in support of this distinction—between merely F-
ing successfully and F-ing intelligently—are perhaps not that helpful.51 However, 
the distinction itself is a perfectly fine one. Consider the action of hitting the 
bull’s eye in darts. One can obviously succeed in hitting the bull’s eye and yet fail 
                                            
51 For one thing, I think it would be both natural and correct to use adjectives like ‘intelligent’ 
‘skilful’ or ‘clever’ to describe either the seal’s actions or the seal itself. The fact that the seal has 
been ‘well-drilled’ so as to perform its tricks does not seem to be a reason to deny that its actions 
of performing those tricks are skilful or clever. An Olympic gymnast has also been well-drilled to 
perform her floor routine, but her action of performing this routine is skilful nonetheless. 
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to do so intelligently or skilfully; for example, when one hits the bull’s eye when 
one was trying to hit the twenty.  
What more is required for one to not only successfully perform some action but 
to also perform that action intelligently? Ryle’s suggestion appears to be that to F 
intelligently one not only has to satisfy criteria—by which I take it he means 
criteria for F-ing successfully—but one has to also apply those criteria in one’s 
action of F-ing, or one has to regulate one’s actions of F-ing so that it satisfies 
these criteria. Ryle’s use of this notion of applying criteria is somewhat elusive, 
but it appears that the general idea he has in mind here is just the obvious one 
that to F intelligently one not only has to succeed in F-ing, but one has to also—
in some sense—be responsible for this success. Ryle claims that this point is 
commonly expressed ‘in the vernacular’ by saying:  
[T]hat an action exhibits intelligence if, and only if, the agent is thinking what he is doing 
while he is doing it, and thinking what he is doing in such a manner that he would not 
do the action so well if he were not thinking what he is doing. This popular idiom is 
sometimes appealed to as evidence in favour of the intellectualist legend (Ryle 1946: 30). 
Ryle’s claim that this analysis of intelligent action is a “popular idiom” seems 
rather far-fetched—for one thing the construction ‘if and only if’ is rarely used by 
anyone other than philosophers and logicians. But, more importantly, what does 
it mean to say that an agent is ‘thinking what he is doing while doing it’? Should 
we interpret this as shorthand for the claim that the agent is thinking about what 
he is doing while doing it? Ryle does not say. It is true that when someone fails to 
perform an action skilfully or carefully we will sometimes explain this failure by 
saying that they were ‘acting without thinking’ or that ‘they were not thinking 
about what they were doing’. But it is not at all clear that we are thereby 
expressing a commitment to Ryle’s popular idiom.  
These difficulties in interpreting Ryle’s claims about this popular idiom are not 
important for our purposes, however. What is important is the structure of this 
popular idiom, for Ryle goes on to present the intellectualist legend as a view that 
97 
offers a reinterpretation of the right-hand side of this biconditional claim. As Ryle 
continues: 
This popular idiom is sometimes appealed to as evidence in favour of the intellectualist 
legend. Champions of this legend are apt to try to reassimilate knowing how to knowing 
that by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules, or the 
application of criteria. It follows that the operation which is characterized as intelligent 
must be preceded by an intellectual acknowledgement of these rules or criteria; that is, 
the agent must first go through the internal process of avowing to himself certain 
propositions about what is to be done (‘maxims’, ‘imperatives’, or ‘regulative 
propositions’ as they are sometimes called); only then can he execute his performance in 
accordance with those dictates. He must preach to himself before he can practise. The 
chef must recite his recipes to himself before he can cook according to them; the hero 
must lend his inner ear to some moral imperative before swimming out to save the 
drowning man; the chess-player must run over in his head all the relevant rules and 
tactical maxims of the game before he can make correct and skilful moves. To do 
something thinking what one is doing is, according to this legend, always to do 
two things; namely, to consider certain appropriate propositions, or 
prescriptions, and to put into practice what these propositions or prescriptions 
enjoin. It is to do a bit of theory and then to do a pit of practice. … I shall argue that 
the intellectualist legend is false and that when we describe a performance as intelligent, 
this does not entail the double operation of considering and executing (Ryle 1949: 29–
30; bold emphasis added). 
According to Ryle’s popular idiom, one’s action F-ing is performed intelligently if 
and only if one is thinking what one is doing while F-ing, and thinking what one is 
doing in such a manner that one would not F so well if one were not thinking 
what one is doing. The passage above suggests that, according to the 
intellectualist legend, we can replace the condition that one’s action of F-ing is 
performed intelligently only if one is thinking what one is doing while F-ing, with 
the condition that one’s action F-ing is performed intelligently only if prior to F-
ing one contemplates some relevant proposition(s) concerning something like a 
way or procedure for F-ing.  
What of the condition in the popular idiom, that one’s action F-ing is performed 
intelligently only if one is thinking what one is doing in such a manner that one would 
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not F so well if one were not thinking what one is doing? The passage above suggests that 
proponents of the intellectualist legend hold that one’s act of F-ing has to be the 
execution or application of the way described by the proposition(s) that one 
contemplates. Elsewhere, Ryle indicates that proponents of the intellectualist 
legend hold that one’s action of F-ing has to be both ‘introduced’ and ‘steered’ by 
one’s contemplating. For example, he describes the intellectualist legend as the 
view that: 
[P]ractical activities merit their titles ‘intelligent’, ‘clever’, and the rest only because they 
are accompanied by some such internal acts of considering propositions (and 
particularly ‘regulative’ propositions). That is to say, doing things is never itself an 
exercise of intelligence, but is, at best, a process introduced and somehow steered by 
some ulterior act of theorising (Ryle 1946: 212; bold emphasis added). 
I think the intellectualist legend that Ryle opposes then can be represented as a 
view of intelligent actions that is either equivalent to, or at least entails, the 
following equivalence claim, where the square parentheses indicate some of the 
variations in the terminology Ryle uses to express this view: 
One performs an action F intelligently [or skilfully, or cleverly, carefully 
etc.] if and only if one Fs and one’s action of F-ing is introduced and 
guided [or steered] by one’s contemplating [or considering, or 
acknowledging] of some relevant proposition(s) concerning a way to F [or 
a rule, or procedure for F-ing] (and this contemplating is distinct from and 
prior to one’s F-ing).  
We cannot avoid altogether the variations in the terminology Ryle uses when 
describing the intellectualist legend. But it will be useful to focus on just one 
version of the biconditional stated above. And for the sake of brevity, I will also 
replace ‘introduced and guided’ with just ‘guided’ (so in the following discussion 
‘guided’ should be read as shorthand for ‘introduced and guided’). I will also drop 
the condition, stated in the bracketed clause, that the relevant contemplating must 
occur prior to one’s action of F-ing. Ryle often describes the intellectualist legend 
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as including this condition, but sometimes he acknowledges that a proponent of 
the intellectualist legend could hold that this contemplating and one’s action of F-
ing occur at the same time. And Ryle’s regress argument against the intellectualist 
legend does not need to appeal to this condition. I will take the intellectualist 
legend then that Ryle opposes to be the following equivalence claim that I will 
refer to as simply the legend: 
 The Legend         
 One performs an action F intelligently if and only if one Fs and one’s 
action of F-ing is guided by one’s contemplating of some relevant 
proposition(s) concerning a way to F and one’s action of F-ing (and this 
contemplating is distinct from one’s F-ing). 
As I will show, Ryle rejects both directions of this biconditional. But he was 
particularly concerned to establish that the left to right direction of the legend is 
false, as he wanted to maintain that some actions are intelligent even though they 
are not preceded by any ‘shadow act’ of contemplating propositions. That is, Ryle 
wanted to show that having one’s action of F-ing be guided by one’s prior 
contemplation of certain propositions is not a necessary condition for one’s action 
of F-ing to be an intelligent action.  
It is important to note that Ryle does not reject the idea that some actions are 
intelligent as a result of their being guided by some distinct action of 
contemplating a proposition; as Ryle (1946: 30) says, “Certainly we often do not 
only reflect before we act but reflect in order to act properly.” What Ryle rejects is 
the idea that all intelligent actions are guided by the contemplating of certain 
relevant propositions, or that “all intelligent performance requires to be prefaced 
by the consideration of appropriate propositions” (ibid).  
Indeed, I think Ryle would even allow that actions that are successful as a result 
of one’s prior reflecting on how to perform them are paradigmatic instances of 
intelligent or skilful actions. For example, consider a kind of scenario familiar 
from many an action film; namely, a scene where the hero is faced by a corridor 
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in which a series of mechanical guillotines are going up and down at different 
rates. The hero, who has to get through the corridor, pauses to take careful note 
of the sequence in which the different blades fall, and then he makes his way 
through the corridor, stopping and starting at just the right points and for just the 
right amount of time, so that he is not chopped in two. The hero’s action here is a 
prime example of a skilful or intelligent action, and his performance of this action 
is, in some sense, guided by his prior reflection on, or contemplation of, 
propositions concerning a way to get through the corridor in one piece.  
Now Ryle need not deny the description of this case. I take it that Ryle’s point is 
simply that it would be a mistake to infer from the fact that our hero’s action is a 
paradigmatic example of an intelligent action that it is an essential feature of any 
intelligent action that it be guided by the agent’s prior contemplation of relevant 
propositions. And Ryle’s point is surely reasonable, especially given that there are 
other equally clear cases of intelligent or skilful actions where it is does not seem 
very plausible that the action is guided by the agent’s contemplation of a 
proposition concerning a way to perform it. Consider, for example, a skilful 
behind-the-back pass by Chris Paul in a basketball game. Unlike the hero’s action, 
the idea that in making this pass Chris Paul is guided by his contemplation of a 
proposition concerning a way to perform a behind-the-back pass is prima facie 
implausible. But, of course, it is one thing to point out that a view is implausible 
in some respect and it is another to show that assuming it to be true leads to an 
infinite and vicious regress. So, what is Ryle’s regress argument against this 
legend?  
Ryle’s regress argument: version 1 
The following passage from Ryle is the one that is typically used to illustrate his 
regress argument against the legend: 
The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this. The consideration of 
propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, 
less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior 
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theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a 
logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. (Ryle 1946: 31) 
If we consider this passage, on its own, it seems that the regress argument Ryle 
envisages here is generated from something like the following two premises:  
(1) If one performs an action F intelligently then one contemplates some 
proposition p intelligently (and this contemplating is distinct from one’s 
action of F-ing). 
(2) To contemplate a proposition is to perform an action.  
An infinite regress is then generated like so. Imagine that Ari performs some 
action F intelligently. By (1) it follows that prior to his act of F-ing Ari 
contemplated some proposition p1 intelligently. By (2) it follows that Ari’s 
intelligent contemplating of p1 was itself an action. But then we can reapply (1) to 
conclude that prior to his act of contemplating p1 Ari contemplated some 
proposition p2 intelligently. By (2) it follows that Ari’s intelligent contemplating of 
p2 was itself an action. By (1) it follows that prior to his act of contemplating p2 
Ari contemplated some proposition p3 intelligently. By (2) it follows that Ari’s 
contemplating of p3 was itself an action. And so on ad infinitum.  
So, if (1) and (2) are true then, to perform any action intelligently one would have 
to also perform an infinite number of distinct actions of intelligently 
contemplating propositions.52 Now this conclusion looks to be absurd, for given 
that we are finite beings, what this conclusion tells us essentially is that we never 
perform intelligent actions. But while this conclusion is absurd, the inferences that 
generate this regress are valid, therefore, we must reject either (1) or (2). Ryle 
                                            
52 Note that it does not follow from (1) and (2) that these distinct acts of contemplating 
propositions would have to involve the contemplation of distinct propositions, that is, it is 
consistent with (1) and (2) that p1 = p2 and p2 = p3 and so on. 
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assumes that the right response is to reject (1), as he seems to regard (2) as being 
obviously true.53 
However, even granting to Ryle that the right response to this regress is to reject 
(1), his regress argument appears vulnerable to a simple objection; namely, that 
the conclusion that (1) is false is consistent with the legend being true. For (1) is 
not entailed by the left-to-right direction of the biconditional expressed by the 
legend; that is, (1) is not entailed by the claim that if one performs an action F 
intelligently then one’s action of F-ing is guided by one’s contemplation of some 
relevant proposition concerning a way to F. As (1) says, if one performs an action 
intelligently then one contemplates some proposition intelligently. But from the 
legend, it only follows that if one performs an action intelligently then one 
contemplates some proposition. A proponent of the legend could then reply to 
Ryle’s regress argument by pointing out that it only shows us that if the legend is 
true it must be the case some actions are intelligent, even though they are guided 
by actions of contemplating propositions that are not themselves intelligently 
                                            
53 Ryle does sometimes gesture at an argument for (2), one example is the following passage: 
That thinking-operations can themselves be stupidly or intelligently performed is a notorious 
truth which by itself upsets the assumed equation of ‘exercising intelligence’ with ‘thinking’. 
Else ‘stupid thinking’ would be a self-contradictory expression and ‘intelligent thinking’ 
would be a tautology. It also helps to upset the assumed type-difference between thinking and 
doing, since only subjects belonging to the same type can share predicates. But thinking and 
doing do share lots of predicates, such as ‘clever’, and ‘stupid’, ‘careful, ‘strenuous’, ‘attentive’, 
etc (Ryle 1946: 213). 
The argument suggested by this passage is something like this: (i) if the same predicates apply 
both to practical operations and thinking operations then they are operations of the same type; 
(ii) the same predicates apply to both practical and thinking operations; and therefore, (iii) 
practical and thinking operations are operations of the same type. From this initial conclusion, 
Ryle infers that theoretical operations are a kind of action. It is also worth noting that Ryle often 
suggests that proponents of the intellectualist legend deny (2): “it is also assumed that theorising 
is not a sort of doing, as if ‘internal doing’ contained some contradiction” (Ryle 1946: 212).  
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performed. And, as Ryle’s regress argument gives us no reason to think that this 
could not be the case, his argument fails to establish that the legend is false. 
Snowdon (2004: 15) and Scott Soames (2005: 102) both raise variations of this 
simple objection to Ryle’s regress argument. For example, Soames claims that all 
that Ryle’s argument establishes is the following disjunction: 
[e]ither some performances are intelligent by virtue of intellectual preplanning (or the 
application of theoretical knowledge) that is not itself intelligent, or some performances 
are intelligent but not by virtue of intellectual preplanning (or the application of 
theoretical knowledge) at all (Soames 2005: 102; bold emphasis is original). 
However, as Soames notes, what Ryle wants to conclude is that the second 
disjunct in the above disjunction is true—that some performances are intelligent 
but not by virtue of any intellectual preplanning. To paraphrase Soames’ point (so 
as to reflect the statement of the legend earlier), it seems that Ryle’s regress 
argument merely establishes that either some actions are intelligent even though 
they are guided by a non-intelligent action of contemplating a proposition, or 
some actions are intelligent even though they are not guided by any action of 
contemplating a proposition.  
Ryle’s regress argument: version 2 
Does this simple objection to Ryle’s regress argument succeed? I think this 
objection actually misrepresents Ryle’s reasoning when he presents his regress 
argument. To see why, let us replace (1) with our statement of the legend, whilst 
retaining (2): 
The Legend          
 One performs an action F intelligently if and only if one Fs and one’s 
action of F-ing is guided by one’s contemplating of some relevant 
proposition(s) concerning a way to F and one’s action of F-ing (and this 
contemplating is distinct from and prior to one’s F-ing). 
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(2) To contemplate a proposition is to perform an action. 
I think that Ryle’s regress argument against the legend is really an argument by 
dilemma, where only one of the horns of the dilemma is an infinite and vicious 
regress. The argument proceeds like so: either the contemplating referred to in the 
legend must be intelligently performed or it need not be. If it must be intelligently 
performed, then (as we have seen) the left-to-right direction of the legend, 
together with (2), will generate an infinite and vicious regress. Assuming that (2) is 
true then, we must reject the legend. On the other hand, Ryle would claim that if 
the contemplating referred to in the legend need not be intelligently performed 
then there is no reason to believe that the right-to-left direction of the legend is 
true. For if one’s action of F-ing is guided by, for example, one’s stupid or 
careless contemplating of relevant propositions concerning a way to F, then one 
will in all likelihood fail to F intelligently.  
To support this interpretation of Ryle, consider this passage which follows shortly 
after the famous statement of his regress argument, where Ryle is now 
considering “some salient points at which this regress would arise”: 
Next, supposing still that to act reasonably I must first perpend the reason for so acting, 
how am I led to make a suitable application of the reason to the particular situation 
which my action is to meet? For the reason, or maxim, is inevitably a proposition of 
some generality. It cannot embody specification to fit every detail of the particular state 
of affairs. Clearly, once more I must be sensible and not stupid, and this good sense 
cannot itself be a product of the intellectual acknowledgement of any general principle. 
A soldier does not become a shrewd general merely by endorsing the strategic principles 
of Clausewitz; he must also be competent to apply them (Ryle 1949: 31–32). 
I take it that Ryle’s point here is that if one is to F intelligently as a result of one’s 
contemplating propositions concerning a way F, then one had better exercise 
intelligence both when contemplating these propositions, and when applying their 
content in action. For otherwise, one might still fail to F intelligently even though 
one’s action of F-ing is guided by one’s contemplating of relevant propositions 
concerning a way to F.  
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Ryle’s writings on knowledge-how are full of cases—like the soldier case—that 
purport to illustrate the existence of what he calls a ‘gap’ or ‘gulf’ “between 
acknowledging principles in thought and intelligently applying them in action” 
(1946: 218). Ryle’s soldier can make the wrong tactical decisions even though he 
always contemplates the relevant strategic principles of Clausewitz before making 
these decisions. For if the soldier does not exercise intelligence when he 
contemplates these principles, he might not see how to apply them to his 
particular situation. Similarly, Ryle (1946: 215–16) uses the example of a ‘stupid 
chess-player’ who knows all the same maxims or propositions concerning chess 
strategies that are known to the ‘clever chess-player’, but who is unable to 
intelligently apply them: 
What facts or what sorts of facts are know to the sensible which are not known to the 
silly? For example, what truths does the clever chess-player know which would be news 
to his stupid opponent? Obviously there is no truth or set of truths of which we could 
say, ‘If only the stupid player had been informed of them, he would be a clever player,’ 
or ‘When once he had been appraised of these truths he would be play well.’ We can 
imagine a clever player generously imparting to his stupid opponent so many rules, 
tactical maxims, ‘wrinkles’, etc. that he could think of no more to tell him; his opponent 
might accept and memorise all of the them, and be able and ready to recite them 
correctly on demand. Yet he might still play chess stupidly, that is, be unable intelligently 
to apply the maxims, etc (Ryle 1946: 215). 
Ryle (1946: 216) claims that his stupid chess-player, who knows all the right 
propositions concerning chess strategies, could contemplate the right proposition 
concerning a chess strategy whenever he tries to make a good move in a game of 
chess and yet still fail to make a good move because “he might not see that it was 
the appropriate maxim or if he did he might not see how to apply it.”  
What is the import of such examples? At the very least, I think Ryle takes such 
cases to support something like the following claim:  
The Gap Premise        
 One can fail to perform an action F intelligently even though one Fs and 
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one’s action of F-ing is guided by one’s contemplation of some relevant 
proposition concerning a way to F. 
The gap premise simply tells us that one can fail to perform an action F 
intelligently even when one Fs and one’s action of F-ing is guided by one’s 
contemplation of true and relevant propositions concerning a way to F. In 
particular, Ryle thinks this can happen when the action of contemplating is not 
itself performed intelligently. If the gap premise is true, then the legend is false 
because the gap premise entails that the right-to-left-direction of the legend is 
false. And, as we have seen, a proponent of the legend cannot respond to this 
objection by simply stipulating that the contemplating of propositions referred to 
in the legend must be intelligently performed. For this response, together with the 
assumption that to contemplate a proposition is to perform an action, leads to an 
infinite and vicious regress. 
Responses to Ryle’s regress argument 
I think it is clear that, once properly understood, Ryle’s regress argument against 
the legend succeeds. But there are related positions that a proponent of the legend 
could still retreat to. For example, they could accept the gap premise, whilst still 
avoiding an infinite and vicious regress, by separating the two conditionals 
embedded in the legend and instead endorsing the following two claims: 
(LR) If one performs an action F intelligently then one Fs and one’s action 
of F-ing is guided by one’s contemplating of some relevant proposition 
concerning a way to F. 
(RL*) If one Fs and one’s action of F-ing is guided by one’s intelligent 
contemplating of some relevant proposition concerning a way to F then 
one Fs intelligently.  
In other words, the proponent of the intellectualist legend could respond to 
Ryle’s gap premise by inserting ‘intelligently’ into the antecedent of the right-to-
107 
left conditional expressed by the legend—giving us (RL*)—whilst avoiding an 
infinite and vicious regress by not inserting ‘intelligently’ into the consequent of 
the left-to-right conditional—i.e. (LR).  
I think this response reveals the grain of truth in the simple objection to Ryle’s 
argument. For what this response shows is that Ryle’s regress argument does not 
demonstrate that the key idea expressed by (LR) is false, that is, the idea that all 
intelligent actions are guided by the contemplating of propositions. If Ryle’s gap 
premise is true it follows that sometimes one will fail to F intelligently when one’s 
act of F-ing is guided by one’s non-intelligent contemplating of some proposition. 
But it does not follow that one will always fail to F intelligently when one’s action 
of F-ing is guided by one’s non-intelligent contemplating of some proposition. In 
which case, it could still be true that some intelligent actions are guided by non-
intelligent actions and, therefore, one could hold that all intelligent actions are 
guided by the contemplation of propositions whilst avoiding Ryle’s regress 
argument.  
I suspect that Ryle would find the idea that an action could be intelligent if it were 
guided by a non-intelligent action of contemplating a proposition to be deeply 
implausible. It seems that Ryle holds that if one’s action of F-ing is guided by 
one’s non-intelligent contemplating of propositions, it is not only the case that 
one could but that one must fail to F intelligently. That is, I think Ryle holds that it 
is a precondition of one’s F-ing intelligently when one’s action of F-ing is guided 
by one’s contemplating of propositions, that this contemplating be performed 
intelligently. For example, Ryle (1946: 216) appears to endorse this idea when he 
concludes on the basis of the stupid chess-player case that: “it requires intelligence 
not only to discover truths, but also to apply them” (emphasis added). 
However, I think one might reasonably object here that all that Ryle’s examples 
clearly demonstrate is that if one’s action of F-ing is guided by some stupid or 
careless action of contemplating a proposition, then one will not F intelligently. But 
these examples do not establish that if one’s action of F-ing is guided by some 
non-intelligent action of contemplating a proposition, then one must fail to F 
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intelligently. To claim otherwise, according to this objection, would be to conflate 
an action’s being non-intelligent with it being stupid or careless etc. 
Ryle does not demonstrate then that (LR) is false. But Ryle’s regress argument 
does undermine the legend. And, in showing that the legend is false, Ryle 
demonstrates that one cannot simply analyse intelligent actions as actions that are 
guided by one’s contemplating of certain relevant propositions.   
The legend and intellectualism  
Ryle’s regress argument against the legend succeeds. But there is still a serious 
problem with this argument. The problem, given our interests, is simply that 
Ryle’s regress argument is not an argument against intellectualism, where 
‘intellectualism’ is the view that knowledge-how is a kind, sort, or species of 
knowledge-that. For the legend that Ryle’s regress argument targets is a view 
about the nature of intelligent actions, not the nature of knowledge-how.  
While Ryle made famous the idea that there is a successful regress argument 
against intellectualism, the irony is that he never explicitly stated such an 
argument himself. It is true that Ryle frequently intimates that his regress 
argument against the legend somehow also supports the conclusion that 
knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that, or that one cannot define 
“‘knowing how’ in terms of ‘knowing that’” (1949: 32). But it is not clear exactly 
why he thought this. One explanation would be that Ryle thought that 
intellectualism entailed the legend, in which case any argument that showed that 
the legend is false would thereby entail that intellectualism is false. But clearly, the 
view that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that does not entail the rather 
odd view of intelligent actions expressed by the legend.  
Perhaps a more charitable explanation is that a regress argument against 
intellectualism is implicitly suggested by Ryle’s critique of the legend. This would 
also explain why so many philosophers have credited him with providing such an 
argument, when he only ever explicitly states a regress argument against the 
legend. One might hope then that we can reconstruct Ryle’s implicit regress 
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argument against intellectualism, and that this argument will turn out to be a 
successful argument against intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson (2001) have 
provided the most well known reconstruction of Ryle’s supposed regress 
argument against intellectualism. I will now examine the argument they present 
before going on to identify another form of regress argument against 
intellectualism, which is also related to Ryle’s argument against the legend. 
4.2 The Contemplation Regress 
The argument Stanley and Williamson offer as a reconstruction of what they take 
to be Ryle’s regress argument against intellectualism relies on two premises, what 
I will call the action premise and the contemplation premise: 
The Action Premise         
 If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. 
The Contemplation Premise       
 If one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the proposition that p. 
Of course, for the sake of the argument, we also need to assume that 
intellectualism is true or that some thesis entailed by intellectualism is true. Stanley 
and Williamson (2001: 413–14) claim that: “If knowledge-how is a species of 
knowledge-that, the content of knowledge-how to F is, for some Φ, the 
proposition that Φ(F)”, where Φ is some function that maps acts to propositions, 
and so Φ(F) is the proposition that is the value of the function Φ when the input 
to that function is the action F. They reconstruct Ryle’s regress argument against 
intellectualism as an argument against the following identity claim, which they call 
the reductio assumption:  
The Reductio Assumption (RA)     
 Knowledge how to F is knowledge that Φ(F). 
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Note that (RA) is essentially a version of the simple identity thesis that we saw in 
Chapter 1: 
The Simple Identity Thesis        
 To know how to F is to know that p (for some relevant proposition p 
concerning a way to F). 
The only difference between (RA) and the simple identity thesis is that (RA) does 
not include the condition that the proposition in question has to concern a way to 
F. Stanley and Williamson describe how Ryle’s regress argument against (RA) is 
meant to proceed like so, where ‘C(p)’ stands for the act of contemplating some 
proposition p: 
Suppose that Hannah Fs. By [the action premise], Hannah employs the knowledge how 
to F. By RA, Hannah employs the knowledge that Φ(F). So, by [the contemplation 
premise], Hannah C(Φ(F))s. Since C(Φ(F)) is an act, we can reapply [the action premise], 
to obtain the conclusion that Hannah knows how to C(Φ(F)). By RA, it then follows 
that Hannah employs the knowledge that Φ(C(Φ(F))). By [the contemplation premise], it 
follows that Hannah C(Φ(C(Φ(F))))s. And so on. 
Ryle’s argument is intended to show, that, if [the action premise] and [the contemplation 
premise] are true, then, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, doing anything 
would require contemplating an infinite number of propositions of ever increasing 
complexity (Stanley and Williamson 2001: 414). 
This then is the regress argument against intellectualism that Stanley and 
Williamson attribute to Ryle. 54 They point out (ibid) that if this argument is to 
                                            
54 Stanley and Williamson (ibid) also note that Ryle himself would have presumably endorsed an 
even stronger version of the contemplation premise; that the “employment of knowledge-that 
requires a prior action of contemplating a proposition.” For recall that Ryle characterises the 
intellectualist legend as saying that an action is intelligent just in case it is guided by a prior act of 
contemplating a relevant proposition. However, as Stanley and Williamson point out, this 
stronger version of the contemplation premise is not needed as the conclusion that to engage in 
any action “it is necessary to contemplate an infinite number of distinct propositions” (ibid) is 
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succeed at least two further premises are also required: (i) that the function Φ 
maps distinct acts to distinct propositions; and (ii) that C(p) is a distinct act from 
C(Φ(C(p))), which is a distinct act from C(Φ(C(Φ(C(p))))), and so on.55  
Now, one could always debate whether or not this argument can be legitimately 
attributed to Ryle, given that Ryle himself only explicitly states a regress argument 
against the legend and not intellectualism. But such interpretative issues are not 
my concern here. My concern is simply whether this argument succeeds or not. 
Accordingly, from here on I will refer to this argument as the contemplation regress 
argument against intellectualism, so as to remain neutral on the issue of whether it 
should be attributed to Ryle. The question we have to address then is this: is the 
contemplation regress argument a successful regress argument against 
intellectualism? 
                                                                                                                            
itself surely false. Ryle does not need the stronger conclusion, that to engage in any action one 
would have to perform an infinite number of distinct actions of contemplating propositions 
performed over an infinite time span. 
55 One also has to assume that the infinite regress of act of contemplating propositions does not 
‘loop’ back on itself. For even if every member of an infinite series is distinct from its immediate 
predecessor in that series, it could still be the case that every member of that infinite series is 
identical to some other member of the infinite series. To illustrate the point, suppose we have 
shown that some thesis, if true, generates an infinite regress of actions: A1, A2, A3, A4 and so on 
ad infinitum; where each action in the series is distinct from its predecessor so A1 ≠ A2, and A2 ≠ 
A3, and A3 ≠ A4 and so on ad infinitum. Now it may appear that a commitment to such a regress 
commits one to the existence of an infinite number of distinct actions. But this is not quite right. 
For example, it could be that after A1 and A2 every ‘new’ action in the regress is identical to 
either A1 or A2 as follows: A3 = A1, A4 = A2, A5 = A1, A6 = A2, A7 = A1 and so on ad 
infinitum. This is of course possible, because unlike identity, non-identity is not a transitive 
relation. And if this were the case, our regress of actions would be intuitively benign rather than 
vicious, as it would only commit us to the existence of exactly two distinct actions, rather than an 
infinite number of distinct actions. 
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Stanley and Williamson’s Critique of the Contemplation Regress 
The contemplation regress argument relies on two key premises. The action 
premise tells us that one Fs only if one employs knowledge how to F. The 
contemplation premise tells us that one employs knowledge that p only if one 
contemplates p. Stanley and Williamson argue that the contemplation regress 
argument is unsound on the grounds that there is no interpretation of these two 
premises such that they are both plausibly true, and we can derive an infinite 
regress from these two premises and RA. They reach this conclusion in three 
steps.  
Step 1: Restrict the Action Premise 
The first step in Stanley and Williamson’s critique is to point out that the action 
premise is clearly false for many values that we could give to ‘F’. For example, 
consider the following claim: 
If Hannah digests food, she knows how to digest food. 
As Stanley and Williamson (2001: 414) point out, this claim is false because: 
“Digesting food is not the kind of thing that one knows how to.” They also offer 
the example of Hannah, who wins a fair lottery, but who did not know how to 
win a fair lottery, since she only won the lottery by sheer chance.  
One might worry that the digestion example is not a counterexample to the action 
premise because it is not something that we do; rather, digesting is an involuntary 
process that occurs inside our bodies.56 But I take it that Stanley and Williamson’s 
point is simply that grammatically speaking, digesting is something that we do. In 
which case, ‘Hannah digests food’ is a legitimate value for ‘F’ in the action 
premise, and this is why the case is a counterexample to the claim that if one Fs 
then one employs knowledge how to F.  
                                            
56 Noë (2005: 279) raises this kind of concern about this case. 
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Similarly, sweating is presumably something we should classify as a mere 
involuntary bodily process or activity— like the beating of our hearts—and not as 
an action that we as agents perform. But grammatically speaking, sweating—
unlike the beating of our hearts—is something that we do, and so at least in this 
very limited sense of the word ‘action’, it is an action. Hence, the claim that if 
David sweats then he employs knowledge how to sweat, is a counterexample to 
the action premise because the claim is clearly false, and yet ‘David sweats’ is a 
legitimate value for ‘F’ in the action premise.  
The digesting and sweating cases are counterexamples to the action premise 
because these ‘doings’ or ‘actions’ are just not the kind of thing that one knows 
how to do. But there will also be cases that are counterexamples to the action 
premise where one does know how to F but one still Fs without employing this 
knowledge-how. For example, I know how to knock the vase off the mantelpiece, 
but when I do so accidentally I do not employ this knowledge-how.  
According to Stanley and Williamson (2001: 415), the lesson of such 
counterexamples to the action premise is that this premise is only correct if we 
restrict the range of actions that can be values for ‘F’ to intentional actions. That is, 
they claim that the action premise is false but that the following claim is true: 
The Intentional Action Premise       
 If one Fs intentionally, one employs knowledge how to F. 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this intentional action premise is actually an 
important component of Stanley and Williamson’s full account of knowledge-
how. So, they do acknowledge that there is an important constitutive or 
conceptual connection between knowledge-how and action, but only once we 
restrict our attention to intentional actions. And, as they point out, neither the 
digestion case nor the lottery case is a counterexample to the intentional action 
premise, as neither of these actions are actions that Hannah does intentionally. 
And the same point obviously applies to David’s sweating or one’s action of 
accidentally knocking the vase off the mantelpiece. 
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Before proceeding to the second step in Stanley and Williamson’s critique, it is 
worth mentioning that one could presumably appeal to alternative restrictions on 
the range of actions that can be values for ‘F’ in the action premise, as a means of 
avoiding such counterexamples. Indeed, as Stanley and Williamson themselves 
point out, Ryle himself appears to endorse the following version of the action 
premise that is restricted to intelligent rather than intentional actions: 
The Intelligent Action Premise      
 If one Fs intelligently [or cleverly, or carefully etc.], one employs [or applies] 
knowledge how to F. 
Ryle appeared to think that only intelligent actions should be analysed as actions 
that exercise our knowledge-how. In particular, he seems to be committed to 
some claim of the form: one Fs intelligently if, and only if, one Fs and in F-ing 
one employs (or as Ryle would say, exercises or applies) one’s knowledge how to 
F. In which case, Ryle would hold that if one Fs intelligently then one employs 
knowledge how to F.  
Stanley and Williamson note that Ryle would endorse the intelligent action 
premise, and they grant that this restricted version of the action premise also 
avoids the digestion and lottery counterexamples; for neither Hannah’s digesting 
of her food nor her winning the lottery are actions that she performs intelligently. 
However, they do not regard this alternative strategy for revising the action 
premise as being significantly different from their own suggestion that one restrict 
the action premise to intentional actions. For after mentioning Ryle’s alternative 
restriction Stanley and Williamson (ibid. 415) say that: “the range of actions under 
consideration must be restricted to intentional actions, or perhaps a proper subset 
thereof.” The thought here being that any intelligent action will also be an 
intentional action.  
Note that if Stanley and Williamson are right that all intentional actions are 
employments of knowledge-how then this strongly suggests that Ryle was wrong 
to think that there was some special connection between intelligent actions and 
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knowledge-how. For, sadly, many of our actions that are ‘stupid’, dull’, ‘silly’, 
‘careless’, ‘unmethodical’ or ‘uninventive’ etc., are nonetheless actions that we 
perform intentionally. But if the intentional action premise is true these non-
intelligent actions are still all employments of knowledge-how. 
Step 2: Deny the Contemplation Premise 
The first step in Stanley and Williamson’s critique of the contemplation regress 
argument is to claim the action premise is false unless we stipulate that it only 
applies to intentional actions. The second step is to claim that the contemplation 
premise—the claim that if one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the 
proposition that p—is false. In support of this claim Stanley and Williamson 
(2001: 415) cite the following passage from Carl Ginet: 
I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the 
knob and pushing it (as well as my knowledge that there is a door there) by performing 
that operation quite automatically as I leave the room; and I may do this, of course, 
without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that proposition or any other relevant 
proposition (Ginet 1975: 7). 
Stanley and Williamson think that what Ginet’s door example illustrates is that we 
often exercise or employ our knowledge that p without contemplating the 
proposition that p. In which case, it is a mistake to assume that employments “of 
knowledge-that must be accompanied by distinct acts of contemplating 
propositions” (2001: 415). 
Step 3: Block a Bad Reply to Step 2 by Appealing to Step 1 
Stanley and Williamson do imagine a way in which someone might try to 
accommodate Ginet’s door example whilst maintaining that the contemplation 
premise is correct:  
Ginet clearly construes “contemplating a proposition” as referring to an intentional act 
of contemplating a proposition, which is one natural sense of the phrase. If 
“contemplating a proposition” is construed in its intentional action sense, then [the 
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contemplation premise] is false. But we can rescue [the contemplation premise] from 
Ginet’s objection by denying that “contemplating a proposition” should be taken in its 
intentional action sense in [the contemplation premise]. Perhaps there is a sense of 
“contemplating a proposition” in which it refers to an action that is no more intentional 
than is the action of digesting food. Or perhaps it can also be construed as denoting an 
action in some deflationary sense of “action”. If “contemplating a proposition” is taken 
in such a sense, then [the contemplation premise] can be salvaged after all (Stanley and 
Williamson 2001: 415–16). 
The third and final step then in Stanley and Williamson’s critique is to point out 
that while this response might save the contemplation premise it would not save 
the contemplation regress argument, given what they have said about the action 
premise. For if ‘contemplates the proposition that p’ is interpreted so that it refers 
to a non-intentional action, then it is not a legitimate substitution for ‘F’ if the 
action premise is interpreted so that the range of actions that can be values for ‘F’ 
is restricted to just intentional actions or some proper subset thereof. And, they 
claim, the action premise is only plausible if it is so restricted. 
Stanley and Williamson conclude that there is no interpretation of the action 
premise and the contemplation premise such that both premises are plausibly true 
and we can derive a regress from these premises and RA. Their diagnosis of the 
contemplation regress argument (ibid. 416) is that this argument is “unsound” and 
so it “fails to establish any difficulty for the thesis that knowledge-how is a species 
of knowledge-that.”  
A Defence of the Contemplation Regress? 
Is there some way of defending the contemplation regress argument against this 
critique? Noë (2005: 278–82) argues that Stanley and Williamson fail to show that 
the contemplation regress argument is unsound. Noë’s main criticism of their 
critique is directed at their claim that the contemplation premise is false if we 
assume that ‘contemplates the proposition that p’ in the contemplation premise 
refers to an intentional action. Noë claims that Stanley and Williamson do not 
provide an argument for this claim. Presumably, this is because they take the 
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claim to be intuitively obvious once one has considered examples like Ginet’s 
door case. However, Noë argues that all that the door case establishes is that 
when we perform actions that exercise our knowledge-that we need not be 
consciously aware of contemplating the relevant proposition. But as Noë points out, 
this conclusion is at least consistent with the possibility that we always 
contemplate the relevant proposition when we exercise our knowledge-that, and 
that we do so intentionally: 
Ryle can accommodate Ginet’s observation by countenancing the possibility that not 
every act of contemplating a proposition is performed consciously. To say that it is or 
could be performed unconsciously is not to say that it is not the sort of thing that could 
be performed intentionally (Noë 2005: 282). 
Perhaps Noë is right that a proponent of the contemplation regress argument 
would be best advised to respond to Ginet’s door cases by claiming that 
whenever one employs one’s knowledge that p, one does intentionally 
contemplate the relevant proposition, it is just that one need not be consciously 
aware of performing this intentional action. The problem is that Noë does not 
provide us with any reason to think that the contemplation premise is true.  
The contemplation premise is deeply implausible if we interpret it as claiming that 
if one employs one’s knowledge that p then one consciously contemplates the 
proposition that p—as Ginet’s case clearly establishes. But the contemplation 
premise is, at best, only marginally less implausible if we interpret it as saying that 
if one employs one’s knowledge that p then one intentionally (but not necessarily 
consciously) contemplates the proposition that p. Consider my everyday action of 
opening my office door in the morning. As Ginet points out, it is natural to say 
that in performing such actions I exercise or employ various kinds of knowledge-
that, including my knowledge that one can open my office door by turning the 
knob and pushing it. But why think that in employing this knowledge-that I must 
also intentionally perform the action of contemplating the proposition that one 
can open my office door by turning the knob and pushing it? Noë is right that it 
is at least possible that I perform such an intentional action even though I am not 
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consciously aware of doing so. But why should we believe in the first place that 
performing an intentional action of contemplating a proposition is a precondition 
of employing one’s knowledge-that? 
If we follow Noë and assume that if one employs one’s knowledge that p then 
one intentionally (but not necessarily consciously) contemplates the proposition 
that p, then we can derive an infinite and vicious regress from this assumption, 
the intentional action premise, and RA. But in the absence of some argument for 
this strange assumption, it is perfectly reasonable for intellectualists to respond to 
the contemplation regress argument by rejecting this assumption rather than RA. 
I doubt that any such argument could be given, and so I think we must agree with 
Stanley and Williamson that the contemplation regress argument fails.  
4.3 The Employment Regress  
We have seen that the contemplation regress argument is not a successful regress 
argument against intellectualism. Is there a more promising regress argument 
against intellectualism? In this section I want to identify another form of regress 
argument against intellectualism that is related to the contemplation regress 
argument, but which does not rely on the premise that if one employs one’s 
knowledge that p then one contemplates the proposition that p. Rather, this form 
of regress argument relies on some premise of the form: if one employs [or 
applies, or exercises] one’s knowledge that p then one employs [or applies, or 
exercises] knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that p.  
This form of argument is, I believe, often implicit in discussions of Ryle’s 
supposed regress argument against intellectualism. In particular, Hetherington 
(2006) presents an argument that I think implicitly relies on this kind of premise, 
and he claims both that it is Ryle’s regress argument and that it is a successful 
regress argument against intellectualism. I will discuss Hetherington’s argument 
separately in §4.5. In this section I will construct what I take to be the clearest 
statement of this general form of argument, and then identify the connections 
between this argument and Ryle’s critique of the legend. However, before 
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introducing this argument it will be useful to first make note of a certain fact 
about employments of knowledge-how. 
Direct knowledge-how 
Consider the action premise again: 
The Action Premise         
 If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. 
Unlike the contemplation premise, one might think that the action premise is at 
least prima facie plausible. This is suggested by the fact that both proponents of 
intellectualism—like Stanley and Williamson—and opponents of intellectualism—
like Ryle and Noë—have endorsed certain restricted versions of this claim. In 
fact, for Stanley and Williamson (2001: 443), the plausibility of the intentional 
action premise explains why philosophers have (albeit mistakenly in their view) 
found Ryle’s supposed regress argument against intellectualism so plausible: “the 
thesis that intentional actions are in fact employments of knowledge-how is 
precisely what accounts for the initial plausibility of Ryle’s original argument 
against the claim that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.”  
An interesting point about the action premise—that is not noted by any of its 
aforementioned proponents—is that the unrestricted version of the action 
premise by itself generates an infinite regress. For suppose that Hannah performs 
some action F1. By the action premise, Hannah employs knowledge how to F1. 
But employing one’s knowledge how to F1 is a legitimate value for ‘F’ in the 
unrestricted action premise because, at least grammatically speaking, employing 
one’s knowledge-how is something that one does. But then, given that employing 
knowledge-how is something that we do, we can reapply the action premise to 
conclude that Hannah employs knowledge how to employ her knowledge how to 
F1. But then by the action premise, Hannah also employs knowledge how to 
employ her knowledge how to F1. And so on ad infinitum.  
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The unrestricted action premise can be used then to generate an infinite regress of 
employments of knowledge-how. To avoid an infinite and vicious regress one 
must allow that sometimes we can employ our knowledge-how directly, in the 
sense that sometimes we employ our knowledge how to F without also employing 
some distinct state of knowledge how to employ our knowledge how to F. In 
other words, the following claim must be false: 
 If one employs knowledge how to F, one employs knowledge how to 
employ one’s knowledge how to F (and one’s state of knowledge how to F 
and one’s state of knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge how to F). 
To deny this claim is to commit oneself to the conclusion that whenever we 
employ our knowledge how to F we also employ an infinite number of further 
and distinct states of knowledge-how. This conclusion is surely absurd, for given 
that we are finite beings, it tells us that we never employ our knowledge-how. 57  
                                            
57 Note that there are two ways one might deny this claim. One way would be to deny the claim 
that if we can employ our knowledge how to F without employing knowledge how to employ 
our knowledge how to F. This response would block the regress of employments of knowledge-
how. Alternatively, one could accept the regress of employments of knowledge-how but claim 
that it is benign, rather than vicious, by denying the bracketed clause that states that these two 
states of knowledge-how are distinct. The idea then would be that when we employ our 
knowledge how to F we always employ knowledge how to employ our knowledge how to F, but 
these two states of knowledge-how need not be distinct. The first proposal seems by far the 
more natural to my mind, and I suspect that the second proposal just collapses into the first. But 
the important point is simply that we must deny this claim if we are to avoid saying that an 
infinite and vicious regress ensues whenever anyone employs their knowledge how to do 
something.  
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The employment regress argument 
Some employments of knowledge-how must be direct. I take it that once pointed 
out, this claim is obvious, even trivial. The employment regress argument relies on 
the idea that employments of knowledge-that—unlike employments of 
knowledge-how—cannot be direct. That is, the employment regress argument 
relies on the following premise that I will refer to as the employment premise: 
The Employment Premise        
 If one employs knowledge that p, one employs knowledge how to employ 
one’s knowledge that p (and one’s state of knowledge that p is distinct 
from one’s state of knowing how to employ one’s knowledge that p). 
The contemplation premise tells us that if one employs one’s knowledge that p 
then one contemplates the proposition that p. The employment premise tells us 
that if one employs one’s knowledge that p then one employs knowledge how to 
employ one’s knowledge that p. Furthermore, it says that the relevant state of 
knowledge that p and the relevant state of knowledge how to employ one’s 
knowledge that p are distinct.  
Now, to construct a regress argument here we also need to assume that some 
intellectualist thesis is true. Let us assume then, for the purposes of reductio, that 
the simple identity thesis is true: 
The Simple Identity Thesis        
 To know how to F is to know that p (for some relevant proposition p 
concerning a way to F). 
Together, the employment premise and the simple identity thesis generate an 
infinite regress like so: imagine that Ari Fs and in so doing he employs his 
knowledge how to F. By the identity thesis, it follows that Ari thereby employs his 
knowledge that p1 (for some proposition p1 concerning a way to F). By the 
employment premise, it follows that Ari also employs knowledge how to employ 
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his knowledge that p1, and that Ari’s state of knowing how to employ his 
knowledge that p1 is distinct from his state of knowing that p1. By the identity 
premise, it follows that Ari thereby employs his knowledge that p2 (for some 
proposition p2 concerning a way to employ one’s knowledge that p1). By the 
employment premise, it follows that Ari also employs knowledge how to employ 
his knowledge that p2, and that Ari’s state of knowing how to employ his 
knowledge that p2 is distinct from his state of knowing that p2, and so on ad 
infinitum. 
We have an infinite regress then of employments of knowledge-that; and every 
state of knowledge-that in this infinite series is distinct from the state of 
knowledge-that that immediately precedes it. Such a regress certainly seems 
vicious. For it is a consequence of this regress that whenever we employ our 
knowledge how to do something we must also possess and employ an infinite 
number of further and distinct states of knowledge-that.58 This conclusion is 
absurd, for given that we are finite beings what it tells us is that we never employ 
our knowledge-how. But the inferences required to generate this absurd 
conclusion are valid, therefore, we must reject either the employment premise or 
the simple identity thesis. The employment regress argument tells us that we 
should reject the simple identity thesis, on the basis of the assumption that the 
employment premise is true. 
Challenges to the employment premise 
Is the employment regress argument a successful argument against 
intellectualism? One might think that it is at least more promising than the 
contemplation regress argument. For unlike the contemplation regress argument, 
                                            
58 Strictly speaking, however, the existence of this regress only entails that whenever we employ 
knowledge how to F we also have to possess and employ an infinite number of distinct states of 
knowledge-that if we assume that this regress does not ‘loop’ back on itself (as explained earlier, 
see fn. 54). I ignore here the possibility that such a regress loops back on itself simply because it 
strikes me as being highly implausible. 
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the employment regress argument does not rely on the dubious idea that one 
employs one’s knowledge that p only if one contemplates the proposition that p.  
However, an intellectualist faced with this argument will no doubt suspect that 
they can offer good reasons for rejecting the employment premise. For one thing, 
as we saw earlier, to avoid an infinite and vicious regress it must be the case that 
some employments of knowledge-how are direct. That is, sometimes we must 
employ our knowledge how to F without also employing some further state of 
knowledge how to employ our knowledge how to F. But then why should the 
same not be true of employments of knowledge-that? It is true that, unlike 
knowledge-how, merely denying that employments of knowledge-that can be 
direct does not by itself generate an infinite and vicious regress. But still why 
should we think that one employ one’s knowledge that p only if one employs 
knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that p? 
Furthermore, as already indicated, the employment premise is just an instance of 
the more general claim made by the action premise: 
The Action Premise         
 If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F. 
That is, the employment premise makes the same claim as the action premise 
except that the range of actions that can be values for ‘F’ is restricted to a 
particular kind of action, namely, employments of knowledge-that. But, as 
discussed earlier, the unrestricted version of the action premise is subject to clear 
counterexamples. The intellectualist may well suspect then that we should find 
analogous counterexamples to the employment premise.  
Still, it does not follow from the fact that there are counterexamples to the action 
premise that there will be counterexamples to the employment premise. And even 
if there are such counterexamples, it may be that we can offer some revised 
version of the employment premise that avoids them, and which still generates an 
infinite and vicious regress together with the simple identity thesis. I will examine 
such issues in §4.4. But first I will return briefly to Ryle, for I think that within his 
124 
critique of the legend we can perceive an attempt to motivate something like the 
claim made by the employment premise.  
Rylean motivations for the employment premise 
Consider the following passages where Ryle discusses an example modelled on 
Lewis Carroll’s (1895) famous dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise: 
A pupil fails to follow an argument. He understands the premises and he understands 
the conclusion. But he fails to see that the conclusion follows from the premises. The 
teacher thinks him rather dull but tries to help. So he tells him that there is an ulterior 
proposition which he has not considered, namely, that if these premises are true, the conclusion 
is true. The pupil understands this and dutifully recites it alongside the premises, and still 
fails to see that the conclusion follows from the premises even when accompanied by 
the assertion that these premises entail this conclusion. So a second hypothetical 
proposition is added to his store; namely, that the conclusion is true if the premises are 
true as well as the first hypothetical proposition that if the premises are true the 
conclusion is true. And still the pupil fails to see. And so on for ever. He accepts rules in 
theory but this does not force him to apply them in practice. He considers reasons, but 
he fails to reason. (This is Lewis Carroll’s puzzle in ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. 
I have met no successful attempt to solve it.)  
What has gone wrong? Just this, that knowing how to reason was assumed to be 
analysable into the knowledge or supposal of some propositions, namely, (1) the special 
premises, (2) the conclusion, plus (3) some extra propositions about the implication of 
the conclusion by the premises, etc., etc., ad infinitum. ‘Well but surely the intelligent 
reasoner is knowing rules of inference whenever he reasons intelligently.’ Yes, of course 
he is, but knowing such a rule is not a case of knowing an extra fact or truth; it is 
knowing how to move from acknowledging some facts to acknowledging others. 
Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extra information but being able 
to perform an intelligent operation. Knowing a rule is knowing how (Ryle 1946: 216-17). 
There are obviously numerous different ideas and arguments suggested by Ryle’s 
brief discussion of this example. For one thing, I think Ryle uses this example to a 
support a version of the insufficiency objection to intellectualism that was 
discussed in Chapter 1; that is, the objection that intellectualism is false because 
knowledge-that is not sufficient for knowledge-how. He appears to be using the 
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pupil case to support the claim that someone could know any given proposition 
while still failing to know how to do something, for example, according to Ryle 
the pupil could know any given proposition whilst still failing to know how to 
reason.59  
However, I think Ryle also infers a more specific insufficiency claim from this 
example; namely, that knowing that p does not suffice for knowing how to 
employ one’s knowledge that p. As we saw in §4.1, Ryle (1946: 218) often refers 
to a ‘gap’ or ‘gulf’ “between … acknowledging principles in thought and 
intelligently applying them in action.” But, at the same time, Ryle (ibid.) also refers 
to a ‘gulf’ “between having the postulated knowledge of those facts and knowing 
how to use or apply it”. In other words, Ryle often points to a gap between 
knowing that p and knowing how to employ or apply one’s knowledge that p. 
How does the pupil case support this idea that one can know that p without 
knowing how to employ one’s knowledge that p? If we let r be the proposition 
that p and (if p then q), Ryle appears to take one of the morals of this case to be 
that one could know that r whilst failing to know how to employ one’s knowledge 
that r so as to perform some action, like (say) the action of inferring q from r. In 
other words, Ryle characterizes this case as one where someone stands in the 
knowledge-that relation to some proposition(s), but they do not know how to 
employ or apply this knowledge-that. 
Ryle’s claim that merely knowing that p is not a sufficient condition for knowing 
how to employ one’s knowledge that p does not establish the employment 
premise, but it does at least support the claim made by the bracketed clause in the 
employment premise:  
                                            
59 As noted in Chapter 1, there is at least one clear kind of counterexample to the claim that it is 
possible to stand in the knowledge-that relation to any given proposition p whilst failing to know 
how to perform some action F; namely, the case where p is the proposition that one knows how 
to F, or where p is some other proposition the truth of which entails that one knows how to F.  
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The Employment Premise        
 If one employs knowledge that p, one employs knowledge how to employ 
one’s knowledge that p (and one’s state of knowledge that p is distinct 
from one’s state of knowing how to employ one’s knowledge that p). 
The employment premise and the simple identity thesis together generate an 
infinite regress of employments of knowledge-that. The bracketed clause in the 
employment premise ensures that each new state of knowledge-that in this 
infinite regress will be distinct from its predecessor, and so it ensures that this 
regress is vicious. Ryle’s claim that it is always possible that one know that p but 
fail to know how to employ one’s knowledge that p, supports the assumption that 
this bracketed clause expresses; namely, that knowing that p and knowing how to 
employ one’s knowledge that p are always two distinct states of knowledge. 
Furthermore, I think Ryle sees the pupil case as supporting a claim that is even 
more closely related to the employment premise: the claim that if one employs 
one’s knowledge that p then one knows how to employ one’s knowledge that p. 
For example, it appears that Ryle infers from this case that if one is to infer q 
from one’s knowledge that r, then one must know how to employ one’s 
knowledge that r so as to reach this conclusion; as the difference between the 
intelligent reasoner and the pupil for Ryle (1946: 217) is that only the former 
“[knows] how to move from acknowledging some facts to acknowledging 
others.” 
Similarly, on the basis of the stupid chess player example discussed in §4.1, Ryle 
concludes that “it requires intelligence not only to discover truths, but also to 
apply them, and knowing how to apply truths cannot, without setting up an 
infinite process, be reduced to knowledge of some extra bridge truths” (Ryle 
1946: 216). Ryle seems to suggest here not only that employing one’s knowledge-
that is an action that requires intelligence, but also that it is an action the 
performance of which requires one to know how to perform that action. 
Presumably, for Ryle, the stupid chess player supports this claim because his 
repeated failures to make a good move in a game of chess are naturally explained 
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by his failure to know how to apply, or employ, his propositional knowledge of 
the relevant chess strategies. Ryle will think that without such knowledge-how the 
stupid chess–player “might not see how to apply” (1946: 216) this propositional 
knowledge, so as to make a good move in a game of chess.  
It seems then that one of the many morals Ryle infers from examples like his 
pupil and stupid chess player cases is that it is a precondition of employing one’s 
knowledge that p that one know how to employ one’s knowledge that p. And 
from this idea it is a fairly short step to the claim that it is a precondition of 
employing one’s knowledge that p that one employ knowledge how to employ 
one’s knowledge that p. Indeed, I think it is reasonable to attribute both of these 
claims to Ryle, with one important qualification.  
The qualification is that Ryle would presumably hold that these principles only 
apply to intelligent employments of knowledge-that. For recall that Ryle does not 
endorse the unrestricted version of the action premise; rather, he endorses the 
intelligent action premise: 
The Intelligent Action Premise      
 If one Fs intelligently [or cleverly, or carefully etc.], one employs knowledge 
how to F. 
Presumably then, Ryle would only hold that knowing how to employ one’s 
knowledge that p is a precondition of employing one’s knowledge that p, when 
one employs one’s knowledge that p intelligently, or cleverly, or carefully etc. For as we 
saw in §4.1, Ryle frequently stresses that employing one’s knowledge-that—or 
‘applying truths’—is itself an action that can be performed more or less 
intelligently. We can assume then that Ryle would only endorse the following 
restricted version of the employment premise:  
 If one employs knowledge that p intelligently, one employs knowledge how 
to employ one’s knowledge that p (and one’s state of knowledge that p is 
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distinct from one’s state of knowing how to employ one’s knowledge that 
p). 
Whether this restricted version of the employment premise could be used to 
generate a plausible regress argument against intellectualism is an issue I will 
address in the next section. For now it will suffice to simply note Ryle’s attempt 
to motivate a version of the employment premise.  
4.4 Intellectualist Responses to the Employment Premise 
In this section I consider what reasons an intellectualist might offer for rejecting 
the employment premise. To begin with, consider Ryle’s attempts to motivate the 
claim made by the employment premise (or something in the neighbourhood of 
this claim) succeed. Do examples like Ryle’s pupil and stupid chess player cases 
really support the idea that if one employs one’s knowledge that p then one 
employs knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that p? Ryle is surely right in 
proposing that failing to know how to employ one’s knowledge that p will 
sometimes result in one’s failure to successfully employ one’s knowledge that p. But 
the employment premise tell us that failing to know how to employ one’s 
knowledge that p will always result in one’s failing to successfully employ one’s 
knowledge that p.  
Suppose that all of the cases Ryle describes are in fact cases where someone fails 
to employ their knowledge that p because they do not know how to employ it. 
Even given this assumption, the existence of such individual cases by itself does 
not demonstrate that knowing how to employ one’s knowledge that p is a 
necessary condition of employing one’s knowledge that p, nor does it 
demonstrate that employing knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that p is a 
necessary condition of employing one’s knowledge that p.  
Furthermore, as I suggested earlier, an intellectualist will suspect that there will be 
counterexamples to the employment premise that are analogous to 
counterexamples we can give to the action premise. Before I consider whether 
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there are such analogous counterexamples, note that if there are such 
counterexamples a proponent of the employment regress argument could not 
respond to them by merely restricting the employment premise to intentional 
employments of knowledge-that, like so: 
If one employs knowledge that p intentionally, one employs knowledge how 
to employ one’s knowledge that p.  
Even if this restricted version of the employment premise is correct, one cannot 
validly derive an infinite regress from this claim and the assumption that the 
simple identity thesis is true. Rather, for the derivation to be valid, one would 
have to instead endorse the following claim: 
If one employs knowledge that p intentionally, one employs knowledge how 
to employ one’s knowledge that p intentionally. 
But this claim looks deeply implausible. Surely we can intentionally employ our 
knowledge-that without intentionally employing knowledge how to employ this 
knowledge-that. So, if there are counterexamples to the employment premise one 
could not plausibly respond to them by stipulating that the claim it makes only 
applies to intentional employments of knowledge-that. And if all intelligent 
actions are intentional actions then the same point applies to Ryle’s version of the 
employment premise that is restricted to intelligent employments of knowledge-
that.  
Of course, we have not yet established that there are clear counterexamples to the 
employment premise. Indeed, I think this is actually quite a difficult endeavour. 
For one thing, it seems difficult to imagine a counterexample to the employment 
premise that parallels the case where Hannah wins the lottery, but she does not 
know how to win the lottery as she only wins the lottery due to sheer chance or 
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mere luck.60 But suppose that we could describe a case where someone employs 
their knowledge that p but only by sheer chance or mere luck, and so they do not 
thereby employ knowledge how to employ their knowledge that p. Even if there 
was such a case, I think it would be reasonable for a proponent of the 
employment regress argument to respond to it by simply replacing the 
employment premise with something like the following claim: 
If one employs one’s knowledge that p non-accidentally, one employs 
knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that p non-accidentally. 
                                            
60 One might think that the following is an example of such a case: Suppose that Mary is a 
contestant in a TV game show. The first question is ‘What is the capital of New Zealand?’ Mary 
knows the answer, but she was not listening when she was told the rules of this game and so she 
is not sure what she is meant to do when she knows the answer to a question. Mary knows that 
she has to shout the answer out loud a specific number of times depending on how much prize 
money is at stake at that point in the game, but she has no idea how one is meant to calculate 
that number. Given her predicament, Mary shouts out ‘Wellington!’ nine times, simply because 
nine is her lucky number. Luckily for Mary, given the prize money on offer at that point in the 
game, the right thing to do to win the prize was to shout the correct answer exactly nine times, 
and so Mary wins the prize. One might think that this is a case where someone employs their 
knowledge that p but does not employ knowledge how to employ their knowledge that p, given 
the luck involved in Mary’s winning the prize. However, I think this is a mistaken diagnosis. The 
right diagnosis is that it is a case where someone employs their knowledge that p so as to F 
without employing knowledge how to employ their knowledge that p so as to F, and such a case is 
not a counterexample to the employment premise. It is true that Mary did not employ knowledge 
how to employ her knowledge that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand so as to win the 
prize, for this is something Mary did not know how to do. But Mary did know how to employ 
her knowledge that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand so as to shout out the correct 
answer nine times, and she did employ this knowledge-how in shouting out ‘Wellington!’ nine 
times. 
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As this claim does not obviously commit one to the implausible claim that these 
non-accidental employments of knowledge-that and knowledge-how must be 
intentionally performed. 
Perhaps we can find telling counterexamples to the employment premise by 
looking for analogues of the digestion and sweating counterexamples to the 
action premise, rather than the lottery counterexample? The only kind of cases 
that I can imagine that might be roughly analogous to such examples are 
employments of the kind of tacit knowledge appealed to in cognitive psychology. 
For example, suppose that our best theory of the linguistic competence of native 
English speakers attributes to them the tacit knowledge that ‘NP → Det + Adj + 
N’ is a rule of English; such that sometimes when an English speaker exercises 
that competence (by producing grammatical utterances or detecting 
ungrammatical sentences etc.) they do so (in part) by employing their tacit 
knowledge that ‘NP → Det + Adj + N’ is a rule of English.  
Now imagine that Mary, a native English speaker, exercises her linguistic 
competence in some way and, in so doing, she employs her tacit knowledge that 
‘NP → Det + Adj + N’ is a rule of English. Would Mary thereby also employ 
knowledge how to employ her knowledge that ‘NP → Det + Adj + N’ is rule of 
English? Arguably not, as it seems odd to say that Mary knows how to employ 
her knowledge that ‘NP → Det + Adj + N’ is a rule of English. Employing her 
tacit knowledge that ‘NP → Det + Adj + N’ is a rule of English, one might think, 
is something that Mary does but it is not something she knows how to do. In 
which case, when Mary employs her tacit knowledge that ‘NP → Det + Adj + N’ 
is rule of English, she does not also employ knowledge how to employ this 
knowledge-that. This conclusion that Mary employs this tacit knowledge directly 
seems particularly plausible given that the content of such states of tacit 
knowledge is often thought to be inaccessible to conscious reflection and 
inferentially isolated from our belief forming mechanisms etc. 
Insofar as we can be said to possess and employ such states of tacit knowledge, it 
seems to me that we must employ them directly. But, nonetheless, I think there is 
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an inherent problem with this strategy of appealing to employments of tacit 
knowledge as a way of trying to identify counterexamples to the employment 
premise. The problem is that even if we assume that we do need to posit such 
states of tacit knowledge to explain (say) our linguistic capacities, it is not at all 
clear that such states should really be thought of as being genuine states of 
propositional knowledge, rather than some other kind of intentional or 
informational state. For example, propositional knowledge requires justification 
or warrant, but such notions do not even seem to be applicable to the states of 
‘tacit knowledge’ or ‘implicit knowledge’ appealed to in psychology. As Martin 
Davies (2001: 8127) writes: “the notion of justification does not seem to be 
applicable in cases where the subject is unaware of the presence or influence of 
the information.” Furthermore, Gareth Evans (1981) and Steven Stich (1978, 
1980), amongst others, have argued that the states of ‘tacit knowledge’ are not 
even genuine belief states, let alone states of knowledge-that. 
The intellectualist could always try to argue that the states of tacit knowledge 
appealed to in the cognitive sciences really are genuine states of propositional 
knowledge. But given how controversial this issue is, appealing to such states of 
tacit knowledge does not look to be a promising way of identifying clear 
counterexamples to the employment premise. Rather, the intellectualist needs to 
appeal to a case were it is clear that someone employs a genuine state of 
knowledge-that, and not merely some other kind of intentional or informational 
state.  
Perhaps a better kind of case for the intellectualist to appeal to in the attempt to 
find a compelling counterexample to the employment premise would again be 
Ginet’s door case:  
I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the 
knob and pushing it (as well as my knowledge that there is a door there) by performing 
that operation quite automatically as I leave the room; and I may do this, of course, 
without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that proposition or any other relevant 
proposition (Ginet 1975: 7). 
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This is a case where someone clearly employs or exercises a genuine state of 
knowledge-that. And it is also a case where the employing of knowledge-that is 
not performed either consciously or intentionally. The intellectualist might argue 
then that because Ginet’s ‘automatic’ employment of his knowledge (that one can 
get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it) is not an intentional action, 
then it is an action that he performs without employing knowledge how to 
perform it.  
Is such a diagnosis of Ginet’s door case correct? That is, is this case an example 
of someone employing their knowledge that p without employing knowledge how 
to employ their knowledge that p? What is clear is that when I open my office 
door in the morning I do not consciously or intentionally employ knowledge how 
to employ my knowledge that one can open my office door by turning the knob 
and pushing it. But nor do I consciously or intentionally employ my knowledge 
that one can open my office door by turning the knob and pushing it, yet it still 
seems correct to say that, in some sense, I employ or exercise this knowledge-that 
when I open my office door—as Ginet’s example illustrates. A proponent of the 
employment regress argument might claim then, analogously, that in opening the 
door I do employ my knowledge how to employ my knowledge that one can 
open the door by turning the knob and pushing it, even though I do not do so 
either consciously or intentionally.  
It seems to me that it is not entirely clear what the correct thing is to say about 
such examples. I can feel some pull towards the claim that I not only know that 
one can open my office door by turning the knob and pushing it; but that I also 
know how to employ my knowledge that one can open my office door by turning 
the knob and pushing it; and that I employ or exercise this knowledge-how when 
I open the door. But, on the other hand, it seems to me that it is far clearer that 
the knowledge-that attribution is correct than that the knowledge-how attribution 
is.  
Of course, if I employ my knowledge that p then I can employ my knowledge that 
p, from which it follows that, in some sense, I have the ability to employ my 
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knowledge that p (at least if my employing of my knowledge that p was not a 
mere accident or fluke). Now, from this initial conclusion a neo-Rylean would 
infer that I thereby know how to employ my knowledge that p, because they hold 
that possessing the ability entails knowing how to F. In which case, having the 
ability to employ my knowledge that one can open the door by turning the knob 
and pushing it, entails that I know how to employ my knowledge that one can 
open the door by turning the knob and pushing it. Furthermore, neo-Ryleans 
claim that to know how to F just is to possess the ability to F. And if this identity 
claim is true, to employ an ability to employ my knowledge that p just is to 
employ knowledge how to employ my knowledge that p. In other words, if one 
accepts neo-Ryleanism it is a fairly easy matter to motivate the employment 
premise. 
Indeed, I think that it is likely that Ryle himself is implicitly assuming the truth of 
neo-Ryleanism when he appeals to his pupil and stupid chess player cases in 
supporting the claim that if one employs one’s knowledge that p then one knows 
how to employ one’s knowledge that p. For recall that in his discussion of the 
pupil case Ryle moves freely from the claim that “[k]nowing a rule of inference is 
not possessing a bit of extra information but being able to perform an intelligent 
operation” to the claim that “Knowing a rule is knowing how” (Ryle 1946: 217; 
emphasis added). This suggests that for Ryle the claim that if one employs one’s 
knowledge that p then one employs knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that 
p is simply equivalent to, or at least entails, the claim that if one employs one’s 
knowledge that p then one employs one’s ability to employ one’s knowledge that 
p. 
But the problem here is that intellectualists offer strong reasons for denying the 
idea that possessing the ability to F is either identical with or entails knowing how 
to F, as we saw in Chapter 1. In which case, the intellectualist will feel that they 
can happily agree, on the one hand, that Ryle’s examples show us that if one 
employs one’s knowledge that p then one employs an ability to employ one’s 
knowledge that p, whilst denying, on the other hand, that if one employs one’s 
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knowledge that p then one employs knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that 
p.  
As I have illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, Stanley and Williamson hold that if one 
has the ability to F intentionally then one knows how to F. But this claim is 
consistent with the point being made here. For one thing, whilst they accept this 
entailment, they do not think that knowing how to F entails having the ability to F 
intentionally (because of examples like the ski instructor case). So, they are clearly 
not committed to identifying knowing to F with possessing the ability to F 
intentionally. Furthermore, such an identity claim could only be used to help 
motivate a version of the employment regress argument that relied on the claim 
that if one employs one’s knowledge that p intentionally then one employs 
knowledge how to employ one’s knowledge that p intentionally. And this claim is 
clearly false.  
The moral here is that the intellectualist will not want to contest the obvious truth 
that to employ one’s knowledge that p one has to, in some sense, possess the 
ability or capacity to do so. What they will deny is that this ability must be identical 
to some state of knowledge-how.  
Such considerations suggest that the intellectualist can offer good general reasons 
for rejecting the employment premise, even if it is difficult to produce a really 
decisive counterexample to this claim. For the intellectualist can argue that the 
counterexamples we find to the action premise at least suggest that when one 
non-intentionally employs one’s knowledge that p, one need not also employ 
knowledge how to employ their knowledge that p. And they could also point out 
that even if our intuitions about examples like Ginet’s door case are not entirely 
clear either way, this at least shows us that it is not obviously true that any case of 
someone employing their knowledge that p will also be a case where they employ 
knowledge how to employ their knowledge that p.  
Furthermore, insofar as we are inclined to think that the employment premise is 
correct, the intellectualist could argue that we are being misled by the fact that 
grammatically speaking, ‘employing’, ‘applying’, or ‘exercising’, our knowledge-
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that are things that we do. As discussed in §4.2, digesting and sweating are also 
things that, at least in a grammatical sense, we do. But it would obviously be a 
mistake to infer from this grammatical fact that such ‘actions’ are the kind of 
actions that we perform as agents, or that we know how to perform. Similarly, 
one might argue that at least some employments of knowledge-that are simply not 
the kind of ‘actions’ one knows how to perform. In opening my office door I 
employ my knowledge that one can open the door by turning the knob and 
pushing it, and my employing of this knowledge-that is, at least grammatically 
speaking, something that I do. But is this action of employing my knowledge really 
of a kind with my action of opening the door? That is, is this employment of 
knowledge-that also an action that I perform as an agent, and that I know how to 
perform? At the very least, I think an intellectualist could make a strong case for 
thinking that it is not.  
Where does this leave our assessment of the employment regress argument? I 
think we must conclude that—at the very best—the employment regress 
argument presents an inconclusive case against the simple identity thesis. As we 
saw earlier, it must be possible to employ one’s knowledge-how directly, for to 
assume otherwise would lead to an infinite and vicious regress. The employment 
regress argument relies on the idea that unlike employments of knowledge-how, 
employments of knowledge-that cannot be direct. But it is not at all clear that the 
intellectualist must accept this asymmetry. And while it is difficult to describe a 
decisive counterexample to the employment premise, the intellectualist can offer a 
number of strong considerations for thinking that the principle it expresses is 
nonetheless false.  
4.5 Related Regress Arguments 
In the previous two sections, we have seen that there are good reasons for 
thinking that both the employment and contemplation regress arguments are 
unsound. In this section I will show how similar problems arise for the regress 
arguments presented by Hetherington (2006) (whose argument is closely related 
to the employment regress argument) and Noë (2005).  
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Hetherington’s regress argument 
Hetherington presents his regress argument against the intellectualist view of 
knowledge-how as a reductio of the following claim he calls simply R: 
R For any action F, and for some content Φ describing a sufficient criterion of how to 
do F: If (when doing F) one knows how to F; then (1) one already has knowledge that 
Φ(F), which (2) one knows how to, and one does, apply so as to do F (Hetherington 
2006: 73). 
Now, Hetherington’s talk here of ‘a content Φ describing a sufficient criterion of 
how to do F’ is somewhat opaque, but I take it that his idea is that Φ is a 
proposition concerning something like a way to F. If we leave the quantifiers in 
Hetherington’s original statement of R implicit, his regress argument then is 
meant to be a reductio of the following claim: 
(R) If (when doing F) one knows how to F, then one already has 
knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to F), which 
one knows how to, and one does, apply so as to do F.  
An infinite regress can be generated from R like so. Suppose Ari Fs and he knows 
how to F. From R three things follow: Ari knows that p1 (for some proposition p1 
concerning a way to F); he applies his knowledge that p1; and he knows how to 
apply his knowledge that p1. But applying his knowledge that p1 is something that 
Ari does, and it is something that Ari knows how to do, in which case we can 
reapply R to conclude that: Ari knows that p2 (for some proposition p2 concerning 
a way to apply one’s knowledge that p1); he applies his knowledge that p2; and he 
knows how to apply his knowledge that p2. But, again, applying his knowledge 
that p2 is something that Ari does, and it is something that he knows how to do, 
so we can reapply R, and so on ad infinitum. 
Hetherington (2006: 73–4) clearly thinks that the infinite regress that follows from 
R is vicious, and that therefore we must reject R. This is clear in his own 
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description of how his “Rylean anti-intellectualist argument” against R is meant to 
proceed:  
If one knows how to F, then one does F only if (for some content Φ describing a 
sufficient criterion of how to do F): one already has knowledge that Φ(F), which one 
knows how to, and one does, apply so as to do F. But if one already knows how to—
and one does—apply one’s knowledge that Φ(F) so as to do F, then this is a fresh 
instance of both performing and knowing how to perform a specific action. At which 
point, R is again applicable; and so the foregoing form of reasoning recurs. We thereby 
begin a regress (an infinite vicious one) of more and more instances of increasingly 
complex regulative knowledge-that being needed and applications of them being 
performed—all of this, before one can perform even one action which manifests 
knowledge-how. Given R, therefore, we are unable to perform even one such action in 
the first place. Yet we can do so. Hence, R is false (ibid. 73–4). 
Evidently Hetherington thinks that the regress that follows from R will be vicious 
because he assumes that each new action of applying knowledge-that in this 
infinite regress must be distinct from its predecessor in the series, and that each 
new state of knowledge-that must be more complex than, and distinct from, its 
predecessor. I think that as R is formulated, it is not obvious that these 
assumptions about the regress that follows from it are correct. But, for the sake of 
argument, let us grant that the regress generated by R is vicious, and that 
therefore we must reject it.  
What is the import of this conclusion? Hetherington (ibid. 74) claims that in 
establishing that R is false his argument establishes that ‘intellectualism’ is false on 
the grounds that “R is intellectualism-as-applied-to-our-intelligently-performed-
actions, which is to say that it is intellectualism.” Now, Hetherington’s talk of 
‘intellectualism-as-applied-to-our-intelligently-performed-actions’ is difficult to 
interpret. But the important point is that Hetherington (ibid. 74) clearly holds that 
his regress argument establishes that the intellectualist view of knowledge-how is 
false, or as he says, that: “Knowledge how is not simply, or even complicatedly, 
knowledge-that.” And Hetherington (ibid. 74) thinks that it is a virtue of his 
regress argument that, unlike the contemplation regress, the reasons Stanley and 
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Williamson offer for rejecting the action premise and the contemplation premise 
do not apply to R. For digestion is not the kind of thing that one knows how to 
do, and so one never digests one’s food whilst knowing how to digest one’s food. 
And R does not include the dubious claim that if one employs or applies one’s 
knowledge that p, then one contemplates the proposition that p.  
To properly assess what Hetherington’s argument establishes it will help to note 
that the claim made by R is of the form: if p then q, r and s. In which case, there 
are actually three conditional claims expressed by R of the form: if p then q; if p 
then q and r; and if p then q, r and s. To see more clearly what follows if R is 
false, let us separate out these three claims expressed by R as R.1, R.2 and R.3: 
(R.1) If (when doing F) one knows how to F, then one already has 
knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to F). 
(R.2) If (when doing F) one knows how to F, then one already has 
knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to F) which 
one knows how to apply so as to do F. 
(R.3) If (when doing F) one knows how to F, then one already has 
knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to F) which 
one knows how to, and one does, apply so as to do F.  
Now that we have distinguished these three claims we can see that an 
intellectualist can happily grant Hetherington’s claim that his argument shows us 
that R is false. Any intellectualist must endorse R.1, for if any form of 
intellectualism is true it follows that if one knows how to F then there is some 
proposition p concerning a way to F such that one knows that p. But while an 
intellectualist must endorse R.1, they can still consistently deny R.2 and/or R.3, 
for neither of these claims in entailed by intellectualism. Hence, Hetherington’s 
claim that R “is intellectualism” is simply false if ‘intellectualism’ is used to refer to 
the view of knowledge-how called ‘intellectualism’. And in response to 
Hetherington’s regress argument, an intellectualist can accommodate the 
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conclusion that R is false by denying R.2 and/or R.3, as to do so would be 
consistent with their commitment to R.1. So, if Hetherington’s regress argument 
against intellectualism is to succeed it must be that R.2 and R.3 are independently 
plausible, and not that they are entailed by the intellectualist view of knowledge-
how, as Hetherington himself appears to suggest.  
An intellectualist faced with Hetherington’s argument can easily justify rejecting 
R.3. To see why, consider an intellectualist who accepts the simple identity thesis, 
that is, an intellectualist who thinks that to know how to F is to know that p (for 
some proposition p concerning a way to F). According to such an intellectualist, 
R.3 is equivalent to the following claim: 
If (when doing F) one knows how to F then one already knows how to F, 
one knows how to apply one’s knowledge how to F, and one does apply 
one’s knowledge how to F so as to do F.  
To reuse an earlier example, I can know how to knock the vase off the 
mantelpiece but, when I do so accidentally, I do not apply this knowledge-how. 
What this shows us is that it is a simple task to describe cases where someone Fs 
and knows how to F, but does not apply their knowledge how to F when they F. 
In which case, an intellectualist faced with Hetherington’s regress argument can 
easily justify rejecting R.3 whilst still endorsing R.1.  
Rather than the idea that one merely Fs and one also knows how to F, I think 
what this problem reveals is that when Hetherington talks of ‘(when doing F) one 
knows how to F’ the real idea he is aiming at is something like the idea that one 
Fs and in so doing one applies one’s knowledge how to F. To focus on the deeper issues 
facing Hetherington’s argument then, I suggest that we replace his R with 
something like R*: 
(R*) If one Fs and in so doing one applies knowledge how to F, then one 
already has knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to 
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F), one applies one’s knowledge that p and in so doing one applies 
knowledge how to apply one’s knowledge that p.  
R tells us that if one Fs and one knows how to F then: one knows that p (for 
some proposition p); one knows how to apply one’s knowledge that p; and one 
does apply one’s knowledge that p so as to F. The intellectualist can obviously 
reject this claim because one can clearly know how to perform some action and 
yet not apply that knowledge-how when one performs that action, as the vase 
example demonstrates. What R* tells us, on the other hand, is that if one Fs and 
in so doing one applies one’s knowledge how to F then: one knows that p (for some 
proposition p); one applies one’s knowledge that p; and in so doing one applies 
knowledge how to apply one’s knowledge that p. The vase example is not a 
problem for this claim because one does not apply one’s knowledge how to 
knock the vase off the mantelpiece when one accidentally knocks it off the 
mantelpiece. 
To see how we can generate an infinite regress from R* suppose that Ari Fs and 
in so doing he applies his knowledge how to F. From R* it follows that: Ari 
knows that p1 (for some proposition p1 concerning a way to F); he applies his 
knowledge that p1; and in so doing he applies knowledge how to apply his 
knowledge that p1. But then we can reapply R* to conclude that: Ari knows that 
p2 (for some proposition p2 concerning a way to apply one’s knowledge that 
knowledge that p1); he applies his knowledge that p2; and in so doing he applies 
his knowledge how to apply his knowledge that p2; and so on ad infinitum. And, as 
with R, let us grant for the sake of argument that the infinite regress that follows 
from R* is vicious, and therefore we must reject R*.  
I think this regress argument against R* is essentially the one Hetherington has in 
mind when he presents his own regress argument against R, so from now on I 
will simply refer to it as Hetherington’s argument. But again, as with R, to 
properly assess the import of this argument we need to distinguish the three 
conditionals expressed by R*: 
142 
(R.1*) If one Fs and in so doing one applies knowledge how to F, then one 
already has knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to 
F). 
(R.2*) If one Fs and in so doing one applies knowledge how to F, then one 
already has knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to 
F), and one applies one’s knowledge that p. 
(R.3*) If one Fs and in so doing one applies knowledge how to F, then one 
already has knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to 
F), one applies one’s knowledge that p, and in so doing one applies 
knowledge how to apply one’s knowledge that p.  
Now, as with R.1, any intellectualist must accept R.1*, for if any form of 
intellectualism is true it follows that if one Fs, and in so doing one applies 
knowledge how to F, then one already has knowledge that p (for some 
proposition concerning a way to F).  
What about R.2*? An intellectualist committed to some instance of the simple 
identity thesis must accept R.2*. For if to know how to F is to know that p (for 
some proposition p concerning a way to F) then it follows that if one applies 
one’s knowledge how to F then one applies one’s knowledge that p (for some 
proposition p concerning a way to F). But not all intellectualists need accept the 
simple identity thesis, so it is not clear that any intellectualist need accept R.2*. 
This is a serious concern with this argument, but similar concerns arise for the 
contemplation and employment regress arguments, so I will discuss this general 
issue separately in §4.6. For now, let us simply consider whether Hetherington’s 
argument can, at the very least, show us that the simple identity thesis is false. 
Given that an intellectualist who endorses the simple identity thesis must accept 
both R.1* and R.2*, the issue is whether such an intellectualist can deny R.3* 
whilst still maintaining that R.1* and R.2* are true.  
143 
The first thing to note is that any intellectualist can consistently deny R.3* whilst 
maintaining that R.1* and R.2* are true, for no form of intellectualism entails the 
conditional stated by R.3*. Furthermore, note that an intellectualist who is 
committed to the simple identity thesis will regard R.3* as being equivalent to the 
following claim: 
If one Fs and in so doing one applies knowledge how to F, then one 
already has knowledge how to F, one applies one’s knowledge how to F, 
and in so doing one applies knowledge how to apply one’s knowledge how 
to F.  
This claim is obviously false, for it tells us that applications of knowledge-how 
can never be direct; that is, that one can never apply one’s knowledge how to F 
without also applying some distinct state of knowing how to apply one’s 
knowledge how to F. And, as we saw in §4.3, the assumption that applications or 
employments of knowledge-how cannot be direct leads to an infinite and vicious 
regress.  
I take it that the implicit reason that Hetherington thinks that an intellectualist could 
not justifiably reject R.3* is that he assumes that something like the employment 
premise is correct. In particular, I think that it is clear that in giving his regress 
argument Hetherington is implicitly appealing to something like the following 
claim: 
The Application Premise       
 If one applies one’s knowledge that p (for some proposition p concerning 
a way to F) then one applies knowledge how to apply one’s knowledge that 
p so as to F  
The basic idea behind Hetherington’s argument appears to be that if we assume 
that to know how to F is to know that p (for some proposition p concerning a 
way to F) and that the application premise is correct, then it follows that: if one 
Fs, and in so doing one applies one’s knowledge how to F, then one knows that p 
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(for some proposition p concerning a way to F); one applies one’s knowledge that 
p; and in so doing one also applies knowledge how to apply one’s knowledge that 
p. But together these two assumptions generate an infinite and vicious regress, 
and therefore one of them must be false. Because Hetherington holds that the 
application premise is true, he thereby concludes that the assumption that to 
know how to F is to know that p (for some proposition p concerning a way to F) 
is false. Hetherington appears to assume that in establishing this conclusion he 
thereby establishes that intellectualism is false, but as mentioned above, this 
conclusion would only clearly establish that the simple identity thesis is false.  
This is, I think, is the best interpretation of how Hetherington’s regress argument 
is meant to work. But, as we have seen, intellectualists can offer good reasons for 
rejecting the employment premise, and these same reasons could obviously be 
redeployed against the application premise. As with the employment regress 
argument then, I think we must conclude that Hetherington’s argument, at best, 
only presents an inconclusive case against the simple identity thesis. 
Noë’s possession regress argument 
All of the regress arguments against intellectualism that I have considered so far 
have been arguments that claim that if intellectualism is true then an infinite and 
vicious regress ensues whenever we employ or apply our knowledge-how. Noë 
(2005), however, has sketched a different kind of regress argument against 
intellectualism. Roughly, Noë claims that if intellectualism is true then an infinite 
and vicious regress ensues whenever we possess knowledge-how. He states his 
regress argument like so: 
[g]rasping propositions itself depends on know-how; but if know-how consists in the 
grasp of further propositions, then one might wonder whether one could ever grasp a 
proposition. One way this argument might be fleshed out is in terms of concepts: to 
grasp a proposition, you need to understand the concepts deployed in it; to understand 
some concepts may be to grasp propositions; but this can’t be true for all concepts, on 
pain of infinite regress. At some point, therefore, it must be possible to give possession-
conditions for concepts in non-conceptual, and so non-propositional terms. For 
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example, my grasp on the concept red probably does not consist in my knowledge of 
propositions about redness. Indeed, one can reasonably wonder whether there could be 
such propositions. My grasp of red consists, it is more likely, in my disposition to apply 
red to an object when it exhibits a certain quality (Peacocke 1992). This regress argument 
remains unanswered. (Noë: 285–286) 
I think the simplest way of representing the regress argument that Noë has in 
mind is that it is one in which an infinite regress is generated from the following 
three premises:  
(N.1) If one knows that p then one possesses the ability to F (for some 
action F).  
(N.2) To possess the ability to F is to know how to F. 
(N.3) To know how to F is to know that p (for some proposition p 
concerning a way to F). 
To see how these premises generate a regress, suppose that Hannah knows that 
p1, for some proposition p1. By N.1 it follows that Hannah possesses the ability to 
F1, for some action F1. By N.2 it follows that Hannah’s ability to F1 consists in 
her knowing how to F1. By N.3 it follows that Hannah’s knowing how to F1 
consists in her knowing that p2, for some proposition p2. But then we can reapply 
N.1 to conclude that Hannah possesses the ability to F2, for some action F2. By 
N.2 it follows that Hannah’s ability to F2 consists in her knowing how to F2. By 
N.3 Hannah’s knowing how to F2 consists in her knowing that p3, for some 
proposition p3. But then we can reapply N.1 to conclude that Hannah possesses 
the ability to F3, for some action F3, and so on ad infinitum.  
Together, N.1, N.2 and N.3 generate an infinite regress of states of knowledge-
that. It is not clear that this regress must be a vicious, but let us grant for the sake 
of argument that it is. What is the import of this conclusion? Noë holds that the 
right response to this regress is to reject N.3, which is just the simple identity 
thesis. How might an intellectualist who is committed to the simple identity thesis 
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respond to this argument? Presumably, they would not deny N.1, as Noë is 
presumably correct in thinking that it is a precondition of knowing that p (for any 
proposition p), that one possesses certain abilities or dispositions. But, of course, 
an intellectualist will deny N.2, as N.2 is just a statement of the neo-Rylean idea 
that to possess the ability to F is to know how to F. And, as we have seen, 
intellectualists argue that neo-Ryleanism is false on the grounds that possessing 
the ability to F is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowing how 
to F. 
Now, Noë does acknowledge that intellectualists like Stanley and Williamson will 
reject N.2 but he does not believe that they would be justified in doing so: 
Stanley and Williamson can perhaps evade these difficulties if they can show that having 
the ability to do something does not consist in knowing how to do it (for then they 
could admit that grasping propositions depends on basic practical abilities without 
admitting that it thereby depends on knowledge-that). As we have seen, they do not give us 
reason to follow them in making this separation. If, as I remain convinced, the 
possession of abilities is a matter of knowledge-how, then we are led to consider the 
possibility that the truth is exactly the opposite of what Stanley and Williamson 
maintain: All knowledge-that depends on and must be analysed in terms of a more basic 
knowledge-how. Intellectualism over-intellectualizes the mind (ibid. 286). 
I do not wish to examine Noë’s criticisms of the reasons Stanley and Williamson 
give for rejecting neo-Ryleanism. For one thing, I do not think they are very 
convincing. But, more importantly, the fact that Noë’s regress argument relies 
upon the truth of neo-Ryleanism reveals that his regress argument against 
intellectualism is, in a sense, redundant. For it is not merely the case that, as a 
matter of fact, most proponents of intellectualism reject neo-Ryleanism. Rather, 
intellectualists must reject neo-Ryleanism, for these two views of knowledge-how 
are plausibly contraries, as I noted in Chapter 1. An easy way of illustrating that 
these views are contraries is to note that it is surely possible that one possess the 
ability to F even though there is no way w such that one knows that w is a way to 
F, or that w is a way for oneself to F, etc (at the very least, this is surely true in 
cases where this ability is not an ability to F intentionally). But then the truth of neo-
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Ryleanism entails that any form of either simple or sophisticated intellectualism 
must be false. In which case, the key premise that Noë’s regress argument relies 
upon is a premise the truth of which entails that intellectualism is false. The real 
issue raised here then is whether or not neo-Ryleanism is true, and as we saw in 
Chapter 1, intellectualists have offered examples that strongly suggest that 
possessing the ability to F is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing how to 
F. In which case, neo-Ryleanism is false and Noë’s argument is unsound. 
4.6 Assessing the Regress Objection 
I have now examined four regress arguments against intellectualism, all of which 
can be seen as drawing inspiration from Ryle’s critique of the intellectualist 
legend, to varying degrees. My examination of these arguments suggests that none 
of them is sound. But even if they are sound, there is another kind of problem 
with them, which I have alluded to but not as yet examined. Namely, the problem 
that even if these arguments are sound it is not clear that they could establish the 
conclusion that all forms of intellectualism are false. To introduce this problem, 
note that the contemplation regress, the employment regress, and Noë’s regress 
argument are all arguments against some version of the simple identity thesis: 
The Simple Identity Thesis        
 To know how to F is to know that p (for some relevant proposition p 
concerning a way to F). 
All three arguments assume that the simple identity thesis is true and then attempt 
to show that this assumption leads to an infinite and vicious regress. But, as 
mentioned in passing in Chapter 1, it is actually not clear that even a simple 
intellectualist need accept the simple identity thesis. Recall that, as defined in 
Chapter 1, a simple intellectualist is someone who is committed to the truth of 
some instance of the simple equivalence thesis: 
148 
The Simple Equivalence Thesis       
 Necessarily, S knows how to F if and only if there is some relevant 
proposition p concerning a way to F such that S stands in the knowledge-
that relation to p. 
To see why someone committed to the truth of some instance of this equivalence 
thesis might still reject the corresponding version of the simple identity thesis 
consider the following version of the simple equivalence thesis: 
Necessarily, S knows how to F if and only if there is some way to F w such 
that S knows that w is a way to F. 
In endorsing this view of knowledge-how, is one thereby committed to the claim 
that to know how to F is to know that p, for some proposition p of the form ‘w is 
a way to F’? One reason to think not, is that there is a multiple realizability issue 
lurking here, because for most (if not all) actions there will be as many ways to 
perform that action as there are ways to skin the proverbial cat. And simple 
intellectualism tells us that there will be as many different states of knowledge-
that that one could be in when one knows how to F as there are ways to F. 
Suppose, for example, that there is some way to swim w1 such that Ari knows that 
w1 is a way to swim. A proponent of the equivalence thesis stated above will claim 
that it follows that Ari knows how to swim. But they might reasonably deny that 
it follows that Ari’s state of knowing that w1 is a way to swim is identical to his state 
of knowing how to swim. For Ari could have failed to possess this knowledge-
that and still known how to swim, because even if Ari does not know that w1 is a 
way to swim he can still know how to swim if there is some other way to swim w2 
such that Ari knows that w2 is a way to swim.  
Even if the regress arguments we have considered are sound, it does not 
obviously follow that simple intellectualism is false, because it is not obvious that 
a simple intellectualist must endorse the simple identity thesis. Now, this issue is 
not a serious problem for Noë’s regress argument, as one could restate his 
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argument using an equivalence claim of the form ‘S has the ability to F if and only 
if S knows how to F’ instead of the identity claim that to possess the ability to F is 
to know how to F.  
This issue does look to be a serious problem for the contemplation regress, the 
employment regress, and Hetherington’s regress argument. For, as we have seen, 
all of these arguments rely on the idea that when one employs (or applies) one’s 
knowledge how to F one thereby employs (or applies) one’s knowledge that p, for 
some proposition p. But if the relationship between Ari’s state of knowing how to 
swim and Ari’s state of knowing that w1 is a way to swim is not the identity 
relationship, then it does not obviously follow that if Ari employs his knowledge 
how to swim that he thereby employs his knowledge that w1 is a way to swim.  
It appears then that even if they are sound the contemplation, employment and 
Hetherington’s regress arguments only clearly undermine the simple identity 
thesis, and not the simple equivalence thesis. In which case, it is not clear that 
these arguments could even undermine simple intellectualism if they are sound. 
What about sophisticated intellectualism? Recall that a sophisticated intellectualist 
is someone who is committed to the truth of some instance of the following 
claim:  
The Sophisticated Equivalence Thesis     
 S knows how to F if and only if, for some relevant proposition p 
concerning a way to F:        
 (i) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to p, and   
 (ii) S satisfies X (for some further condition X). 
As with the simple equivalence thesis, it is not at all clear that someone 
committed to some instance of the sophisticated equivalence thesis is thereby also 
committed to the corresponding version of the sophisticated identity thesis; that 
is, the claim that to know how to F is to know that p and to satisfy X (for some 
proposition p, and some condition X). The same kind of issues concerning 
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multiple realizability will obviously apply here as well. In which case, the 
contemplation, employment and Hetherington’s regress arguments, at best, would 
only clearly establish that the sophisticated identity thesis is false and not that the 
sophisticated equivalence thesis is false. 
But there is also a further reason to think that these arguments cannot establish 
that sophisticated intellectualism is false. For suppose that the truth of the 
sophisticated equivalence thesis did entail the truth of the corresponding identity 
claim that to know how to F is to know that p and to satisfy X (for some 
proposition p, and some condition X). Does it follow that if one employs (or 
applies) one’s knowledge how to F one employs (or applies) one’s knowledge that 
p, for some proposition p? I think not, for suppose one endorsed the following 
version of the sophisticated identity thesis: 
The Proxy Identity Thesis       
 To know how to F is to:       
 (i) Stand in the knowledge-that relation to p (for some relevant proposition 
p concerning a way to F), and      
 (ii) To possess the ability to F. 
Now imagine that Ari Fs, and in doing so he employs or applies his knowledge 
how to F. From the proxy identity thesis it follows that there is some proposition 
p such that Ari knows that p, but does it follow that Ari thereby employs or applies 
his knowledge that p? The answer is clearly no; the proxy identity thesis does not 
identify knowing how to F with knowing that p. Rather, the proxy identity thesis 
identifies knowing how to F with knowing that p and possessing the ability to F. 
In which case, all that clearly follows from the proxy identity thesis and the fact 
that Ari employed his knowledge how to F, is that either Ari employed his 
knowledge that p or he employed his ability to F.  
There are good reasons then to think that even if they were sound the 
contemplation, employment and Hetherington’s regress arguments could not 
establish that intellectualism in general is false. The same concerns do not apply 
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to Noë’s regress argument, but we have seen that Noë’s argument crucially relies 
on the assumption that neo-Ryleanism is true, which is a view of knowledge-how 
that any intellectualist must reject. And intellectualists have presented numerous 
cases that indicate that neo-Ryleanism is false. In which case, Noë’s argument is 
unsound. 
Furthermore, our discussion has shown that there are good reasons to think that 
the contemplation, employment and Hetherington’s regress arguments are also 
unsound. The contemplation regress argument relies on the implausible claim that 
if one employs one’s knowledge that p then one contemplates the proposition 
that p. The employment premise relies on the employment premise, and while 
this premise is perhaps slightly more plausible than the contemplation premise, an 
intellectualist can still offer strong considerations in favour of rejecting the idea 
that whenever we employ our knowledge that p we also employ a distinct state of 
knowledge how to employ our knowledge that p. And the same kind of 
considerations can be offered for rejecting the application premise that 
Hetherington’s regress argument implicitly relies on. 
Ryle’s idea that there is a successful regress argument against intellectualism is the 
most famous objection to the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. However, in 
this chapter I have shown that it is an unconvincing objection. There are good 
reasons to conclude that all of the regress arguments I have considered are 
unsound. And even if the contemplation, employment and Hetherington’s regress 
arguments were sound, they would not establish that all forms of intellectualism 
are false.  
In conclusion, it could be that there is still some successful regress argument 
against intellectualism out there waiting for us to find it. However, on the basis of 
the discussion in this chapter, it is safe to say that the kinds of regress arguments 
that are currently offered against intellectualism give us no reason to be confident 
that such an argument exists. And, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, the 
insufficiency objection fails to establish that sophisticated intellectualism is false. 
In which case, the two most prominent objections to intellectualism both fail to 
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undermine the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. To find a successful 
argument against all forms of intellectualism I submit we must turn to the new 
arguments I presented in Chapter 3 for the conclusion that knowledge-that is not 
necessary for knowledge-how. 
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